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ABSTRACT 
Normative modernist accounts of the construction of scientific medical 
knowledge, beliefs and practices disavow the part played by social variables 
in the constitution of medicine as a discipline. Although social factors are 
recognised as an integral part of the policy and research agenda of 
biomedicine, beliefs about scientific medical know ledge hold that when 
medical research (and its subsequent application) is carried out in a rigorous 
manner it will remain free from the impact of extraneous social influences. 
Despite critiques within history, philosophy and sociology, this modernist 
approach to scientific know ledge continues to underpin medical research 
and policy practices. This thesis explores the continuing commitment to the 
notion of 'truth' within medicine. An explanation of how accounts of the 
history of particular beliefs and technologies are made durable and how they 
function helps explain the persistence of this commitment to scientific 
realism in medicine. Contemporary biomedical histories of 'evidence-based 
practice' are analysed through two case studies, each of which centres on 
entities generally considered to be 'real': breast cancer and prostate cancer. 
Because randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are understood to be the 'gold 
standard' in the production of scientific medical knowledge, the case studies 
focus on RCTs: involving first, the use of tamoxifen in the prevention of 
breast cancer and second, hormonal discourses in the conceptualisation and 
treatment of prostate cancer. A major focus of the thesis is a sociological 
account of how RCTs' operate in relation to the traditional scientific method 
story, and how this ideal connects with practice as described within medical 
literature. The tensions and contradictions between the belief systems and 
rhetoric which surround clinical trials, and the ways in which they are 
practised, open fertile disjunctions from which to tease out questions about 
RCTs epistemological and political foundations. The case studies are 
developed by analysing published medical and sociological commentaries 
and policy documents. 
A belief in a stable, fixed, and ultimately 'knowable' biology is necessary to 
sustain a commitment to RCTs as they seek to map and codify a 
universalisable body. RCTs construct female and male bodies in different 
ways and to different political ends. The socially unstable nature of the body 
is explored through a blending of poststructural and postmodern critiques of 
the body with the emergence of discourses and practices relating to sex 
hormones. 
Finally, the thesis deals with how ideas about the sex/gender distinction are 
represented both ideologically and practically within medicine. Research on 
prostate cancer is contrasted with the breast cancer case study to illustrate 
some of the differences and inconsistencies in the way medicine treats and 
conceptualises women and men. These inconsistencies emphasise the need 
for a continued feminist analysis of the impact of sexual politics on the 
provision of services to both women and men in order to develop strategies 
for positive intervention in the research and policy arenas. 
Overall the thesis develops an account of the complex ways in which social 
values are woven through the intellectual and material practices of medicine. 
Tracing how seemingly distinct areas within medicine are linked through 
beliefs and practices about scientific, biological, and sexual know ledge 
provides strategies for influencing the perceived truth and stability of these 
constructs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Framing the science of medicine and a 
sociology of medical knowledge 
1 
This is a study of the legitimation of knowledge claims within medicine and the 
consequences of that legitimation for the way medicine impacts on society. The 
pages that follow tell a story about science as it operates in late twentieth century 
medicine and about the authority of the randomised controlled clinical trial (RCT) 
as the exemplar of scientific medical practice. I explore the relation between 
science and beliefs about the human body, and how understandings of human 
bodies affect sexual and social equity. My argument is that there are webs of 
beliefs, practices, and material phenomena that shape our experience of the world, 
and it is only through the interaction of these forces that we are able to know the 
world or to speculate about its nature. Beginning with an analysis of RCTs, I 
develop an account of the way these webs construct know ledge of biology and 
experiences of the lived body. 
This first chapter identifies the historical and theoretical starting points that frame 
the terms of my inquiry. My sociological training inclines me to give primacy to 
human accounts of the world. Humans exist within a physical world that both 
constrains and enables their actions, but the point at which the materiality of the 
world ends and sociality begins is impossible to ascertain. My work is less 
concerned with ontological and epistemological questions about the boundary 
between natural and social objects and know ledge, than it is with the socio-
political construction of a division between the two and the implications this has 
for the expression and maintenance of any such boundary. In order to develop a 
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through.going account of the practice of RCTs I have drawn on literature from 
feminist critiques of science, the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and 
literature on the making of the body. This chapter is made up of four sections, 
beginning with an account of 'commonsense' beliefs about science and medicine. 
These beliefs are significant because they feed into accounts of the sexed body as 
biologically fixed and historically inflexible and of science as a privileged means 
of interpreting this body. They articulate a position from which I want to 
distinguish myself. The remaining three sections discuss the contributions SSK, 
feminist critiques of science and post-structuralist accounts of the body have to 
offer for a sociological critique of randomised controlled trials. 
The commonsense view of science and scientific experiment 
Of immediate importance for each of the theoretical perspectives I draw upon is 
the phenomenon of science. 'Science' is an exceptionally powerful force in modern 
society. Infinitely complex, 'science' is at once a metaphysics, an ideology, an 
organising principle and justification for numerous material social institutions, as 
well as a wide range of specific cultural practices. Science is revered as a special 
and reliable form of know ledge. Pinning down and defining the nature of the 
multiple enterprises that are 'science' has spawned commentaries as diverse as 
science itself. Within these commentaries one can identify a 'commonsense' or 
'received' view of science. This is the dominant ideological view, the story that 
science tells about itself, the public face of science, the description that most 
scientists, politicians and policy makers mobilise in their attempts to order society. 
According to this standard view, science is an intellectual and practical system for 
ascertaining reliable factual know ledge about a natural world. The task of science 
is to provide an accurate account of the objects, processes and relationships 
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occurnng 1n the natural world. When scientific know ledge is valid, it 
systematically reveals and describes the true character of this world (Mulkay, 
1979: 19-20). Traditional accounts of scientific knowledge rely heavily on the 
assun1ption that the world science seeks to describe is governed by universal and 
stable a priori physical laws. Science is the project which strives to give an 
account of these laws and the way they govern the material relationships which 
make up the world. These laws cannot be influenced by the preferences or desires 
of an observer but they can be brought to light by the methodologies of objective 
inquiry, the best representative of which is the scientific experiment (Kuhn, 
1970). Although the world is constantly in flux the basic universal regularities 
represent trans-historical, trans-geographical truths. 'Progress' in science (and 
scientific medicine) may result in a degree of instability in the expression of these 
natural laws as new problems disrupt existing theoretical assumptions however 
this is considered healthy as it indicates a movement towards a greater degree of 
accuracy in scientific representation of the world (Mulkay, 1979: 29). 
The universal laws governing the world can be uncovered by evidence generated 
through unbiased, detached observation which allows scientists to build a body of 
theoretical knowledge which explains the observations. To paraphrase Fleck, 
'factual' know ledge is supposed to be distinguishable from transient theories 
because it is definite, permanent, and independent of any subjective interpretation 
by scientists (Fleck, 1979: xxvii). The authority of scientific knowledge rests on 
the belief that science has evolved stringent criteria through which empirical 
know ledge claims and the accuracy of their representation of phenomena are 
tested. These criteria are embodied in the 'scientific method': a single and 
transferable set of practices which capture the directness of an encounter between 
an observer and nature, resulting in the elimination of potential bias on the part of 
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the investigator and the production of objective truths about the world. The 
standard commonsense view of scientific know ledge assumes that the rules of 
method govern scientific experiment in a straightforward way, resulting in a fairly 
predictable pattern in the growth of knowledge. The most widely known 
philosophical account justifying this view is Popper's notion of falsificationism 
(Popper, 1959; Popper, 1963). Merton's influential sociological account of the 
institutions of science also legitimates the trust placed in scientific know ledge as 
true knowledge (Merton, 1973). 
According to the story of scientific method, 'progess' within science occurs when 
some novel or unusual claim is identified within the scientific literature or through 
the workings of scientific practitioners. While trying to solve this puzzle, 
theoretical deductions are made which are tested against the existing corpus of 
' 
know ledge using observation and experiment. Although the story of scientific 
method recognises the necessity of adhering to discipline-specific beliefs and 
practices when actually 'doing science', at its core it holds that the value of the 
scientific method is self-evident and the rules for practising the scientific method 
can be followed by almost anyone. Consequently, it is supposed to be an 
egalitarian way of generating knowledge: 
[a] reliable observation is one which any individual with normal powers of 
perception might make. An acceptable law or theory is one which any 
individual with normal powers of reasoning might justify. Ideally, as it is 
generally perceived, the whole of science should rest upon such individual 
acts of perception and justification. And it should so rest because science is 
then based upon reason and experience alone ... " (Barnes, 1985: 80-81). 
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Science is an intellectual pursuit about which people can be 'enlightened', as the 
rules by which scientific method operate are straightforward, logical and rational: 
It is a form of knowledge which can be accepted by anyone in a society of 
equal individuals, out of deference to nothing more than his or her own 
powers of perception and inference (Barnes, 1985: 81). 
More than simply providing tools for generating knowledge, the scientific 
experiment provides an ideological model for society. In the open minded, 
disinterested individual, the impartial observation of the natural, carried out in 
accordance with universal standards of rational thought, will produce unbiased and 
accurate accounts about the world, and thus a reliable guide to its governance. 
One essential component of this scientistic model of society is the belief that the 
reliability of natural rules (observation statements and theoretical innovations) can 
be tested using practices prescribed by the rules of scientific method. In other 
words, should a researcher or research group produce findings which challenge 
communal expectations, then that result ought be repeatable by others. In practice 
the act of replicating an experiment is fraught with messy contingencies, but a 
commitment to the principle that experimental results can be replicated remains 
"the touchstone of common sense philosophy of science" (Collins, 1985: 18-19). 
However, while scientists will invoke replicability as a reason for accepting 
scientific change, they are rarely sufficiently motivated to implement this 
principle and replicate earlier work as no professional advantages arise from doing 
so, unless they are seeking to disrupt an accepted theory. Thus the axiom of 
replicability is more often a demarcation criterion (objective knowledge claims 
must in principle be susceptible to replication) rather than a matter of practice 
(Collins, 1985: chapters 1 and 2). 
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The ethos and ideology of sci~nce extend well beyond attempts to account for the 
physical world: they have become a central feature of our cultural fabric, and the 
depth of communal commitments to the scientific rationale indicates the extent to 
which they are now entrenched as an authoritative way of interpreting the world 
around us. Rhetoric about adherence to scientific method has become a powerful 
rationalisation for social decision making. The strength of this cultural 
commitment awards science, and thereby 'scientific medicine', special significance 
in determining the ontological status of phenomena. The subjects of science and 
scientific medicine are assumed to be pre-existing elements of the natural world. 
Modern western medicine justifies itself largely through its claims to a cognitive 
foundation within science (Bates & Lapsley, 1985:181). This cognitive foundation 
is made to work through the techniques of different types of clinical trials, of 
which the RCT is considered the most valuable because it produces the most 
scientifically rigorous outcomes (Richards, 1991: 2). The rise of biomedicine 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been accompanied by an 
increasing emphasis on the importance of scientific investigation as a means of
 
arriving at empirically substantiated, generalisable and transferable solutions to 
medical problems. Like science generally, the scientific component of medicine is 
supposed to eliminate any prejudice which may result from the interests of 
practitioners or patients involved with a medical experiment, and should prevent 
external economic or political factors impacting on the outcome of the experiment
 
(Nelkin, 1987: 283-84). As a discipline, medicine is practised by experts who, 
through their training in the methods of science, are able to remain en1otionally 
and morally detached while dealing with their patients. Objectivity in assessing 
contending medical claims and treating patients is seen as beneficial and necessary 
for ensuring that optimal results are achieved. 
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In popular accounts of scientific method, representations of actual scientific 
work 
are sanitised or escape mention entirely while philosophical questions, such a
s the 
logic of scientific justification or confirmation, become the focus of attention. 
Theoretical claims are abstracted from the context where they are produced, w
hich 
results in simple linear histories of 'ideas', and to a lesser extent 'practices', 
being 
put forward when accounting for the growth of science. Recognition o
f the 
everyday work of scientists is rarely included in such accounts, and when
 it is 
acknowledged it is usually for the purposes of establishing epistemic warra
nt of 
theoretical claims and is reduced to descriptions of data gathering 
and 
experimental hypothesis testing. But when undertaking scientific investigatio
n the 
problems surrounding experiment are not simply reducible to epistemologica
l and 
ontological questions about adherence to method. Instead, as the follo
wing 
discussions on the sociology of know ledge and feminist critiques of scienc
e and 
technology illustrate, scientific work involves the everyday practicalities w
hich 
make up the relationships, be they personal, institutional or technological, w
ithin 
which scientists live their lives. 
Tools from the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) 
In western intellectual traditions the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'b
elief 
usually holds that 'knowledge' is that which can rightfully be considered cre
dible 
and trustworthy whereas 'beliefs' belong to small groups or individuals and d
o not 
warrant acceptance in the wider society (Barnes, 1990: 60). Because the scientific 
method is seen as ensuring that what counts as scientific knowledge is determ
ined 
by nature, the sociology of science was traditionally relegated to explainin
g the 
persistence of false belief. The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), however, 
holds that the making of all know ledge, including science, is amenab
le to 
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sociological investigation. In other words, what comes to count as knowledge is a 
product of its social context. Despite the historical tendency to assume that 
scientific and technical know ledge could be exempt from sociological 
investigations of the kind applied to customary belief, researchers have been 
producing empirical case-studies since the mid 1960s which demonstrate that 
there are no a priori epistemological grounds for excluding science from a 
sociology of knowledge. The epistemological privilege once awarded to science 
obstructed the development of sociological critique, but over the last three decades 
the limitations imposed by the old epistemology have weakened and sociologists 
have extended and modified the work of philosophers and historians so as to 
produce a robust sociology of scientific knowledge (Mulkay, 1979:2). 
Techniques for 'doing' sociology of scientific knowledge are varied. One possible 
approach articulated by David Bloor is the 'strong program'. Bloor argues that 
sociological analysis of science should develop a causal explanation for the beliefs 
and actions of scientists which exhibits the following characteristics; it should be 
impartial with regard to the perceived 'tn1th' or 'falsity' of the knowledge in 
question; it should develop a symmetrical analysis inasmuch as the same 
explanatory criteria should be used to explain both true and false know ledge; and 
it should reflexively apply its analysis to its own methods (Bloor, 1976: chapter 
1). When sociologists ask the question 'What is a scientific experiment?' their 
answers will involve examining historical and social issues concerning the 
systems within and through which experiments occur. The practicalities of how an 
experiment is performed, the means by which experiments can be said to produce 
matters of fact, the relationships between experimental facts and explanatory 
constructs, and the criteria and processes by which the success or failure of an 
experiment is determined are the subject matter for a sociology of experiment. The 
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answers which emerge from addressing these issues provide a perspective on why 
experiments are considered to be a privileged means of generating consensually 
agreed know ledge and the commitment to doing experiments as a means of 
arriving at scientific truth that is radically different from the perspective operating 
in traditional philosophical and historical accounts of science. According to 
Bloor's principle of symmetry, questions about experimentation can also provide 
insights into whether or not there are other possible means for constructing robust 
truths about the world. 
In Leviathan and the Air Pump Shapin and Schaff er develop historical answers to 
questions about the nature of scientific experiment (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). 
Approaching social analysis from the position of a cultural stranger allows one to 
query the self-evident methods which that culture employs. In the history of 
science, as in contemporary sociology and politics, the successes of the 
experimental programs are commonly treated as their own explanation. That they 
stand as the pinnacle of the legitimation of everyday cultural practices is not seen 
as problematic (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985: 5-6). 
Sociology of experiment, including Shapin and Schaffer's treatment of Boyle's 
experimental method, stresses the significance of convention, practical agreement, 
and of the manual labour of science as productive forces. Such qualities are not 
usually recognised as significant in the generation of experimental knowledge. By 
taking this approach Shapin and Schaffer transform the characteristics generally 
awarded to scientific knowledge, features such as 'truth', 'adequacy' and 
'objectivity', into categories of inquiry (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985: 13-14). In my 
work I follow their lead by looking at claims about scientific method as part of the 
activity of clinical practice. For example, how are experiments carried out in 
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clinical medicine? How do experimental findings become constituted as facts? 
What kinds of criteria are used for judging the success or failure of an experiment 
and how do they vary across specialities and across time? How, and to what 
extent, are clinical experiments actually replicated, and what enables replication to 
take place? Are there hierarchies of medical experiments and know ledges and, if 
so, on what grounds are these hierarchies constructed? 
'Scientific experiment' is a principle around which practioners can consolidate 
patterns of activity in the everyday practical 'doing' of science and thereby 
naturalise specific forms of social organisation and specific interactions within the 
scientific community. For SSK, disputes over scientific method are disputes over 
different models of action and different practices for organising scientific workers 
to achieve practical outcomes. Consequently, solving the problems of knowledge 
becomes a matter of solving the problems of social order, and different practical 
solutions to the problems of social order involve distinct solutions to the problems 
of knowledge (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985: 15). 
Feminism, Science and Technology 
Explicitly feminist critiques of science, technology and medicine have their 
historical origins in second wave feminism and the increased interest this brought 
to investigating women's position within society (Wajcman, 1991). Women's 
experiences at the hands of patriarchal medical professionals, as those at the 
receiving end of medical know ledge and technologies within clinical practice, 
provided the catalyst for the initial feminist critiques of medical science. Once 
feminist attention was directed toward the concerns women raised, the difficulty 
of reconciling the rhetoric of science with women's lived experiences became 
apparent. Women's exclusion from and marginalisation within science and 
11 
medicine highlighted the structural obstacles women faced in gaining access to 
professional employment. This posed substantive problems for the social 
neutrality these professions claimed for themselves (Ehrenreich & English, 1976; 
Fee, 1986; Rose, 1983). Feminist scholars drew out evidence of women's limited 
access to scientific jobs and of the relegation of women to low status positions 
within the profession. The startling inequities which were revealed became levers 
for policy reform and provided a focus for further research on gender within the 
professions. Although this work took place in an intellectual and political climate 
where the supposed impartiality and disinterestedness of science was coming 
under increasing scrutiny (for example through the work of the radical science 
movement) mainstream social sciences did not question the relationship between 
gender and science (Wajcman, 1991). Since the first feminist engagement with 
science, technology and medicine, scholarship has evolved and fractured and there 
are now a diverse range of sometimes contradictory approaches available for 
feminist researchers. Finding a trait which unifies these approaches can be 
difficult, but perhaps the single most consolidating feature of feminist engagement 
with science and technology is a recognition of the partial perspectives offered by 
mainstream science and an acknowledgment that this detrimentally affects the 
quality of women's lives. 
One useful approach to understanding feminist critiques of science, technology 
and medicine is that developed by Sandra Harding in The Science Question in 
Feminism (Harding, 1986). Harding develops a schema identifying 'feminist 
empiricism' and 'standpoint feminism' against which she contrasts moves towards 
a postmodern and social constructivist feminism. Although published nearly 
fifteen years ago Hardings' commentary continues to provide a useful way of 
ordering the diversity of feminist critiques. The analysis which focuses primarily 
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on the gendered barriers to women's equal participation and the reclaiming of their 
histories within the professions contributes to the project of 'feminist empiricism' 
(Harding, 1986). Works such as Margaret Rossiters' Women Scientists in America 
(Rossiter, 1982) (which focuses on women's struggles to enter the sciences) 
describe the gender biases within the sciences as resulting from social factors 
which are not related to the methodological norms of scientific inquiry. According 
to feminist empiricism, liberatory social movements, such as feminism, may 
unsettle social order and thereby remove the old veils which obscure clear 
knowledge and observation. Feminist engagement with science produces the 
opportunity for broadening the perspective of science as the increased numbers of 
women scientists are more likely than their male colleagues to notice science's 
andocentric bias (Harding, 1986: 25). 
Harding identifies the way feminist criticisms of science shifted from asking the 
· 'woman question in science' to asking the more radical 'science question 1n
 
feminism'. Instead of focusing solely on investigating the marginalisation of 
women within the sciences and seeking to find ways that woman can be more 
equitably treated within and by science (the primary focus of feminist 
empiricism), feminist scholarship turned its attention to ask whether or how a 
science which seems to be so patriarchal in its constitution and social applications 
could be used for emancipatory ends (Harding, 1986). Close attention was paid to 
the gendered methodologies and practices of science and their results for both 
knowledge production and social implementation of science (Keller, 1983). 
The response of feminist emp1nc1sm to the epistemological and structural 
gendered inequities of science appears to leave the methodological norms of 
science unchallenged. For those interested in doing or using science, this is an 
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appealing form of critique because it debates the meanings and products of 
science within terms that maintain a commitment to the standard view of science. 
Although feminist empiricism offers a subtle subversion of traditional empiricism 
by drawing attention to the identity of the scientific inquirer, it is a small shift 
away from the modernist project. It is, however, a useful shift and has provided 
ammunition for social movements that call for an increase in the objectivity of 
science by pointing out that the norms of science as they have been practised are 
often at odds with their philosophical reconstruction (Harding, 1986: 25). 
Highlighting the importance of the scientific inquirer, however, significantly 
subverts the modernist project by emphasising the partial perspective of a 
patriarchal science, and feminist insistence on the potential contributions women 
scientists can make implies there may be something unique about the standpoint 
of women as a category. 
Feminist standpoint theory was developed from the insights of Hegel, Marx and 
others, in an attempt to establish an explanation for the authority of feminism, to 
identify those for whom it speaks and to throw light on "the forces of oppression 
and exploitation it contests" (Hennessy, 1993: 67). A 'standpoint' is a social 
location which is created by, and in turn helps create, factors such as prevailing 
epistemologies, power structures and the distribution of resources. Attending to 
the complex ways these factors influence women's lives provides the basis for 
articulating a feminist reality; a reality that captures the activities, interests and 
values of women yet is self-consciously a product of historical and social 
conditions. In this way women's experience becomes an empirically grounded 
basis for feminist authority. Central to the engagement of standpoint feminists 
with science are attempts to reform knowledge and practice by challenging the 
andocentrism of current science and by developing scientific explanations which 
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improve the living conditions and social opportunities available to women. As 
with feminist empiricism, standpoint feminism has developed as a strategy for 
justifying scientific projects, and it maintains a commitment to the emancipatory 
possibilities of science (Harding, 1990: 83). 
The most commonly cited problem of standpoint feminism is the way it treats the 
experiences of women as empirically valid reference points across time and 
culture, thereby erasing much of the specificity which gives them meaning. As a 
critical theory, standpoint feminism has been charged with homogenising and 
universalising women's experiences as they are mediated by feminist interests to 
form a foundation of feminist knowledge. In particular, the analytic primacy 
awarded to gender in Anglo-American critical feminism inscribes female and 
feminist subjectivity within the framework of the racist imperialism and 
empiricism of traditional masculine European epistemology (Hennessy, 1993: 69, 
Haraway, 1988). 
In contrast to feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism, both of which are 
positioned within the modernist project ( despite providing fundamental challenges 
to it), feminist postmodernism and social constn1ctionism require a more radical 
questioning of the nature of science. By claiming that the very criteria which 
demarcate categories such as science, myth, fact or superstition, are internal to the 
intellectual conventions of modernism and cannot be justified unless those 
conventions are invoked, feminist postmodernism and social constructionism 
challenge the boundary between the natural and social order. Further, they hold 
that the development, deployment and extension of these criteria of demarcation 
into social life should be interpreted as indicating the growth of particular "regin1es 
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of power" (Nicholson, 1990: 4). The writings of Donna Haraway provide a case in 
point. 
Haraway's early work investigating the science of primatology supplies an 
impressive case study detailing the numerous actors and influences involved in the 
production of scientific narratives. Haraway demonstrates that these actors and 
influences extend well beyond those outlined in traditional accounts of the growth 
of scientific know ledge by tracing the effects of phenomenon as diverse as 
monopoly capitalism, fashions in taxidermy, the effects of colonialism and a 
specific fictional portrayal of a Pliocene woman (Haraway, 1989). In particular, 
she uses primatology to question the ordering of difference which constitutes the 
boundaries between the natural and social worlds. Science for Haraway is a 
process of storytelling with many 'tellers and hearers' whose presence may or may 
not be discernible, but whose various stories function to produce scientific reality 
(Haraway, 1989: 8). Constructed as the most 'human' of creatures within the 
animal world, 'primates' inhabit the boundary between nature and culture. The 
bodies of primates can be read as 'maps of power' which reveal the political, 
historical and cultural discourses through which primates' difference from human 
kind and other animals have been contested and ordered (Haraway, 1989: 10). 
Through the metaphor of the cyborg Haraway to reiterates her insistence on the 
social and cultural nature of the natural sciences (Haraway, 1991; Haraway 1997). 
She writes: 
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The cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a fusion of the organic and the 
technological forged in particular, historical, cultural practices. Cyborges are 
not about the Machine and the Human, as if such Things and Subjects 
universally existed. Instead, cyborgs are about specific historical machines 
and people in interaction that often turns out to be painfully counterintuitive 
for the analyst of technoscience (Haraway, 1997: 51). 
The point of the cyborg for Haraway is that it demands a blurring of the 
boundaries of organic and technological, foregrounding the indebtedness of each 
to the other and the impossibility and futility of attempting to divide the two. 
Instead, her interest lies in exploring and bringing to light the competing narratives 
which constitute any particular instance of technoscience. 
The postmodern focus on difference, fragmentation of identity, and the importance 
of language for constructing meaning and regimes of power has been criticised as 
potentially neutering feminism's ability to function as a political project (see for 
example; McNay, 1992: Introduction). If the category 'women' is reduced to an 
infinitely fragmented array of rhetorical difference, how can it provide a unifying 
entity around which to focus political action? 
The attention this thesis pays to social and historical aspects of legitimation in 
medical experiment locates my work within the social constructivist and 
postmodern critique of science; however the ongoing tensions and ambivalences 
between various feminist critiques of science are themselves also important. Each 
critique has specific strengths and weaknesses. As Harding points out, the tensions 
between them reflect the different, and sometimes contradictory, political and 
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theoretical needs of women (Harding, 1990: 86). If the challenge, as Haraway puts 
it, is to simultaneously account for the 'radical historical contingency' of science 
and maintain a commitment to faithful accounts of the world (Haraway, 1988: 
579), then a range of strategies for engaging with the material conditions of 
women's lives are needed. 
The Medical Body 
The final analytic tool I will employ is drawn from the literature that deals with 
how human bodies are conceptualised. According to medical science there is a 
biological body which, with minor variation, transcends history and geographical 
location. This body is a natural entity which is open to scientific codification and 
manipulation in straightforward and unproblematic ways. While the human body 
may be infinitely complex and as yet not fully understood, it is a stable material 
object whose intricacies are waiting to be unveiled when the right innovative 
researchers or scientific techniques come along. However, scholars from the 
humanities and social sciences have sought to demonstrate that human bodies are 
the products of specific histories, that they have been quite different entities 
throughout the ages and across cultures and that these differences have affected 
experiences of the lived body. 
In many ways literature on the construction of the body is a logical extension of 
critiques of science and technology. Science and technology studies problematise 
'natural objects' and causal chains that link nature and society, and the critiques of 
science outlined above pose as many problems for a constitution of the human 
body as they do for the air pump or the feminist scientist. The human body is a 
rich repository of meaning. Perhaps more than any other object, it sits on the 
boundary between the natural and the social world and becomes the marker and 
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mediator of social and scientific know ledge. The body is a person's most 
immediate reality. Its accessibility has allowed it to become a formidable part of 
the interdisciplinarity currently flourishing in the humanities and social sciences. 
Consequently, writers concerned with the body provide a way to traverse the 
treacherous terrain of 'sex' and 'gender' and 'science' and, for my purposes, of 
linking breast cancer and prostate cancer as sites of material, metaphorical and 
cultural study. Throughout the thesis I will return to and elaborate on the theme of 
the construction of the body through the rules and practices of cultural life. 
Recent developments in social theorising about the body owe a substantial debt to 
the works of Michel Foucault. For Foucault, the body is radically contingent on 
the exercise of social power, both as it exists at any given time, and as it has 
operated throughout history. In particular, he was interested in the production of 
bodies and their regulation and representation through the various processes of 
disciplinary surveillance (Turner, 1997: xv). These processes include the exercise 
of legal and medical power, and social and self discipline through the constraint of 
desire and morality according to the mandate of the Church (Foucault, 1977; 
Foucault, 1980). As systems of legal, medical and moral authority change 
throughout history so too do the ways in which they inscribe bodies. The body is a 
site of continual struggle between competing forces within society (such as the 
state, the Church and the medical profession), and is thoroughly imprinted by the 
histories created as these forces strive to impose their own ideal order (McN ay, 
1992: 13-16). Foucault sees the way in which the forces in history act upon the 
body as uncontainable within a totalising historical narrative with the result that 
the human body becomes 'radically anti-essentialist' (McNay, 1992: 15). In this 
way he is methodologically aligned with scholars such as Haraway for whom 
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history is at once a way of understanding the creation of social order and always 
open to interpretation. 
The influence of Foucault has been enormous. His insistence that the body is the 
product of the prevailing forces of history has enriched feminist critiques of 
biological essentialism by articulating a way of understanding the body as a 
material phenomenon without assuming that materiality is biologically fixed. At 
the same time, however, his own work pays little attention to the gendered nature 
or consequences of the disciplinary techniques he investigates (McN ay, 1992: 
Introduction, Chapter 1). The impact of Foucault's methods and critical 
approaches to history, the body and the formation of sexuality, can also be seen in 
subsequent historical analysis of gender and sexuality (Gallagher & Laqueur, 
1987; Laqueur, 1987; Laqueur, 1990) and in the study of the relationship between 
women and medicine (Martin, 1987; Martin, 1996, see also Turner, 1997). 
The ways in which the human body have been understood and represented have 
changed dramatically across different historical epochs. According to Gallagher 
and Laqueur this has resulted in dramatically different experiences of the lived 
body as it is "brought into being within widely dissimilar material cultures, 
subjected to various technologies and means of control, and incorporated into 
different rhythms of production and consumption, pleasure and pain" (Gallagher 
& Laqueur, 1987: vii). In particular, Laqueur argues that a dramatic change 
occurred in representations and understandings of biology during the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries (Laqueur, 1990). This change, which can be seen in 
representations of female biology and sexuality, was attributed to increased 
interest in and sophistication of the techniques of science. However Laqueur holds 
that the new ways of conceptualising the body were actually new ways of 
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describing and constituting social life (Laqueur, 1987: 4). The new biology, which 
was primarily concerned with a search for fundamental differences between the 
sexes and an obsessive questioning of female sexual pleasure, developed at a time 
when the foundations of the old social order were being dismantled. 
Reconceptualising biological and social sex became a critical issue for theorising 
and organising the new social order. 
In The Woman in the Body Martin focuses on the cultural meanings which are 
attached to the body. She argues that metaphorical language and images which are 
chosen to describe bodies and bodily events have profound implications for the 
way those bodies and events are conceptualised. This is borne out in statistics on 
events such as the rates of caesarean sections, and in women's impressions of 
medical accounts of their bodies and in their own bodily experiences (Martin, 
1987: 14). Martin describes events such as menstruation and menopause and 
places them in a continuum in which representations of female biology and 
reproductive agency vary historically yet are consistent in that they are repeatedly 
depicted as being inferior to male biology and male agency. While this work helps 
create the space required to read social meanings into the body, Martin's earlier 
work is less interested in discussing the co-production of biology and social 
meaning, that is, the way they are necessarily contingent upon and specifically 
enjoin and constrain their mutual development, than it is in arguing for a looser 
synergistic relation between the two. 
For my purposes, Laqueur and Martin's earlier work does not engage sufficiently 
with the production of meaning and material phenomena. This shortcoming 
mirrors a problem with Foucaults' work, namely a tendency to describe the body 
as a 'docile body' upon which cultural and social values are inscribed, rather than 
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attributing agency to the embodied subject (McNay, 38-43). However, by 
demonstrating the temporal and cultural malleability of the body each of these 
authors provide a means of teasing open the seemingly impenetrably enterprise 
that is the contemporary scientific construction of the body. 
Randomised controlled trials and the scientific method 
On the surface there are significant theoretical and methodological differences 
between the classic understanding of a 'scientific experiment' and the RCT as 
described in its ideal form. The RCT is an experimental method for determining 
the efficacy of competing therapeutic regimes through comparing two or more 
groups of subjects while they undergo treatment with different therapies. Subjects 
are allocated randomly to discrete treatment groups in order to minimise patient or 
clinician bias or selection effects which might influence the outcome of the trial. 
Observed outcomes undergo statistical analysis in order to determine whether any 
differences between treatment groups are statistically significant and should 
therefore be considered 'real'. If treatment outcomes are deemed to be statistically 
valid then judgements are made regarding the causal relations through which they 
were brought about and how these can be used to improve treatment options. 
The purpose of RCTs is to create scientific confidence within the context of 
clinical practice. This means that the know ledge produced by RCTs is intended to 
be robust enough to be applied in clinics and health systems that are not identical, 
and to be generalisable to patients whose health needs and prognosis may vary 
from those of the trial participants. In other words, RCTs are supposed to reveal 
truths about real biological bodies. Because of the recognition that disease states 
and individual responses to them cannot be mapped precisely, RCTs do not 
attempt to speak in terms of definitive personal outcomes. Instead they emphasise 
' 
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the statistical likelihood of outcomes within defined populations, and the 
generalisability of the outcomes to larger populations. In this context experimental 
'replication' is not about direct and precise duplication of biological events 
between two or more individuals. Despite the continued desire within medicine to 
codify the operation of a universalised human biology, such a complete replication 
would be impossible given the myriad differences between individual life 
experiences. I Rather, researchers try to construct a version of replication within 
any given trial through testing a treatment in a number of individuals 
simultaneously and then attempting to minimise the effect of personal differences 
by averaging them statistically across the trial population when analysing results. 
By doing clinical trials researchers hope to achieve outcomes that are generally 
(with varying degrees of statistical likelihood) descriptive of the risks and benefits 
to the broader population. As well as repeating the general actions of a drug or 
procedure within a trial, replication also occurs at the level of whole trials, where 
researchers seek to implement treatments used by other trialists to ascertain the 
validity of experimental outcomes. This may be done through using identical 
treatment regimes or by adopting similar though slightly modified techniques. 
Provided no discrepancies arise between the outcome of the original and 
subsequent studies, this more fluid interpretation of replication is accepted. In the 
instance of controversy, however, such procedural distinctions become points of 
significant contention. 
1 Discourses about medical science are marked by a tension between descriptions about medicine as 
a craft skill wherein the experience and intuition of the practitioner is paramount, and the desire to 
standardise knowledge and practice. David Armstrong highlights this tension as it arose through 
post second world war clinical trials. As British researchers struggled to formulate methods for 
sound clinical research others highlighted the problems of applying science to medicine. L. 
Whitby, Regius Professor at Cambridge, said "it is true that medicine will never be an exact 
science because the normal variation in individuals have such a wide range that automatic and 
mechanical treatment is prohibited" (Whitby, cited in Armstrong, 1977: 600). 
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RCTs are, then, about generalisations within experimental populations rather than 
about the health of specific individuals. They often require very large numbers of 
patients in order to generate statistically significant outcomes and may also 
require large numbers of researchers. Consequently they may appear to be quite 
diffuse and cumbersome in comparison with traditional accounts of the strictly 
regimented scientific experiment. In practice however, the interpretive flexibility 
of the RCT is probably no different from that which is inherent in all scientific 
experiments. A more extensive account of RCTs follows in Chapter 2. 
Sociology of R CTs 
In the late 1980's Ann Oakley wrote that there had been very little sociological 
interest in the impact and methodologies of the RCT (Oakley, 1989: 27-28). With 
a few exceptions, the intervening years have not changed the situation despite the 
fact that the RCT, under the auspices of 'evidence based medicine' has continued 
its ascendancy (see for example Epstein, 1996; Richards, 1991). The tendency in 
medical sociology has been to address specific aspects associated with clinical 
medicine in ways which either ignore the science involved and focus on the 
human actions and institutional constraints, or else to look at instances and 
implications of erroneous science in clinical practice (Abraham, 1995). One 
reason for this may be that RCTs are a relatively new historical product, coming 
into use after the second world war and only gaining their professional appeal and 
the perception of their applicability to large populations during the last two or 
three decades. Consequently, the full implications of the institutionalisation of 
RCTs for policy and their impacts on the relations between and identities of 
clinicians and patients are still emerging. But another reason for the continued 
' 
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paucity of critical engagement with the RCT may rest with the traditional 
immunity of scientific know ledge to social inquiry. 
Although little sociological inquiry has engaged directly with the scientific 
content of medicine, critical analysis of many other aspects of the operation of 
medicine has paved the way for an examination of what counts as medical 
knowledge and how that knowledge is formulated. By demonstrating the systemic 
institutional and organisational prejudices operating in modern medicine, 
sociologists have made it more possible to question the self-evidence with which 
much medical know ledge has come to be regarded. Examples come from many 
areas; here consider the women's health movement. Feminist analysts have 
questioned the exercise of professional power by examining the way women 
expenence health and the health care system as patients and as medical 
professionals. As I discussed previously, these critiques form an important part of 
feminist engagement with the question of science. Through investigation of 
specific instances, such as the policies and practices governing reproduction and 
fertility control, and by legitimising women's experiences as valid sites for 
analysis, feminists have been able to demonstrate ways in which social and 
political values are a constitutive part of medical practice and medical knowledge 
(see for example Ehrenreich & English, 1978; Holmes et al., 1980; Leeson & 
Gray, 1978). Questioning the representation of female anatomy and physiology 
and respecting women's experiences at the hands of doctors and clinical 
researchers reveals the systematic patriarchal subordination of women within 
medicine. Critiques of psychiatry and mental health, and the consumer health 
literature are other examples of sociological work which has destabilised medical 
knowledge (for feminist examples see Chesler, 1972; Chetwynd & Hartnett, 1977; 
for critiques of psychiatry and mental health see Goffman, 1961; Laing, 1976; 
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Rosenhan, 1973; Szasz, 1961; Szasz, 1970; Smith & David, 1975; for consumer 
health literature see Smith, 1991; Grace, 1994). 
The theoretical moves which accompany a sociology of medical knowledge are 
similar to those which accompany a sociology of scientific know ledge and 
feminist critiques of science. Once it has been demonstrated that social and 
political values are embedded in the organisation and practice of medicine it 
becomes easier to argue that these values may 'get in' to the knowledge upon 
which medical practice is based. As with feminist empiricism, such a position is a 
shift away from a naive belief in the objectivity of medical science, and is often 
used to argue for a better or more robust exercise of the methods of science in 
medicine. Sociological literature on therapeutic evaluation frequently calls for an 
improved empiricism. While there are problems with arguing for 'better' medical 
science, as debates about feminist empiricism show, the call for improved research 
practice is a useful strategy for those wishing to challenge orthodoxy as it 
maintains the authority of medical science and can therefore utilise some of 
medicine's cultural resources while still pointing out contradictions in the status 
quo. 
In 'Clinical Sense and Clinical Science', David Armstrong discusses the RCT 
from the perspective of the standard view of science. He sees the RCT as a 
method for improving the robustness of medical know ledge and making medicine 
more accountable to those outside the profession. His article can be read as 
representative of those who see problems with the operation and implementation 
of medicine but believe that increasing its scientific rigour will help resolve these 
problems and will make medicine more open, democratic and socially equitable. 
Armstrong describes clinical experience and know ledge generated by clinical 
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trials as the two sources of legitimacy for the medical practitioner. The two types 
of authority generated by these sources are not necessarily compatible and as the 
prestige of clinical trials has increased, scientific know ledge has become more 
influential in the clinic (Armstrong, 1977: 600). 
This shift has caused a change in the behaviour of individual doctors and patients 
which Armstrong believes opens up the closed shop of medicine and creates a 
more equitable distribution of power in the doctor-patient relationship. He 
nominates three substantial ways in which 'science' has successfully disrupted the 
personal and professional dominance of medicine by elite groups of practitioners 
and made it more answerable to social scrutiny. First, the rise of scientific 
medicine has fostered a challenge to the traditional notion that 'clinical sense' 
rested in the personal experience of clinicians which in turn validated professional 
seniority and autonomy within the profession: 
Whereas different individual experiences of a problem could not be used to 
assert the correctness of one particular view, the total range of experience 
could be. Thus deference was paid to the clinician, usually the most senior, 
who had the greatest experience (Armstrong, 1977: 600). 
In contrast, Armstrong believes that clinical trials offer the opportunity for the 
integration of the experience of a number of clinicians and create space for junior 
doctors to operate on a more equal footing with their senior colleagues. Secondly, 
the emphasis on the clinician's experience establishes a hegemonic relationship 
between doctors and patients so that a patient's individual experience of their 
condition is always out-weighed by that of their doctor. According to Armstrong, 
published literature from clinical trials now allows patients to gain access to 
information about their conditions which is not dependent on their doctor and 
27 
enables them to question their doctor's op1n1ons. Finally, by emphasising a 
know ledge system based on personal experience, medicine removes itself from 
external scrutiny. Prior to the rise of the clinical trial it was difficult to assess the 
quality of medical care as observers could rarely claim the necessary experience to 
evaluate whether an outcome was the result of a treatment or of the normal course 
of the illness. Clinical trials allow treatment results to become public know ledge 
and thereby potentially contested by parties both within and outside the 
profession. Armstrong states that "knowledge in a system dominated by scientific 
method is no longer personal but universal" (Armstrong, 1977: 600). The 
consequence of the clinical trial is, then, a more open and democratic medicine 
where younger practitioners need not be hampered by the conservative tendencies 
of their senior colleagues, where patients are more equal participants in decision 
making, and where internal and external scrutiny of the processes of medicine 
thrive. 
Armstrong is clearly arguing for the progressive powers of science in effecting 
beneficial social change. Unfortunately he does not support his analysis by linking 
it to the material practices of medicine, choosing instead to frame his work with 
an idealised account of science and the scientific method. If he had made this link 
it would have become apparent that 'science' is never self-evidently true but is 
always tied to a social and historical context. For example, what use are published 
trial results if patients are too sick to access them or their presentation limits lay 
understanding? And what use is an increased equity between junior and senior 
researchers if other obstacles limit entry to the profession in the first place? If 
scientific truth is understood as socially contingent, then its liberatory power is 
limited and perhaps ultimately rhetorical in nature. If science has a liberatory 
power it is as a result of a complex web of historical material conditions and the 
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social context that web produces. Contrary to Armstrong's vision, clinical trials 
are not sufficient of themselves to bring about beneficial social change. Although 
Armstrong praises the clinical trial as a tool to facilitate positive health reforms, 
he is praising a tool with limited investigative power. The various methods for 
conducting clinical trials cannot ask broader questions about the nature of medical 
science and the multiple ways it embodies and reifies the social relations which 
Armstrong hopes scientific medicine will eliminate. 
Ann Oakley begins to address the social embeddedness of medical know ledge in 
Who's Afraid of the RCT when she struggles with reconciling science as a 
potentially progressive force with a feminist awareness of the limitations of 
western science and medicine. Unlike most other sociological writings about the 
evaluation of medicine, Oakley focuses specifically on the RCT. She discusses in 
detail the premise upon which RCTs are based and the methods through which 
they are put into operation. Her analysis maps ways in which feminist critiques of 
medicine stand to benefit from the RCT, as well as discussing areas of significant 
methodological concern. She identifies herself as a feminist sociologist who was 
responsible for designing and running an RCT in the area of prenatal health care. 
She is, therefore, situated within the feminist empiricist project. She tries to 
reconcile the RCT with critiques of science that include feminist concern with the 
social structure of science as being inherently sexist, racist, classist and a 
culturally coercive practice and form of knowledge (Oakley, 1989: 25). Citing the 
radical science movement, the emergence of ethnomethodology and feminist 
critiques about the masculine nature of scientific activity, Oakley stresses the 
"heightened awareness of the contribution made by different kinds of research 
strategies to extending human knowledge in the domain both of the 'natural' and 
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the 'social' sciences" (Oakley, 1989: 27). Knowledge is plural for Oakley, and an 
important part of that plurality is empirical science. 
Oakley is responding in particular to feminist critiques of science and medicine as 
masculinized. She argues that feminist research is often identified with being on 
the 'qualitative' side of a divide in which 'qualitative' is seen as the preserve of 
the social sciences and 'quantitative' as being appropriate for the natural sciences. 
She assumes that the scientific method is beneficial, and she is interested in the 
dilemma of whether feminists can satisfactorily develop or appropriate that 
method without incorporating all of its oppressive masculine baggage. The 
specifics of Oakley's arguments warrant detailed consideration and are discussed 
further in the following chapter. Here, I merely identify her work as an example of 
a sociological attempt to understand RCTs. Her conclusions are that feminist 
appropriation of RCTs is possible and desirable. Provided that they are properly 
designed and adequately scrutinised, RCTs can contribute positively to the 
feminist health project. Further, she argues that they are a useful way of 
monitoring medicine's treatment of women. Women are under-represented 1n 
clinical research and their lives are over-medicalised by drugs and procedures 
which have not been properly assessed. RCTs provide a potentially beneficial 
standard through which this state of affairs can be addressed. But Oakley asserts 
that RCTs are not the only method available, nor are they always the best method. 
Feminists must remain mindful of the need to maintain a close scrutiny of the 
types of RCTs which are being used and the way they position female 
subjectivity. Oakley's commitment to the empirical sciences is evident in the 
article's concluding quote from Evelyn Fox Keller: 
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The intellectual danger resides in viewing science as pure social product; 
science then dissolves into ideology and objectivity loses all intrinsic 
meaning. In the resulting cultural relativism, any emancipatory function of 
modern science is negated, and the arbitration of truth recedes into the 
political domain (Keller, 1982: 593) quoted in (Oakley, 1989: 53). 
Oakley's article is a thoughtful attempt by someone bridging the disciplines of 
public health and feminist studies to de-stigmatise scientific medicine for a 
feminist audience. She rightly questions the feminist dichotomy between 
feminised and masculinized, qualitative and quantitative, and social and natural 
sciences. These dichotomies have come under increasing and sustained fire from 
other feminists who argue that they falsely reify categories which are actually 
more fluid and complex than the dichotomies suggest. One fear commonly 
expressed is that the material conditions of the natural world will cease to be given 
explanatory power and will be completely collapsed and redescribed as a product 
solely of social interactions. Such moves do not make sense within a public health 
that assumes and respects a division between the natural and social aspects of 
health. Oakley is seeking some way of incorporating anti-science critiques which 
question the very essence of modernism with the essentially modernist enterprises 
that are public health and medicine. She argues that one way to do this is to 
reclaim the methods of scientific medicine and address their shortcomings through 
the insights of feminist health. In so doing Oakley lays the foundation for a strong 
sociological critique of RCTs which engages with the organisation of scientific 
knowledge in more sophisticated ways than critiques such as Armstrong's. Oakley 
does not, however, move away from a dichotomous characterisation of social 
knowledge and scientific knowledge, nor does she take into account critiques 
which seek to do so or consider the consequences of such a move. 
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I want to extend the work of Armstrong and Oakley by developing an account of 
RCTs which takes a step towards dismantling the dichotomy between the natural 
and social sciences. Richards' work on the controversy over the efficacy of 
vitamin C for the treatment of colorectal cancer, brings a constructivist critique of 
scientific experiment to the genesis of medical know ledge (Richards, 1991). She 
examines the controversy which arose during the 1980s as Ewan Cameron and 
Linus Pauling sought to have their experimental results verified by the cancer 
establishment. During the 1970s and '80s Cameron and Pauling had consistently 
encouraging results from their use of mega-dose vitamin C as an adjuvant therapy 
for colorectal cancer. These results were not theoretically commensurate with the 
paradigm of orthodox cancer medicine, nor did they fit with the practices of 
orthodox cancer therapy. Richards provides a fine-grained historical account of 
Pauling and Cameron's efforts to have their treatment regime evaluated by 
orthodox means and she comes to the conclusion that the replication attempts 
came about not because of the epistemological merit of their theoretical position, 
nor because of the promising empirical results they produced. Instead, she argues, 
the cancer establishment was persuaded by the political and social authority Linus 
Pauling could mobilise because of his personal eminence and the resources which 
resulted from his alliance with the alternative health movement. 
Richards describes the process whereby strategic allies are enrolled through 
convincing them that it is in their interests to support one's own work. Fact-
making in science is a collaborative enterprise. In order to determine the validity 
of a knowledge claim and to protect it from criticism and dissent, it is necessary to 
enrol allies who participate in the construction and defence of the claim. This is 
not necessarily a conscious process and individuals may be drawn into fact-
making negotiations when their own work is incorporated into the claims of others 
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(Richards, 1991: 17 4). Against all odds, Pauling and Cameron were successful in 
persuading the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to run an RCT of vitamin C for 
colorectal treatment. When the first trial contradicted Pauling and Cameron the 
matter was not simply closed. It is always possible for different interest groups to 
interpret results differently. Instead of conceding defeat Pauling was able to use 
his influential professional allegiances to negotiate another trial on the grounds 
that the first trial did not adequately replicate the work which upon which he and 
Cameron had based their findings. Scientific claims are constantly open to re-
evaluation and re-negotiation, although the social and material costs are often 
great. It is the routine work of science both to carry out these constant negotiations 
and to obscure them from public view, and these negotiations always embody the 
values of competing interests. 
Richards shows that the process of therapeutic evaluation is inherently social and 
political, and that the idea of neutral appraisal through the RCT is a myth. 
Arbitration over experimental findings is not a clean and predictable process , 
rather it is the result of behind the scenes negotiations which are often messy and 
unpredictable and cannot be codified within transferable scientific procedures. 
Further, they are always inextricably linked to the professional and wider social 
values and interests of those who are carrying out the evaluation (Richards, 1991: 
174). Although such a strongly constructivist position is now increasingly 
common within the sociology of scientific knowledge, sociological critique of 
medical knowledge usually tends toward a more gentle constructivist position. 
Richards ' work provides a model for my own in the way that it presents clinical 
medical knowledge as always and unavoidably the product of social interactions. 
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A shortcoming of Richards' work is its failure to engage with Oakley's concern 
that a strong constructivist critique of RCTs will collapse the natural into the 
social resulting in the replacement of scientific determinism with social 
determinism and an impotent relativism. Should such a collapse occur it would 
reduce the confidence of clinicians in their current decision-making practices, and 
rob patients of a supposedly neutral source of information against which to 
consider their experiences of their disease and their treatment. Although Richards 
provides a richly detailed account, she is primarily interested in analysing the 
disjunction between the rhetoric of experiment and justification in medicine and 
the practice of experiment, and the subsequent mechanisms of justification utilised 
in the vitamin C controversy. The need to improve and engage in clinical practice, 
themes present in both Armstrong and Oakley, appear to be outside the scope of 
her work. 
One way of avoiding an apparent collapse of the natural into the social is to treat 
entities traditionally described as 'natural objects' as the condensed materialisation 
of historical and social meaning. Although these objects are thoroughly socially 
constituted, they exist and exert their presence within networks of meaning and 
upon other 'natural objects' in tangible ways. Examples of this approach can be 
seen among writers concerned with the problem of the body. Brian Turner, for 
instance, clearly insists on both the social and historical constructedness of the 
human body and the significance of the phenomenological subjective experience 
of embodiment (Turner, 1992). On one occasion Turner investigates 'the 
epistemology of the hand', considering the relationship between the physiology of 
the hand and its significance within our cultural system (Turner, 1992; chapter 3). 
Analytically dissecting the hand is a matter of interrogating its cultural and 
historical representation, and considering how they affect the lived experience and 
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potentiality of embodiment. But the hand is also an organism which, although 
made and remade in social discourse is constrained by biological possibilities and 
limitations. Turner asks whether "shaking hands, wavying hands, holding hands, 
binding hands, mutilating hands or cutting off hands" is of sociological 
significance. If so, what might be the embodied cultural consequences of human 
beings without thumbs (Turner, 1992, 100). The challenge for a sociology of 
clinical trials is to incorporate an awareness that medical practice, beliefs, and 
technologies are products of human actions, with rich, complex, contestable 
histories, with an appreciation of the frailty and coporeality of the entity on which 
they are enacted (the human body). 
The structure of the thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to develop an account of the ways in which medical 
knowledge and practice are used to naturalise socially and historically specific 
characterisations of gender identity. This is important because biological 
differences between the sexes continue to be used as grounds for limiting women's 
participation in society. Highlighting how various forms of biological 
determinism are used to justify patriarchal social relations is not a new project, but 
it is one which requires continuing attention given that arguments based in the 
natural sciences (which proponents of biological determinism employ) retain a 
special type of cultural authority which advantages them over arguments based 
explicitly in social knowledges. The proliferation of feminist scholarship and 
various critiques of modernism ensure that explaining differences in sexual 
identity as based solely on biology is no longer seen as a straightforward project. 
There is increasing appreciation within the social sciences and an1ong health 
researchers and service providers of the extent to which biological identity and 
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personal well being are affected by psychological and social experiences. New 
areas of research continue to reinforce a sex/gender divide and to do so in ways 
which assume the biological and cognitive inferiority of women. 
Equipped with the tools outlined in this chapter, I now turn my attention to 
developing a contemporary social history of justification in medicine. Chapter 2 
begins this process by summarising and providing a historical overview of one of 
the key elements in the stabilisation of medical know ledge and practice, the RCT. 
From there, the thesis progresses by focusing on specific case studies to 
demonstrate how medical science is socially contingent local knowledge which 
embodies and perpetuates patriarchal assumptions about sex. 
Chapter 3 describes the emergence of sex hormones as biological entities and 
examines the meanings which were and are attributed to them. It asks several 
questions: How have they been historically constituted and by whom? How has 
this constitution shaped current beliefs about hormones? Do sex hormones mean 
different things for men and women? And what role do they play in debates about 
biological and social identity? 
Chapters 4 and 5 bring the preceding sections together by discussing how a 
particular hormonal drug - tamoxifen - is being tested in a particular set of RCTs. 
Chapter 4 outlines the current tamoxifen breast cancer prevention trials and 
examines how hormonal discourses and the discourses of science have been used 
by breast cancer specialists to persuade regulatory authorities and funding bodies 
that these trials are a safe and scientifically rational option. Despite the best efforts 
of their proponents, the tamoxifen trials have proven to be a highly controversial 
enterprise. Chapter 5 canvasses the debates, paying particular attention to the 
mechanisms by which controversies have been identified and the professional 
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identities of those responsible for dissent. How is the trial controversial and to 
whom? In what forums are these disputes being raised? Who is socially 
empowered to speak about the trial and why? And what does this mean for the 
social analyst of medical science and gender? 
In Chapters 6 and 7 I turn my attention to the way medical science constructs male 
bodies and masculinity. The point of these chapters is not to develop an in depth 
account of the constitution of discourses about male sex hormones, but rather to 
draw out the differences between the medical construction of embodied women 
and the medical construction of embodied men. This is done explicitly from my 
perspective as a feminist researcher. To this end Chapter 6 examines discourses 
about men' and hormones and locates them in debates about the role of sex 
hormones in prostate cancer, and Chapter 7 discusses some of the ways in which 
men and women differ as hormonally constituted cancer patients. 
In conclusion I draw out the implications of the social history of RCTs and their 
role in the social constructions of sex hormones. Such a history can challenge 
perceived truths about biological sex and provide strategies for reform within the 
practices of experimental medicine. 
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CHAPTER2 
The RCT in medicine 
RCTs are an historically located technological system comprised of physical 
artefacts (such as drugs), human activity (such as enrolling patients), and 
knowledge (such as the theory of randomisation) (see Law & Bijker, 1992)). This 
chapter describes the significance of RCTs within medical research. I discuss how 
ideas about science are represented within medical and sociological literature and 
by clinicians themselves as they write about their practice. The medical story about 
the RCT contains numerous internal inconsistencies, some of which are 
articulated, some of which are actively denied, and some of which are invisible to 
the clinical storyteller. I explore the factors which obscure these inconsistencies or 
prompt clinicians to live with them as they go about the business of building their 
social worlds. Further, I consider the process through which these inconsistencies 
are smoothed over and made to appear unproblematic or to disappear altogether. I 
also explore how the RCT constructs the clinician as a cognitively and socially 
disembodied knower and the experimental subject as the disembodied known and 
how different types of clinical trials change the ways these constructions occur. 
The practice and theory governing the development and refining of medical 
know ledge and techniques changed dramatically during the twentieth century, and 
the theoretical and material practices which constitute the 'clinical trial' as we 
know it only came into alignment during the 1950s. This chapter begins by 
discussing representations of the RCT in contemporary historical accounts in order 
to explore the role of storytelling in science. There are numerous experimental 
methods at the disposal of clinical researchers and choice of research strategy is 
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contingent on factors such as the condition to be examined, the hypothesis in 
question, the experimental treatment, and the resources at the disposal of 
investigators. In the condensed accounts in medical textbooks these issues are 
represented in a way that glosses over the complexities of doing research while 
representing the RCT as the inevitable result of sound science in medicine and as 
naturally superior to other experimental methods. Textbook histories are contrasted 
with more rigorous historical accounts which tease out the question of how the 
RCT has become privileged without assuming it is the result of the method's 
inherent superiority. The second half of the chapter discusses different types of 
medical experimentation in order to draw out what makes the RCT unique and 
analyse how it is constructed in relation to alternative forms of medical 
investigation. The chapter concludes by focusing on the conflicting meanings of 
the RCT for women. 
History of randomised trials 
As well as making claims about the facts of a matter, the way that histories 
represent the world tells much about the historian and the social and intellectual 
order with which they engage. History is part of the way we give meaning to our 
world: as our historical accounts are made and remade so our understanding of and 
relation to the world change (Law, 1996: 52). The RCT, like all technologies, is a 
product with multiple histories. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, a feature of the process through which science and 
medicine come to be seen as representative of the natural world is the way they 
obscure their links with social influences. This ability to obscure can also be 
present in the history of science. Historical accounts of science and medicine 
which try to pinpoint 'moments of origin' and 'discovery' in individual genius or 
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which present the development of knowledge and techniques as a smooth seamless 
evolution draw a picture of the world in which 'the truth' is always somewhere 
waiting to be revealed and articulated for us. To depict the history of the RCT in 
such a way is to attempt to naturalise it by illustrating both the length of the 
tradition of controlled trials, and the way this tradition has been refined and made 
more scientific throughout the centuries. The histories in medical textbooks and 
journals echo the Enlightenment commitment to the emancipatory power of the 
human intellect and contribute towards the hagiographical accounts of 'great men' 
and 'great moments' which are a rich tradition within the history and teaching of 
medicine (see for example Bailar, 1983; Bull, 1959). 
Because of their pedagogical significance and their function in obscuring the social 
and historical development of clinical trials these accounts warrant consideration. 
A typical introduction to the history of RCTs, drawn from an orthodox 
epidemiology textbook reads: "Non randomised trials date back many years. 
L'Estang considers that the story of Daniel contained a report of a clinical trial" 
(Bulpitt, 1983: 5). The biblical book of Daniel contains the story in which King 
Nebuchadnezzar organised a 'trial', giving youths of royal blood a strict diet of 
meat and wine for three years. Daniel intervened and convinced the King to allow 
a subgroup of youths to eat pulses and legumes: 
Prove thy servants, I beseech thee, ten days; and let them give us pulses to 
eat, and water to drink. Then let our countenances be looked upon before 
thee, and the countenance of the children that eat of the portion of the King's 
meat: and as thou seest, deal with thy servants. So he consented to them in 
this matter, and proved them ten days. And at the end of ten days their 
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countenances appeared fairer and fatter in flesh than all the children which 
did eat the portion of the king's meat (Daniel, 1: 12-17). 
This story is widely cited (see Bull, 1959; Bulpitt, 1983; Feinstein, 1985: 684, to 
name a few; Meinert, 1986). Its admirers claim that it describes the rudimentary 
components of the clinical trial. They suggest that there are clearly identifiable 
control and experiment groups, and a defined intervention. Yet choosing to 
represent the genesis of scientific medicine in this way raises the question as to 
why the roots of clinical research can or should be located within a biblical story. 
The extract cited above does little to account for the precise nature or formation of 
the controlled trial, referring instead to a sacred text whose authority lies not in a 
factual history but with a faith in a religious tradition based on a miraculous God. 
Is the point of locating the birth of the RCT in this ancient text to demonstrate its 
enduring presence, its mythical significance, or possibly even its divine origin? 
One would assume that in accordance with the principles which govern science it 
must surely be the first of these, for mythology and divinity have no place within 
the rhetoric of modern medicine. Yet by using a religious text these narratives 
appeal to the discourses of miracles and divine intervention which are an important 
feature of the rhetoric of hope in medicine. As modern society emerges these 
histories describe how the divine magic in the old testament controlled trial has 
been replaced by the magic of science. In this way the two great cosmic powers, 
God and Science, are linked in the controlled trial, and it is through Science that 
God is laid to rest in modern medicine. 
James Lind's experiments with treatments for sailors with scurvy is another 
historical highlight which is widely reported (Bulpitt, 1983; Feinstein, 1985; 
Meinert, 1986). Green states that Lind's experiment was the first documented 
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example of a therapeutic experiment with matched controls (Green, 1954 1087). In 
1747 whilst at sea on board the Salisbury, Lind carried out a study in which he 
gave twelve sailors suffering from scurvy one of the following six different dietary 
regimes, these being cider, elixir vitriol and acidic gargle, vinegar, sea water, 
nutmeg, and oranges and lemons: 
On the 20th of May 1747, I took twelve patients in the scurvy, on board the 
Salisbury at sea. Their cases were as similar as I could have them .... The 
consequence was, that the most sudden and visible good effects were 
perceived from the use of the oranges and lemons; one of those who had 
taken them, being at the end of six days fit for duty ( cited in Meinert, 1986: 
5). 
Although Lind's experiment indicated that oranges and lemons were the best 
treatment available for scurvy, the finding contradicted his own expectations. 
Consequently this example has an interesting twist which highlights the 
convoluted relationship between experimental outcomes, scientific know ledge and 
clinical practice. He was reluctant to believe that citrus was the most effective 
form of therapy, believing instead in the benefits of placing scurvy stricken 
patients in 'pure dry air'. Orthodox opinion at the time held that the way people 
experienced disease reflected an imbalance in an individual's 'humours', bodily 
forces which were as much spiritual and moral in origin as they were biological. 
To begin with there existed no belief system which could account for the apparent 
effect of fresh fruit on scurvy and there was also little reason for Lind to credit his 
experimental observations as it was not until after the re-constitution of disease as 
a specific entity in itself (which occurred in the mid nineteenth century) that the 
idea of comparative trials gained any theoretical importance (Meldrum, 1994: 12). 
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Despite Lind's findings, it took another 50 years for the British navy to supply 
lemons to its ships at sea (Meinert, 1986). At the time of Lind's original 
observations Britain was involved in the Seven Year War with France. Reflecting 
the assumption that clinical evidence speaks for itself, Green comments that it is 
'strange' that the significance of Lind's results was not immediately realised 
(Green, 1954). If, however, one considers that his findings were at the time 
effectively 'irrational', that is, without rational theoretical basis, and if one 
considers that the provision of oranges and lemons to sailors would have been an 
expensive enterprise given that they were a culinary delicacy, prone to spoil, and 
used up valuable storage space, the reasons for ignoring Lind's anomalous 
observations appear more sensible. By the close of the century France was in the 
throes of revolution and the two countries were again engaging in war. The 
repeated hostilities with France increased the importance of maintaining a healthy 
fighting force which eventually resulted in the British testing out the provision of 
citrus fruit. But considering Lind's work through an essentially historical, political 
and economic lens does not make sense to Green whose concept of justification 
lies solely with the evidence provided by the clinical trial. Therefore he remains 
perplexed by the interval which elapsed between Lind's work and official 
recognition of his findings. 
The conditions for and success of Lind's experiment were inextricably linked with 
the quest for British colonial and military power, adding another layer of meaning 
to the history of the clinical trial. Consider the following statement by Green made 
during a speech to the Royal College of Physicians of London in 1954: 
If, as seems probable, James Lind's account of his test of oranges and lemons 
against scurvy in 1747 is the earliest published description of a clinical trial 
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with carefully matched controls, it can fairly be claimed that the modern type 
of controlled clinical trial was a British 'invention'; it can be claimed with no 
less justice that this kind of trial in the form in which it has been developed 
since the end of the second world war is a very characteristic and respectable 
British institution, attributable in part, perhaps, to our native scepticism and 
our reluctance to take at their face value the over enthusiastic press reports 
that are too often published about new remedies when they are first 
announced (Green, 1954: 1085). 
The status of this comment is unclear within the context of Green's speech. It 
certainly strikes this reader as humorous and may have been made to entertain his 
audience. However, as a moment of narration it works only through reference to 
existing social and historical discourses. It would seem that the clinical trial is not 
only historically indebted to British military might and colonial imperialism, but is 
also dependent on the natural scepticism which is at the heart of the rational 
British character. So far, then, this mythical history of clinical trials has woven 
together Christianity, militarism and nationalism to produce the fabric of scientific 
rationalism in medicine. 
The next common turn taken in these hagiographic histories is to recount the 
medical advances made during the Second World War. Nationalism and the role of 
the military again feature in stories about the testing of penicillin, sulfa drugs, and 
the trials of streptomycin for the treatment of tuberculosis which occurred shortly 
after the war. According to Feinstein "[t]he evaluation of treatment for tuberculosis 
set the stage for the entrance of the modern era of randomised trials" (Feinstein, 
1985: 687). When streptomycin became available shortly after World War II both 
clinicians and pharmaceutical manufacturers wanted prompt evaluation to justify 
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its use and production. Multi-centre trials were undertaken in the United States in 
1946, although the trials did not use any form of control group. The supply of 
streptomycin in the UK was limited, which prompted British researchers to include 
control groups within their trial design. Their study was confined to a subgroup of 
severely ill tuberculosis patients. Green writes: 
The shortage of streptomycin in Britain at the time (which was so distressing 
from the humanitarian point of view) here proved scientifically 
advantageous, for it allowed the Committee [governing the trial] to arrange, 
with a clear conscience, a rigidly controlled trial of the value of bed rest with 
streptomycin, as compared with bed rest alone, in young adults with rapidly 
advancing bilateral pulmonary tuberculosis ... (Green, 1954: 1089). 
Green identifies the key features of the investigation as being the random 
allocation of patients to either control or experimental group and the blinding of 
radiographers to the treatment each patient was receiving (Green, 1954: 1089). 
Initially the British researchers saw the use of a control group as ethically 
acceptable only because of the shortage of streptomycin. The contingencies of the 
material availability of the drug during the immediate post-war reconstruction 
determined this aspect of the design of the trial (Green, 1954: 1089). The 'scientific 
benefits' of using controls would probably have been bypassed had the material 
conditions been more favourable as they were in the US streptomycin trials. 
Conflict between ethical and scientific priorities is a regular feature of debates 
about clinical trials, and so too is the flexible deployment during a controversy 
(and the posthumous reconstruction after its conclusion) of what counts as being 
'ethically appropriate'. Further, by being required to select a specific subgroup 
from a patient population with a disease with a widely variable natural history 
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investigators were able to choose relatively homogeneous groups with similar 
clinical presentations. 'Natural history' of a disease refers to the course of a 
disease from onset to resolution (Last, 1988). The use of the term reinforces 
medicine's assumption that disease is a 'natural' entity rather than a socially and 
historically variable phenomenon. By tightly controlling the selection of patients 
researchers managed to avoid the problems (such as the different effects of a drug 
on people of different sex, age and stage of disease) which would emerge later 
when randomised trials were used in more heterogeneous groups of patients with 
the same disease. Finally, because of the limited availability of streptomycin, and 
the visible and immediate improvements which patients experienced, the trial had 
a short duration, so the long-term adverse effects of the drug did not surface until 
later (Feinstein, 1985: 687-88). 
The historical episodes recounted here, and more importantly their 
historiographical treatment of events and people, involve storylines and subjects 
which are archetypical within the history of science. They assume explanations 
which are similar to those used by science. Along with populist myths about the 
benefits of science, these are histories which tell of intellectual emancipation, 
where individual initiative overcomes the limitations of circumstances and the 
protagonists take on heroic status. Although the incident recounted are discrete 
events they are connected in structure and rhetorical meaning by this myth of the 
beneficence of science thereby forming a cohesive narrative when placed together. 
Each occurrence is described as a significant advance on the preceding state of 
affairs (Olby et al., 1990: 8). 
In contrast, Harry Marks' history of the Collaborative Clinical Group (CCG) is full 
of antiheroes and government conspiracies, problematising the ideal of the 
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seamless progression towards increasingly scientific medicine. Marks is an 
advocate of RCTs, stating that contemporary clinical trials featuring randomisation 
of patients and blinded assessment of outcomes "represents an unparalleled 
technique for measuring the value of novel treatments" (Marks, 1988: 297). 
However the RCT which Marks supports is fundamentally different from the one 
upheld by authors such as Green, Bailar and Meinert. The point of Marks' 
argument is to demonstrate that, rather than being the result of conceptual 
breakthroughs and individual innovation, controlled clinical trials emerged as a 
research form only when bureaucratic, financial and clinical interests had been 
aligned in such a way as to provide the social conditions in which that form of 
study could take place. This alignment was brought about by the active work of 
researchers and government agencies and was opposed and subverted by clinicians 
and pharmaceutical companies (Marks, 1988; Marks, 1997). 
According to Marks, examples can be found of medical researchers who were 
attempting to carry out 'modern' clinical trials prior to the streptomycin trial for 
tuberculosis in 1948. Marks details several clinical investigations, including the 
Cooperative Clinical Group's (CCG) experiments with syphilis treatments (1928-
1935), and the studies of tuberculosis by the Veterans Administration (VA) in the 
USA, and Public Health Service (PHS) in the UK, following World War II (Marks, 
1997: chapters 2 and 4). He argues that their design and execution contained key 
elements of modem clinical research methodology. Although these investigations 
did not produce coherent and definitive findings, this was not the result of 
shortcomings in the research design. Instead Marks proposes that these failures 
were in large part due to the dominant culture of medical research and the way 
individual clinicians and social institutions operated within that culture (Marks, 
1988: 298). In other words, although unsuccessful in achieving their articulated 
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goal, the syphilis and tuberculosis trials are a part of the networks of agency which 
contributed towards the reorganisation of the culture and practice of medical 
research away from one which emphasised individual expertise, towards one 
which stressed a norm of shared professional know ledge. 
The feature which identifies the CCG, VA and PHS studies as intellectually 
interesting and distinct from other contemporary research was their attempt to 
organise clinicians into a culture of communal research. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
prior to the rise of clinical trials individual experience and expertise was the only 
standard considered appropriate for judging therapeutic success, and there was no 
particular place for, or virtue associated with, ideas about joint investigation. The 
initial appeal of cooperative studies lay in the belief they could help overcome the 
limitations of individual research by studying large numbers of patients in order to 
offset the effects of spontaneous recoveries, and by joining together a number of 
experienced clinicians to consider a specific problem, thereby reducing the effects 
of individual clinician bias. It was also hoped that they could produce a 
standardised way of selecting patients, providing treatment and analysing results in 
a research setting (Marks, 1988; Marks, 1997). 
The Cooperative Clinical Group 
In March 1928, Professor John Stokes of the University of Pennsylvania invited a 
number of high profile researchers to join him in forming the Cooperative Clinical 
Group (CCG), and in conducting a multi-clinic evaluation of the treatment of 
syphilis. At the time there was no consensus on syphilis treatment. A range of 
drugs was commonly being given in varying strengths for a condition whose 
presentation, prognosis and natural history were ill defined, all of which made 
evaluating competing treatments a difficult task. The CCG felt that general 
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practitioners should look to the specialists for guidance on the best methods of 
treatment (Marks, 1988: 301). They believed that, as leading specialists in the field 
of syphilis medicine, their combined experience would be of more value than the 
individual experience of general practitioners or the research efforts sponsored by 
pharmaceutical companies. As a collective research enterprise, their mandate was 
to develop an authoritative base from which to assess and subsequently 
recommend treatment regimes; however, finding ways of generating consensus 
and cohesion within this group proved a difficult task. 
Standards literally had to be developed from scratch. Amongst other 
considerations the group had to agree on a model for the 'normal development' of 
syphilis and then decide on which stage of the disease to investigate. They needed 
to document the range of existing treatments, decide which should be studied, and 
in what order. They had to generate criteria for inclusion or exclusion from the 
trial, agree upon indicators against which success or failure could be measured, 
and decide who should carry out the assessment (Marks, 1988: 301). These 
questions are a part of any modern clinical trial, however researchers now have 
cultural and material resources on which to draw, including historical precedents, 
standardised methods, manuals of procedure, and other researchers trained to 
follow the requirements of centralised trial organisers. Even so, agreement over the 
design and operation of trials can still be fragile when parties seek to consolidate 
their research interests. The CCG was attempting to work in a novel way. To 
generate solutions to these problems they needed to arrive at a genuine consensus 
among a disparate group of people whose professional integrity rested largely on 
their ability to act individually and in accordance with their own experience. To be 
successful they needed to reach a consensus which was binding among researchers 
who had no prior experience of, or commitment to, joint research. In the end the 
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task proved too difficult, as differences of op1n1on persisted and consensus 
remained elusive (Marks, 1997: 53-59). 
For an example of the difficulties facing the group, consider the problem of which 
stage of disease and what treatment regimes they should study first. To begin with, 
interpreting symptoms proved to be idiosyncratic and individual doctors' accounts 
of clinical presentation often varied from patient to patient and contradicted their 
colleagues. Patterns of clinic attendance and record-keeping also differed between 
clinics, and treatment history was generally poorly documented which 
compounded the problem of assessing and standardising treatments. It was often 
difficult to work out what treatments patients had received, the stage of their 
disease at presentation, whether they had recovered regardless of treatment, 
whether they relapsed despite treatment, or whether they had been infected anew. 
Further entanglements were experienced when senior investigators delegated the 
classification and coding of patients to statistical staff who lacked clinical 
experience. Publicising the results of the CCG' s work proved another stumbling 
block, as summarising and outlining their findings had generated much contention 
within the group. According to Marks: 
Stokes and Moore, the two members who had worked most with the data, 
were especially cognisant that behind each 'fact' lay a series of decisions, 
often controversial, and sometimes inconsistent, concerning the 
classification and interpretation of the data (Marks, 1988: 304). 
When the group was eventually able to overcome its internal conflict and publish, 
their findings did not make much impact on the medical establishment in the short 
term, although subsequently they have been considered as landmark research. 
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Marks attributes the failure of the CCG to a shortage of financial and personal 
resources which was not simply material, but cultural as well. The major barrier to 
the CCG' s success was the difficulty of getting participating research physicians to 
forgo their intellectual autonomy and to treat patients in accordance with the 
requirements of the trial: 
As chiefs of prestigious clinics, the members were good at giving orders, and 
as former interns they were good at taking orders, but neither experience 
equipped them to share authority. They excelled at originating novel ideas 
and at criticising other people's work, but not at jointly resolving differences 
of opinion (Marks, 1988: 308-9). 
The Group lacked financial support, equipment and drugs, but the problems the 
principal investigators had in relinquishing control of clinical practice and data 
analysis were equally crippling and made complicated issues, such as measuring 
the severity of disease or the treatment outcomes, all but impossible to resolve 
(Marks, 1997: 57). Despite all these dilemmas, the work of the CCG eventually 
gained a degree of recognition and became a standard against which other 
investigations could be judged. 
The conditions under which the CCG worked changed dramatically with the 
advent of World War II. In both the UK and the USA the war increased 
government interest in both the funding and the organisation of medical research. 
In USA monitoring of medical research was centralised in the Committee on 
Medical Research (CMR) through the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development. The increased role of government and military during the war 
fostered elite medical researchers and their interest in cooperative research. 
Leading specialists could be seconded to work on specific well-defined problems 
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with the directive that it was in the national interest to find the most efficient 
solutions (Marks, 1988: 309). 
Due to shortages during the war the CMR was made responsible for rationing 
experimental drugs. When, in 1943, it was suggested that penicillin was effective 
in treating syphilis (a major health problem within the armed forces) a trial was 
organised at the request of the Army with Joseph Earle Moore, a former member 
of the CCG, as chief investigator (Marks, 1997: 108-13). Because the military 
medical bureaucracy could control clinical access to a scarce and highly sought-
after drug, the trial organisers were able to extract agreements from participating 
clinicians to abide by the treatments outlined in the trial design. Initially Moore 
and his team were successful in recruiting both participating clinics and patients; 
however as penicillin became more readily available clinicians increasingly broke 
the trial protocol. Compliance, it seemed, rested not solely on their commitment to 
the research ideals and methodology but required a degree of coercion by state 
regulatory bodies, demonstrating again the unwillingness of physicians to 
relinquish their individual clinical autonomy to external forces. Failure to stick to 
the protocol and poor follow-up meant that nearly half of the patients enrolled in 
the syphilis trials during the war could not be counted in the final results (Marks, 
1988: 310). 
The recurring problem of clinicians' desire to maintain control of the treatment of 
their patients during clinical trials was tempered somewhat by the introduction of 
randomisation into trial design. Although clinicians were becoming increasingly 
sympathetic to the concept of cooperative trials as a good way to carry out 
research, in practise it had proven difficult to maintain their commitment. The 
model of centrally controlled randomisation adopted by the British Public Health 
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Service's trial of streptomycin among soldiers with tuberculosis was introduced on 
the grounds that it would reduce the need for subjective input from clinicians. 
Clinicians could be persuaded to relinquish their personal and professional 
responsibility for treatment as they were doing so in the faith that randomisation 
was a scientifically reliable process which should overcome the fallibility of 
individuals. A consequence of randomisation which was not widely publicised was 
that it would also reduce the ability of individual researchers to stray from an 
agreed research plan (Marks, 1988: 319-29). 
Marks' account of the CCG highlights the work of organising people and things as 
a requisite for 'success' in scientific research. This work is not simply a matter of 
obtaining financial and institutional resources, but reaches to the heart of the 
research effort through the ways it shapes the identity of researchers and the 
knowledges and practices they produce. Marks argues that the CCG 'got it right' 
intellectually by trying to generate a culture of cooperative research. This 
collaborative approach amounted to a major advance in clinical research but could 
not be understood as scientifically beneficial until the work of making adjustments 
to the social conditions governing medical research had been carried out. These 
adjustments were facilitated by pressure from government and were actively 
resisted within the profession, yet they have subsequently been constituted as a 
self-evidently beneficial cultural reorganisation resulting in a methodologically 
more enlightened profession. 
The identities of clinical researchers being constructed by histories like Marks' are 
quite different from the identities constructed in medicine's own hagiographies and 
Whig histories; and they are much less flattering. No longer are the clinical 
researchers heroes leading a hapless public on to a brighter future. Instead, they are 
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a disparate and self-interested group who need to be corralled into collective 
projects in which they have little faith and little interest. Participants in the CCG 
are described as unwilling and unable to reach consensus, easily distracted by their 
own interests, and unwilling to relinquish control of their clinical autonomy to a 
central organising body. As the recognised experts in the field of syphilis 
treatment, their behaviour and actions reflect the state of know ledge and treatment 
practice in the field. Knowledge about syphilis was fragmented, uncertain, and 
personally generated through the experience of individual clinicians who could not 
arrive at a consensus on what that knowledge might be. Experience amounted to 
individual intellectual property and could not be shared amongst the community of 
professionals despite the best intentions of individuals involved. Successful 
treatment depended on the clinical experience of the treating practitioner. 
The advent of World War II saw a rationing of existing resources and an increased 
pressure to maintain fit and healthy armed forces. Money and drugs for research 
were more readily available but only to those who were prepared to follow the 
directions of a central organising committee. Clinical researchers became part of 
the war effort and part of a chain of command. They lost their professional 
autonomy, becoming instead agents working for the national good, and their 
knowledge and experience became part of the collective strategy to bring about 
victory. When individuals objected to this change in their identity, military and 
government pressure could be used to remind them of their obligations as citizens. 
Marks constructs the RCT as an artefact which strips individual researchers of 
their autonomy and authority and tightens the centralisation of medical research in 
the hands of a few individuals who are in close relationship with government and 
corporate capital. But if this description of the historical evolution of clinical 
54 
researchers is challenging, consider for a moment his treatment of medical 
subjects. Patients are all but invisible in his account; they are the absent 'other' in 
the making of modern medicine and can only be read between the lines of the main 
story. To begin with, patients for the CCG were unrelated diverse clinical 
'presentations', with a non-existent or uncertain history (in the form of medical 
records), and an unreliable sense of their own state of health. In order for scientific 
work to be deemed successful, these patients had to be organised into a relation 
with their disease and others suffering from that disease (through codification into 
discrete categories along the spectrum of a normal 'presentation'), and a relation 
with _their doctor and their bodies (through a reinscription of personal history and 
self knowledge into a deference to clinical authority). The CCG were unable to 
bring about this reordering in patients' behaviour and although it is the failure of 
doctors to discipline themselves which is the focus of Marks' commentary, their 
inability to produce disciplined medical subjects also contributed to their failure. It 
is perhaps not surprising that the first RCT which was deemed to be successful 
involved soldiers and ex-soldiers as its medical subjects: as successful patients, 
this group embodied the rhetorical ideals of discipline and altruism. 
Science, identity and contemporary medical research 
The first half of the chapter has focused on different histories of clinical trials and 
the meanings they convey about science, medicine and medical research. The 
historical accounts medical researchers favour for themselves ( those taken from 
textbooks and medical journals) have been contrasted with another history, and 
two narratives have emerged: one telling of the unproblematic evolution and 
natural superiority of the RCT, and the other describing its emergence as a result 
of slow and arduous (and at no point self-evident) work by researchers, 
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government and the military. The remainder of this chapter explores how concepts 
of medical rigour and science are taken up in descriptions of current research 
methodologies. 
There are two principal types of study in clinical medicine: descriptive studies, 
such as correlational studies, cross-sectional surveys, and case reports and case 
series; and analytic studies, such as case-control and cohort studies, and 
intervention studies. Each of these forms of research appeals to and mobilises 
different features of the rhetoric and mythology of science. Before exploring how 
notions of rigour and science are taken up in medical literature these study 
methodologies are briefly described. 
Descriptive Studies 
Descriptive studies are primarily concerned with describing the general 
characteristics of a disease, particularly in relation to individuals and populations, 
geographical locations and historical time frames (Hennekens & Buring, 1987: 
16). This 'trend mapping' is a valuable technique for formulating policy, 
developing education campaigns and allocating resources, and it can contribute 
towards identifying factors which may be responsible for causing the disease or 
conditions in question. Descriptive studies use information from a broad range of 
sources including census data, vital statistics records, employment health 
examinations, clinical records from hospitals or private practices, national survey 
data on consumption of foods, medications and other products (Hennekens & 
Buring, 1987: 101). 
The three main forms of descriptive study are correlational studies, case reports 
and case series, and cross sectional surveys. Correlational studies identify 
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representative features within a population in order to describe disease in relation 
to some specific factor such as age, date and time of an event, exposure, or 
development of a condition, the use of health services, and so on. The primary 
advantage of a correlational study is that existing data sets are often available, 
making the research comparatively quick and inexpensive (Hearst & Hulley, 
1988). Hennekens and Buring identify two chief limitations of the correlational 
study. Because they seek to describe rather than analyse health trends in specific 
populations, they are unable to link exposure to disease in any particular 
individual. Their power thus lies in the strength of observational inference they can 
lend to support an existing causal hypothesis, or in the possibility that their 
findings can contribute towards generating a causal hypothesis. 
An example of this is the study by Schatzkin et al., which examines the con·elation 
of patterns of alcohol consumption with the prevalence of breast cancer. By 
considering measures that represent alcohol consumption alongside measures that 
represent dietary fat intake and the occurrence of breast cancer, Schatzkin and 
colleagues found that there was no independent association between alcohol 
consumption and breast cancer (Schatzkin et al., 1989). As this study is descriptive 
only, it does not shed light on which of a number of different competing factors 
might be responsible for causing the breast cancer of any particular women or the 
cancers in any specific subgroups of women, or in the general population. 
Alternatively, should no theories exist about the causes of breast cancer 
Schatzkin's descriptive study would be a useful attempt to generate an initial 
causal hypothesis about the relationship between alcohol consumption, dietary fat 
intake and the incidence of breast cancer. As correlational studies do not attempt 
intervention, and often rely on pre-existing data, they lack the ability to control for 
the potential effect of confounding factors (influences which are not of interest to 
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the researcher but which nonetheless affect the data generated during a study). The 
existence and effects of such confounding factors may be hinted at by descriptive 
studies, but descriptive studies can not be considered scientifically conclusive. 
A case report or case series documents the history of an individual or a small 
number of individuals. Case reports may simply summarise a patient's symptoms 
or the way these symptoms change over time as a means of identifying the 'normal' 
presentation and development of conditions; but more often they focus on cases 
which are considered to be unusual or anomalous. In terms of the standards of 
science, case reports and case studies are not considered to be reliable as they are 
purely anecdotal, although they do provide an important link between clinical 
practice and research because they allow practitioners to speculate directly as to 
the reasons for an anomalous presentation whilst supposedly alerting researchers to 
the existence of a deviation from the expected presentation of a disease or 
condition. Case reports are among the studies most frequently published 1n 
medical journals and have historical importance in epidemiology because of the 
role they play in identifying a potential epidemic (Hennekens & Buring, 1987: 
106). 
An extension of the case report is the case series in which a number of case reports 
dealing with what is assumed to be a single condition may be grouped together to 
document different examples of the condition, different interventions, and different 
outcomes attributable to these interventions. If a clinician is detailing the effects of 
different treatments in a small number of patients, the case series may provide a 
miniature model of an intervention trial. Merit in modern medical trials is always 
linked with the statistical power attributable to a trial population and the perceived 
objectivity of the researcher, so the numbers contained within a case series are 
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always too small to be considered meaningful. Instead, they are important for 
providing clinicians with an avenue through which to report on unique or unusual 
patients. The case study is not considered to be a scientific mode of knowledge 
production. As with correlational studies, case studies may be useful 1n 
formulating hypotheses, but are not appropriate for testing such hypotheses. 
The final type of descriptive study is the cross-sectional or prevalence survey. 
Cross-sectional surveys provide details about the frequency of occurrence and 
nature of a disease by producing a 'snapshot' of the health status of the population 
at a specified time (Hennekens & Buring, 1987: 111). In these studies an exposure 
or risk event and disease status are measured among a group who are defined by a 
specific set of characteristics. A particular time frame or another identifiable event 
may be the reason people are chosen. As with other descriptive studies, cross-
sectional or prevalence surveys are mapping techniques which are useful in 
measuring the health status and needs of a population and in developing and 
assessing policy. They are particularly useful in identifying the needs of specified 
sub-groups within a community and for suggesting intervention strategies for those 
populations. For example, they can be used to gather information on the 
prevalence of disease or health outcomes in certain occupations, thus indicating the 
need for reviews of workplace occupational health and safety management. 
Although they are said to be 'descriptive', the types of study listed above all 
involve a degree of inferred analysis through the ways in which they order and 
document information and events. Inference is drawn about what is considered to 
be a base level or 'normal' state of affairs (as with a cross-sectional survey) or 
about the way a population's experiences or individual cases (as with case studies 
and case series) differ from an expected norm. Essentially, however, they claim to 
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observe and represent in an unbiased manner, the state of a population's health. 
Once this has been done, researchers can speculate on cause, but cannot test it with 
the methods of descriptive studies. 
Descriptive studies are considered to be the least scientific of the methodologies 
available for medical investigation, and examining how they fashion researchers 
and the researched may shed some light on why this is so. Initially they represent 
researchers as being observers only. Although this is in keeping with traditional 
assumptions about scientists as observers of nature, it limits the primary identity of 
researcher to 'reporter' rather than 'innovator'. Through their reliance on existing 
source material the researcher conducting a correlational study, a cross-sectional or 
prevalence survey is made to be an expert data manager rather than an expert 
clinician, and indeed, they need not even be medically trained. These 
methodologies assume that medical practice results in vast data bases and that 
medical know ledge is best served by linking and aligning this information in 
specific ways so as to represent accurately the health of populations. With the 
exception of case studies and case series, the research subjects in descriptive 
studies are populations not individuals. They are situated populations: people with 
histories, dietary habits, work practices, health service utilisation patterns. They 
are populations who are routinely monitored and tracked by governments, 
employers, insurance companies, and hospital administrations. The human bodies 
in these studies are thoroughly embedded social subjects whose health is 
contingent on the way their activities are given meaning through surveillance 
techniques available to researchers. By drawing on material gathered from large 
surveys and existing health data bases, researchers utilising these methodologies 
are also constructing themselves as part of a system of social surveillance and 
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management - an identity which is at odds with the ideal of the good scientist and 
her/his object of study as existing outside the constraints of the social world. 
The case report or a case series has a special and paradoxical place within the 
rhetoric surrounding clinical research and the identity it helps build for clinicians 
and patients is quite different from the identities created by other descriptive or 
analytic studies. Initially they speak of a direct personal relationship between 
patient and doctor. Here, the subject is not a population, but an individual. The 
patient is of interest solely because of their deviance from the clinical experience 
of the doctor. By nominating their patients as unusual, the clinician is assuming 
their personal clinical experience as an authority for judging norms of health and 
disease. They alone are endorsed to judge the clinical interest of a patient who is 
assumed to be an anomaly from a universalised norm (see Hunter, 1991, especially 
chapter 5). It is, however, this individualising emphasis on both the experience of 
the medical practitioner and the patient which reduces the scientific merit of the 
case study or case series. A scientific clinical researcher is one who remains 
detached from and disinterested in their patients, and a scientifically useful patient 
is one who can be made to fit within codifiable and generalisable organisational 
schemes and is not a problematic unique exception to the rules. Despite this, the 
personal experience of a doctor is still a respected platform for clinical decision 
making which may contribute to the high regard in which case studies and case 
series are held. 
Analytic Studies 
The second major class of medical studies are the analytic studies such as case-
control and cohort studies and randomised controlled trials. Cohort studies involve 
following a group of people defined by a specific characteristic or set of 
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characteristics over time. They serve both a descriptive and an analytic purpose. 
They are descriptive inasmuch as they document the occurrence of a single or 
multiple outcome within a population, and then seek to analyse the association 
between hypothesised risk factors and those outcomes. Cohort studies can be both 
prospective (the samples, risks and outcomes of interest are identified prior to the 
events occurring) or retrospective (the events of interest or outcome have already 
taken place). 
According to Hennekens and Buring case-control studies are more scientifically 
robust than cohort studies because they introduce a control group against which 
risk factors and outcomes among the cases are compared (Hennekens & Buring, 
1987 133). Cohort and cross-sectional studies are described as 'lacking the 
strength' to investigate all but the most common diseases; they would be expensive 
and would require thousands of subjects to identify risk factors for less common 
diseases. By introducing a reference group, the power of a study is increased 
through allowing the prevalence of risk factors in those with a disease (cases) to be 
compared with the healthy reference group (controls). Cases and controls are 
analysed with respect to some existing or past event or exposure which is thought 
to be causally related to the disease or condition (Meinert, 1986: 283). Such 
analysis is generally retrospective but under certain circumstances can be 
prospective. This design is seen as being particularly susceptible to bias where the 
selection of cases and controls is concerned. For example the defining 
characteristics of both cases and controls are specifically chosen by the researcher. 
Consequently the researcher can manipulate directly ( consciously or otherwise) the 
identity and definitions of who and what constitutes an appropriate research 
subject This is thought to be problematic because of biomedicine's comnutment 
to the neutrality and objectivity of researchers. Besides the potential for selection 
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bias, the long time spans which are sometimes involved with retrospective studies 
and the way exposure is recorded in both cases and controls is another point at 
which bias can occur. In particular, in the absence of adequate record keeping, 
personal recall is seen as unreliable. The temporal reversal of the causal chain, that 
is moving from effect (disease or health event of interest) to cause (antecedent 
exposure or event) has led to some scepticism amongst investigators who see it as 
less logically robust than moving from cause to effect (Hennekens & Buring, 1987 
133). Despite this, Newman et al argue that when diseases are either rare, or have a 
long latent period between exposure and onset, case-control studies are far more 
efficient than the other designs, and "are often the only feasible option" (Newman 
et al., 1988: 80). 
The perceived weaknesses of cohort and case-control studies undermines the 
scientific identity of a researcher in two ways. Initially, researchers may be held 
answerable for bias in the selections of participants (something against which the 
process of randomisation guards). Secondly, where the study is retrospective the 
researcher is cast in a passive role, merely recording the experiences of trial 
participants. Although the researchers design surveys and interview schedules the 
intellectual authority of the study is to a large degree dependent on the accounts 
participants give of their lives: it is not the researcher who interprets the physical 
signs and symptoms of study participants, but the participants themselves who 
interpret the surveys and interview schedules. And again, as with the descriptive 
studies, these are socially situated subjects whose life-histories are crucial in 
determining their eligibility for participation in a study. 
Whatever their limitations, all these forms of medical investigation are widely 
used and are highly valued; the most important aspect of good clinical research is 
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rigour which includes assessing at the outset of a project which method of study is 
most suitable. Different problems require different solutions, and the way a 
problem is understood to operate goes a long way toward thinking about how 
solutions may be achieved. Several factors influence the choice of research 
methodology, including the condition, event or disease under investigation, and the 
time frame within which the research will take place. Also important are the 
personnel available to participate in the project both as researchers and subjects, 
the nature of the intervention under investigation and expected degree of 
participant compliance. Finally, funding considerations are crucial. The particular 
strengths and weaknesses of trial designs cater differently for the contingencies of 
specific problem solving exercises. The first task in approaching an investigation 
is to arrive at an appropriate methodological design. What precisely 'appropriate 
methodological design' might mean is constantly the subject of vigorous and 
critical debate within the medical research community. However moves towards 
'evidence based medicine' (such as the Chocrane Collaboration) argue that RCTs 
are the most scientific method and suggest that in the best of all possible worlds 
they should be the method of choice. 
In light of the acknowledged value of descriptive, case-control, and cohort studies, 
why has the RCT risen to such clear epistemological prominence, and why is 
knowledge derived from RCTs considered to be superior to knowledge derived 
from these other forms of experimentation? Why do researchers in one breath utter 
statements about the need for diverse research strategies and trial designs, yet in 
the next breath identify them as less authoritative than RCTs. For example, 
Mosteller et al write of the RCT: 
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Many other, simpler strategies also provide information about what happens 
after treatment is given. Each of these strategies is sometimes used to say 
something about the effectiveness of a treatment. They all lack the strength 
of the controlled trial because their designs are inherently weaker .... They 
are frequently described as being almost as good as or closely approaching, 
but never is it suggested that their weaker design offers the strength of 
inference one can provide with a controlled trial. For this reason, the 
carefully executed controlled trial continues to supply our best evidence of 
cause and effect. (Mosteller et al., 1983: 14). 
And in the next paragraph: 
... in the controlled trial we have a model of perfection ... (Mosteller et al., 
1983: 14). 
TheRCT 
The term 'randomised controlled trial' is generic, referring to a set of intellectual 
and practical approaches to identifying the relative merits of specified medical 
interventions with the aim of generalising the findings to the clinical setting 
(Bailar, 1983 2). A trial is said to be 'controlled' when a researcher actively 
assigns a placebo, single or multiple competing therapies to one or more 
experimental groups within a larger population (Mosteller et al., 1983: 13). 
In theory, a good trial has tightly defined criteria governing eligibility for 
participation. There will always be a 'control' treatment against which the 
experimental treatments are assessed. This control may be a placebo ( considered to 
be inactive), or it may be an available standard treatment. There may be one 
experimental agent, a number of different agents or combination of agents, and the 
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nun1ber of control arms in the trial will vary according to the number of treatments 
being investigated. Allocation of patients to either the control or experimental 
groups is critical and, as indicated by the discussion in the preceding section, is 
seen as a point at which 'bias' can enter a trial. Consequently it is thought to be 
vital that this allocation be completely 'random' and beyond the influence of 
paiiicipating clinical reseai·chers or the subjects themselves. 
The addition of randomisation to trial design is seen as a major contribution to 
scientific medicine because it supposedly guards against selection bias. When 
randomisation is effective the allocation of treatment options occurs in a totally 
unpredictable manner, eliminating the possibility that clinicians' personal interests 
can affect the composition of the groups (Feinstein, 1989: 481). It cannot be 
overstated how significant this aspect of randomisation is thought to be. As well as 
addressing the problem of active selection bias, random allocation theoretically 
ensures that within the chance aberrations produced by the randomised 'luck of the 
draw', the groups receiving the different treatments should have similar prognostic 
outlooks before treatment begins. Ensuring adequate randomisation is essential for 
smoothing out and counteracting the differences that individual patients and 
physicians may bring to a trial situation. Thus randomisation is essential to the 
belief that a well executed trial will result in a conclusion that is generalisable and 
representative not just of the trial population, but of the population as a whole. 
How randomisation actually happens will vary, depending on the individual trial 
design. It may involve sealed envelopes containing details of the arm of a trial to 
which a patient will be allocated, or a prepared chart listing the same information 
(Hill, 1951: 280). A table of random numbers may be used, or a computer program 
generating random lists (Hennekens & Buring, 1987: 186). It is important that 
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randomisation not be open to corruption, so it is considered desirable to have a 
centre of randomisation at a different physical location from the trial site. With 
many modern large-scale multi-centre trials the statistician in control of 
randomisation is located away from any of the clinical sites. 
Blinding, the process whereby as many of the people as possible who are involved 
with the research are prevented from knowing which of the therapeutic agents each 
trial participant is being given, is the next significant feature of the RCT. Blinding 
is said to be important to maintaining neutrality and impartiality throughout the 
experimental process. Initially, if clinicians and researchers know which treatment 
patients are being given they may lose their natural professional objectivity and 
interpret observations and outcomes in a manner which favours their preferred 
outcomes. The more blinding, the better. Thus it is desirable to extend blinding to 
all those handling materials deriving from the trial (for example radiologists or 
pathologists). In the ideal situation the blinding extends well beyond this. It is also 
important that the trial participants are blinded for two reasons: firstly there is 
some hint that if patients know they are being given an experimental agent they 
may well actually do better simply because of that knowledge. Secondly, and more 
significant for the requirements of RCTs, if patients know which agent they are 
being exposed to and if it is not their agent of choice, then they may withdraw 
from the trial and seek alternative treatment, or corrupt the trial by seeking 
additional treatment 'on the side'. Any of these would undermine the research on 
three fronts. Every withdrawal must be considered when calculating the results and 
may require the withdrawal of another subject from the opposing arm of the trial 
which can weaken the statistical power attributable to outcomes. Seeking 
additional treatments may affect the actions of experimental therapies and 
confound outcomes in ways which researchers cannot account for. Finally, when 
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participants withdraw from a trial or seek additional treatment they challenge the 
research clinician's authority to determine what constitutes best treatment (even 
when blinded themselves to what the treatment might be). 
As suggested in Chapter 1 and in the preceding discussion of the history of clinical 
trials, blinding presents a paradox in the operation and ideology of medicine. It 
serves to maintain and further reify the scientific (as opposed to clinical) authority 
of researchers while assuming and formalising a fundamental lack of authority or 
expertise among trial participants. By attempting to maintain the neutrality and 
disinterestedness of the clinician, blinding seeks to reinforce their cognitive and 
professional authority. Appeals to a professional neutrality and disinterestedness 
are a fundamental part of the claims upon which medicine maintains its privileged 
social status. Blinding within professional groups therefore lends support to this 
claim. Blinding within patient groups, on the other hand, is directed at stopping 
patients making decisions about treatment during a trial and in so doing 
threatening the scientific validity of the enterprise. Blinding thus affects the 
exercise of power very differently for clinicians and patients. It reinforces the 
scientific status of the clinical researcher while undermining trial participants who 
would disrupt the research process. The RCT is inextricably indebted to this power 
relation. 
Despite the esteem with which the RCT is regarded, it is not without its critics. 
The concerns raised by such critics will be discussed throughout the thesis and will 
be developed specifically through the case studies in Chapters 4 through 6. But to 
begin this discussion, consider some of the tensions the RCT creates for the 
women's health movement and feminist health researchers. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, feminists have focused a great deal of attention on empowering women 
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patients and practitioners to challenge and resist the androcentrism which was a 
prominent component of traditional medical authority. The RCT has the potential 
to simultaneously disrupt and further entrench gender bias in medicine. 
Challenging the androcentrism of clinical trials 
One requirement for a successful clinical trial is that it be relevant to those likely 
to benefit from its findings, so it is important to recruit a study population that 
reflects the diversity of people potentially eligible for a treatment. However, 
ensuring diversity in trial populations has not always been a priority and in many 
instances has not been achieved. Depending on the frequency of the health event in 
question, in any randomly chosen segment of the community only a small number 
of individuals will experience the condition under investigation. While these 
individuals may include women and men from diverse cultural and socioeconomic 
backgrounds, only a fraction of them will become aware of the existence of a trial, 
be asked to participate, or be eligible for enrolment. At each stage of recruiting 
trial participants social factors come into play. Who finds out about a trial and 
why? Is it because their doctors tell them, they read about it in a newspaper or 
magazine, or hear about it through radio or television coverage? Once a person 
becomes aware, how readily can they obtain enough information to decide whether 
they are interested in taking part in the study? If they are interested, who do they 
contact and what response does their inquiry elicit? Are they encouraged, or 
implicitly or explicitly discouraged, from pursuing the matter? The selection 
process is well underway by the time a study candidate reaches the point of formal 
evaluation where official screening will further reduce the heterogeneity of 
applicants. Self-selection and motivation on the part of individual participants is 
important for the success of a trial, but this commitment from lay participants is 
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mediated in the first instance by the profile of those approached and invited to 
participate. 
Although technical criteria will govern the biological requirements of the trial, 
there will be numerous other issues which become the basis for filtering out 
applicants. When selecting participants consideration is given to whether or not 
they are able and willing to 'comply' with the experimental regimes in question, as 
once a person has been admitted to a trial there will be barriers they must negotiate 
if they are to stay with the trial to its conclusion. For example, are treatments 
affordable and convenient? Do they interfere with people's daily life, for instance, 
by causing undesirable physiological changes or by requiring attendance at clinics 
or time and attention for self monitoring? Do people have the conceptual or 
language skill to meet the requirements of the trial? Do participants require stable 
employment and a long-term postal address for adequate follow-up? While clinical 
researchers may be aware of the goal of getting a representative trial population, 
they must also select people they believe will help their trial succeed, so the way 
researchers answer questions such as these shape their choice of participants. By 
legitimately selecting for success researchers run the risk of assuming only certain 
types of people are appropriate trial subjects, which in turn may lead to the choice 
of an unrepresentative trial population. There has been a tendency for trial 
populations to reflect medicine's belief in a universal body which was both male 
and white (Dresser, 1992; Keville, 1994). Women and men who differed from this 
white male norm have historically been under-represented in trial populations. 
Questions like those listed above illustrate how the exclusion of certain individuals 
or groups can be justified by researchers who are seeking to limit confounding 
-
variables by constructing a standardised trial population (Angell, 1993: 271). They 
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also illustrate how attempts to minimise confounders can result in recruitment 
practices which exclude certain categories of participants and impact on the 
generalisability of outcomes. Clearly culture and physiology affect how disease 
and treatments manifest themselves, yet it is the dominant (and largely 
unquestioned) practice to assume findings based on one gender or racial group can 
be extrapolated to all humans. But if those who actually complete a trial represent 
only a small section of the broader community, will the results be meaningful 
outside the setting of the trial? If the profile of the trial population were 
predominantly male, is it appropriate to presume the outcome will be similar for 
women? If the population were predominantly white are the results relevant to 
other racial and ethnic groups? If the population is predominantly heterosexual is it 
safe to expect the findings will hold true in the gay or lesbian community? 
Assuming the worth of a treatment is an increasingly risky business the less a 
patient resembles the trial population (Assaf & Carleton, 1998), and a consequence 
of past over-representation of white men in trial populations is that clinicians now 
lack evidence on whether accepted treatments are beneficial for women or people 
of colour (Dresser, 1992: 24). 
Difficulty in recruiting appropriate subjects has been used as another reason for 
excluding certain groups from clinical trials (Levy, 1991). As suggested earlier, 
difficulty in recruiting may be the result of the prevalence of a disease or condition 
within a given community, however it may be exacerbated by the prejudices of 
clinicians and the way they design their trials. If so-called design requirements are 
cited as reasons for the difficulty of recruiting suitable female subjects, an 
examination of the assumptions clinicians have about the nature of the disease or 
condition they are investigating coupled with the development of appropriate and 
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inclusive research strategies, may go a long way towards reconceptualising the 
profile of potential subjects. 
Women's exclusion from research was institutionalised through the US FDA's 
1977 policy limiting the participation of women of child bearing age from 
participation in early trials. The FDA stipulated that, because of the potential risks 
to a foetus, women of child bearing age should be excluded from the first phase of 
clinical trials (testing for toxicity and dose tolerance among a small number of 
people) unless there was the possibility of substantial benefit for the woman 
involved (as in the case of a life threatening disease) (Wermeling & Selwitz, 1993: 
905). These restrictions applied across the board and did not discriminate between 
sexually active premenopausal women not using contraception, women using 
hormonal and barrier methods of contraception, those whose partners have had 
vasectomies, those who were celibate, or lesbians (Merkatz et al., 1993: 295). 
Although these regulations were relaxed for participation in later phases of clinical 
trials (as drugs came closer to public release and were tested in larger populations), 
they resulted in the perception that women do not, and should not, participate 
equally in trials (Angell, 1993: 271). I would go further to suggest they continue to 
inform the belief that women are less stable and reliable experimental subjects 
because of their biochemical difference from male biology, the ethical issues 
related to effects on foetuses advertently or inadvertently exposed to the 
experimental treatment, the concern over potential litigation in the face of 
unknown effects on a foetus, and finally, a perceived difficulty recruiting female 
participants. 
Including women in trial populations is not simply a matter of ensuring they 
participate in sufficient numbers; it is also a matter of accounting for female 
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difference from a male norm and somehow standardising the two into a 
generalisable representation of effects of the drug or procedure under investigation. 
The multiple forms of female cyclicity repeatedly arise as problematic when 
comparing treatments among women and men, and when monitoring their impact. 
For example, fluctuating hormone levels during a lifetime, a menstrual cycle or a 
contraceptive cycle, or pregnancy, can impact on the actions of drugs so patterns of 
the effectiveness of a treatment may need to be separately mapped for women at 
different stages of their lives. In an experimental situation where researchers are 
attempting to demonstrate a hypothesis clearly and conclusively, negotiating 
female biology can mean adding an apparently unnecessary layer of 'complexity' 
(see for instance (Merkatz et al., 1993: 293)). When countering the supposed 
problems of female difference a number of responses are possible. If homogeneity 
of a trial population is nominated as important for the smooth generation of an 
outcome, the question can be asked as to why the trial should be made up of whites 
and men rather than any other population, for instance Aboriginal and fem ale? The 
reasons this has largely been the case are ostensively historical and political. In 
addition, the assumption that female hormones, and not male hormones, 
complicate research needs to be scrutinised. And why is women's cyclicity 
considered adequate grounds for exclusion from research populations if women are 
an ultimate target group for the experimental outcome? If horn1ones complicate an 
experimental situation they also complicate the clinical setting, yet perversely in 
the clinic they have been constituted as a reason for medical intervention rather 
than a reason against medical treatment. 
In addition to including women in research populations, consideration should also 
be given to the role their presence plays in analysing whether there are sex or 
gender related differences in the effectiveness or safety of the experimental 
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treatment (Merkatz et al., 1993: 924). Even when trial participation is equal 
amongst men and women and when attempts are made to consider sex and gender 
as analytic variables there is a tendency to assume it is a variable which needs to 
be 'controlled' for in such a way that its effects are minimised. For example, 
Kunkel and Atchley discuss a study of disability and functional limitation among 
the elderly in which gender was considered as a confounding variable (Kunkel & 
Atchley, 1996: 294-295). Atchley found that when coded and considered within 
the trial as a whole, 'gender' was not an indication of functional limitation for 
aging men or women. When the same analytic models were run separately by 'sex', 
substantially different findings emerged. Functional limitations in men were not 
adequately predicted by independent variables such as age, attitudes, and self-rated 
health. For women, however, old age, a negative feeling about retirement, lower 
self-rated health, and lower socioeconomic status were significant predictors of 
ability to function in everyday life (Kunkel & Atchley, 1996). Simply adding 
women to clinical trials may not produce sex-sensitive outcomes: instead a 
questioning of individual trial designs and of specific research and analysis 
methods may be needed. 
The specific exclusion of women of reproductive age is based on the need to 
protect women and their offspring in the instance that a participant becomes 
pregnant while on a trial (Wermeling & Selwitz, 1993: 908). While fear of 
miscarriage, birth defects and other foetal damage or pregnancy complications are 
appropriate reasons for concern, it is worth asking whether they justify the blanket 
exclusion of all women between the ages of 15 and 50. Beyond the obvious 
outcome that society cannot be confident of the effects of treatments on women of 
reproductive age unless they are systematically monitored, this practice assumes 
that the potential hazards to a foetus outweigh the potential treatment benefits to 
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women. It also fails to acknowledge that women can make rational decisions about 
contraception, pregnancy and abortion whether or not they are participating in a 
trial. This theme is carried into the third reason given for limiting women's 
participation. In an increasingly litigious climate concerns over damages claims 
resulting from exposure to harmful medical procedures has been used by sponsors 
of trials as grounds for exclusion. In the USA, litigation over foetal abnormalities 
caused by drugs such as thalidomide, bendectin, and diethylstilbestrol have cost 
the pharmaceutical industry billions of dollars. Since most drugs do not make it 
past early phase testing, animal studies looking at the effects of a d1ug on foetuses 
are normally carried out only when that drug is in later stage trials. It appears to 
make more economic sense to exclude women from early trials (thereby also 
limiting liability), than it does to undertake teratogenic screening on all 
compounds and procedures set for Phase I testing (Wermeling & Selwitz, 1993: 
907). Dresser counters this point by arguing that the chance that a few women may 
become pregnant, might not opt for terminations and subsequently give birth to 
deformed or diseased babies is not enough to justify the current exclusionary 
practices. Further, clearly identifying the risk to potential foetuses in consent forms 
reduces the likelihood that a woman who becomes pregnant and decides against 
termination will seek compensation. She acknowledges that litigation by any child 
injured through exposure in utero is not addressed by this precaution (Dresser, 
1992: 25-26). 
Each of these concerns depicts women's biological identity as centring on 
reproduction and renders this identity problematic. Because of hormonal cyclicity 
women are inherently unstable, difficult to understand and difficult to encompass 
within medical practice. Women cannot be trusted not to become pregnant and 
pregnancy presents an ethical dilemma which can only be resolved by putting the 
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rights of foetuses above those of women. Furthermore, if they do become 
pregnant, women cannot be trusted not to sue pharmaceutical companies. It is 
safer, therefore, to discourage their participation in clinical trials. 
Before leaving this discussion of the gendered nature of RCTs I would like to 
briefly return to Oakley's work (discussed in Chapter 1). Who's afraid of the RCT? 
is a rare instance of a specific sociological critique of the RCT, which is also 
explicitly feminist. While many of the concerns she develops are raised by others, 
she is unusual in articulating them as problems for a feminist health project. 
Oakley begins by noting that feminist health research is often pursued by social 
scientists utilising qualitative methodologies rather than scientists using 
quantitative methods. She writes that: 
Qualitative methods involving indepth interviewing are seen to be more 
suited to the exploration of individual experiences - the representation of 
subjectivity within academic discourse and to facilitate (in practice if not in 
theory) a nonhierarchical organization of research process ... Conversely, 
quantitative methods (large-scale surveys, the use of prespecified scoring 
methods, e.g., in personality tests) are cited as instituting the hegemony of 
the researcher over the researched, and as reducing personal experience to 
the anonymity of mere numbers (Oakley, 1989: 28). 
According to Oakley feminist researchers have been reluctant to engage with 
quantitative methodologies on the grounds that their benefits may not be attainable 
without the associated hazards of losing the richness of individual women's life 
stories and of reducing these women to 'mere numbers'. Yet as women stand to 
benefit from rigorous evaluation of therapeutic interventions to which they are 
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routinely exposed, it is necessary to identify potential advantages of the RCT and, 
wherever possible, separate them from the oppressive influences of patriarchal 
medicine. Oakley identifies the ownership and distribution of medical know ledge, 
randomisation and patient and practitioner blinding as particularly problematic for 
women's health (Oakley, 1989: 29). 
Feminist campaigners place importance on validating women's experiences with 
the medical profession and their own health. As far as patients are concerned, the 
purpose of blinding and randomisation is to remove individual subjective 
experiences from the out~ome of a trial, which has the effect of placing the 
interpretation and dissemination of trial outcomes firmly in the hands of clinical 
practitioners. These practices are, therefore, counter to the feminist goal of 
empowering women in the clinical setting. For practitioners and researcher, it is 
assumed that blinding and the random allocation of patients to treatment groups 
(rather than reliance on professional judgement) is the best way to eliminate 
potential bias. While this may be beneficial in some instances it can also be read as 
an explicitly political challenge to the authority of clinicians: the ideological 
implications of randomisation vary depending on the professional identity of the 
clinicians and researchers involved and the nature of the medical intervention they 
are examining. For example, Oakley refers to a midwifery trial which examined 
the effect of social support on pregnancy outcomes. In this instance it was female 
practitioners, already operating from a subordinate position to the obstetricians, 
who were required to relinquish their professional judgement for the process of 
randomisation. 
Feminist challenging of the tradi_tional hegemony of a patriarchal biomedicine, 
coupled with attempts to redress women's limited employment opportunities 
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within different levels of the medical profession, has emphasised the legitimacy of 
the experience of women practitioners. In particular, in keeping with standpoint 
feminism, it is the experiences of these practitioners as 'women' which partly 
contribute to a unique form of clinical authority. Requiring they relinquish their 
clinical intuitions and personal experience as their patients are randomised to 
different trial groups implies not only that their experiences as (women) 
practitioners are not a beneficial source of legitimacy, but that they are detrimental 
to good clinical practice. For many clinicians the move to limit clinical autonomy 
in a trial setting can be read as a good trade-off as it enhances their status as 
scientists; for a feminist health researcher, however, it can be read as an attempt to 
neuter a justifiable source of their authority in the name of a science that has come 
under sustained attack for being unreflexively masculine. 
This chapter has focused on the role of science in medicine by exarmn1ng 
historical representations of the RCT and current accounts of different medical 
research methodologies. My purpose in doing this has been to show that, more 
than any other form of medical experimentation, RCTs are portrayed as 
incorporating the rhetorical benefits associated with science and the scientific 
method. But, as my treatment of the history of RCTs shows, this perception, far 
from being self-evidently true, has been carefully crafted through a disavowal of 
the historical and social contingencies that surrounded its emergence and rise to 
power and continues to surround its use. The following chapter takes up the theme 
of the scientifically constructed human body and discusses the ways that 
discourses about sex hormones inevitably refer back to this body and are used to 
continue the severing of social influences on biology, personality and behaviour. 
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CHAPTER3 
Constructing the hormonal body 
Hormones are historically and culturally constructed entities which are being 
used to explain an increasing number of phenomena, many of which impact on 
the meanings of sex. In this chapter I seek to demonstrate how cultural values 
come to be an integral part of representations of natural biological entities by 
showing that factors which are not strictly rational and scientific have 
contributed to the historical development and current explanatory success of 
hormones. The cultural imagery which is inscribed within scientific accounts of 
sex hormones illustrates the centrality of hormones in the medicalisation of a 
range of social phenomena. A consequence of this medicalisation has been an 
increase in the clinical regulation of these phenomena. 
Medicalisation and the sexed body 
Sex, in all its manifestations, is a fluid (though deeply embedded) entity whose 
'real' and interpretive boundaries are not and cannot be precisely stabilised. Sex 
is a site of continual contestation in which multiple players vie to define a key 
unit of meaning, a unit which has been made to speak with authority and 
conviction to our expectations about life. For instance, sex informs social 
assumptions about the naturalness of certain psychological preferences of, and 
physical acts between, consenting heterosexual adults. It speaks to beliefs about 
the cognitive ability and rationality of individuals and groups. It invokes and 
continually redescribes aesthetic standards of maleness and femaleness 
(standards whose redescriptions claim for themselves the status of pre-given). 
And these standards are assumed to incorporate two diametrically opposed 
biological types. 
There are many different players seeking to define sex. Problematising 'sex' is 
at the core of most contemporary gender theory and of the 'body politics' 
writers such as Elizabeth Grosz (Grosz, 1994), Susan Bordo (Bordo, 1990), Iris 
Marion Young (Young, 1990), Bob Connell (Connell, 1987), Leonore Tiefer 
(Tiefer, 1995), and Brian Turner (Turner, 1984). Another key player is 
biomedicine in its broadest sense. Although biomedicine's primary concern is 
the codification and stabilisation of biological and psychological sex, a cursory 
look at the dynamics of medical research and practice shows that medical 
definitions of sex are also highly contested and under constant revision. Sex 
endocrinology, the study of sex hormones, is one of the numerous sites through 
which biomedicine seeks to define sex. 
Sex hormones are implicated in a number of phenomena ranging from post-
natal depression, to accounts of sex differences in spacio-temporal ability. 
During the twentieth century there has been a systematic extension of theories 
and practices relating to sex hormones which enables an increasing number of 
life-events to be incorporated within the boundaries of medical science through 
reference to hormones. The notion of medicalisation is a useful tool for 
understanding how sex hormones have developed within and influenced 
twentieth century discourses about medicine and sexuality. Medicalisation 
provides a way of discussing the colonialisation of health, particularly women's 
health, by hormonal discourses. Theories of medicalisation allow for an account 
of the genesis and growth of new medical concepts and areas of medical 
expertise which does not assume a priori that their development and diffusion is 
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driven entirely by factors internal to the scientific and medical community; that 
scientific and technological innovation drives the expansion of the profession. 
By recognising the political nature of medical knowledge and practice, theories 
of medicalisation also provide a link between attempts to expand medical 
management of health, and campaigns by both advocates and opponents of 
specific treatments and technologies. They therefore require an analysis of 
broader ideological factors by firmly situating medicine within the social 
sphere. Finally, through this recognition of the ideological and political nature 
of medicine, they provide scope for linking medical beliefs into the specific 
production of gender identity. For all these reasons the concept of 
medicalisation is also compatible with SSK, feminist postmodernism and 
poststructuralist critiques of the body outlined in Chapter 1. Consequently it 
provides an appropriate point of entry into a commentary on the meanings of 
sex hormones in the late twentieth century, and the practices, beliefs, and 
resistances which have both preceded and emerged because of, these meanings. 
Critical discussions about the medicalisation of social life have been a part of 
sociological theory since at least the 1960s (Pitts, 1968). In 1972 Irving Zola 
outlined a social analysis in which he described medicine as a major institution 
of social control (reprinted in Zola, 1983). According to Zola medicine was 
becoming 
the new repository of truth, the place where absolute and often final 
judgments are made by supposedly morally neutral and objective experts. 
And these judgments are made, not in the name of virtue, but in the name 
of health (Zola, 1983: 247). 
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The social power of medical professionals has enabled medicine to assume a 
mantle of truth and moral neutrality which in turn has obscured the 
manoeuvrings through which medicine has asserted its relevance for an ever-
increasing part of social life (Zola, 1983). The negative sentiments expressed 
here have been taken up by many sociologists who have seen medicalisation as 
a cumulative project which aimed at social control of deviance according to the 
requirements of a ruling elite (see, for example, Ehrenreich & English, 1976; 
Illich, 1977; Oakley, 1984). The way that menopause has become defined as a 
hormone deficiency disease and its management claimed as the appropriate 
preserve of the medical profession is one example of how specialists have 
expanded their expertise to incorporate an area of human life not previously 
considered as a medical problem (Bell, 1987). Other notable examples include 
the medicalisation of mental illness (Szasz, 1961; Szasz, 1970), hyperactivity 
(Conrad, 1975), homosexuality (Bayer, 1981; Stevens & Hall, 1991), 
alcoholism (Fingarette, 1988; Roman, 1988), body weight and eating disorders 
(Brumberg, 1988; Riessman, 1992). 
In the last decade, theories of medicalisation have developed so as to recognise 
networks of power and resistance that extend beyond the boundaries of the 
medical profession. For example, Broom and Woodward argue that it is 
inappropriate to describe medicalisation simply as a process of medical 
hegemony controlled and directed purposefully by medical professionals for 
their own ends. Medicine is made up of relationships among different 
subcultures within the profession and interest groups within the broader 
community, some of which can benefit from the clinical and symbolic 
implications of medicalisation (Broom & Woodward, 1996). An example of this 
might be PMT or PND which 30 years ago were generic 'women's problems' 
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whereas now sufferers can gain some solace from being able to naine, and 
possibly treat their problem. Markle and McCrea's study of the prescription 
patterns of hormone replacement therapy for menopause during the 1970s and 
early 1980s in the UK and the USA provides another example of the way that 
problems move into and out of the medical domain, or sit precariously on its 
boundaries, being subject to pressures both within and external to biomedicine 
for a redefinition of meaning, treatment and management. They found that 
national health structures and consumer and feminist pressure groups, as well as 
medical professionals, influenced what constituted the 'problem' of menopause 
and the different degrees to which it was considered a medical issue. While 
feminists in the USA were lobbying against the over-medicalisation of 
menopause, feminists in the UK were actively campaigning to gain recognition 
of and medical treatment for the symptoms experienced by many menopausal 
women (McCrea & Markle, 1984). 
Peter Conrad writes that: 
[m]edicalisation consists of defining a problem in medical terms, using 
medical language to describe a problem, adopting a medical framework to 
understand a problem, or using a medical intervention to 'treat' it 
(Conrad, 1992: 211). 
Being endowed with the social and cognitive authority to define the nature of 
problems is crucial because articulating what is problematic or deviant both in 
terms of biological and social behaviour also serves to constitute what it is to be 
'normal' (Riessman, 1992: 125). According to Conrad and Schneider the 
definition of a problem as 'medical' happens on three levels: conceptual, 
institutional and interactional (Conrad & Schneider, 1980). On the conceptual 
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level, a medical vocabulary or cognitive framework is used to define a problem. 
This may occur in an elite medical literature governed by a small number of 
influential individuals and it need not involve large numbers of medical 
practitioners or focus on specific treatments. Consider, for example, how the 
reconceptualisation of menopause as a deficiency syndrome has contributed to 
its medicalisation. Theories explaining the mechanisms by which oestrogen 
deficiency occurs have been investigated and discussed at great length in 
professional journals using esoteric specialist language. Once a phenomenon has 
been reconceptualised, medicalisation can take place at an institutional level. 
This occurs when organisations adopt a medical approach to treating a 
condition. The shift in the conceptualisation of menopause has been reified in an 
institutional reordering of medical practice and research which recognises 
professionals specialising in the menopause and awards grant money 
accordingly. Other institutions have also incorporated medicine's definition of 
hormone deficiency disease; for example consider the state reimbursement for 
menopausal hormone replacement therapy. Medicalisation on an interactional 
level occurs as part of doctor-patient relations when physicians and patients 
define a problem as medical or manage a 'social' problem with a medical 
treatment. The valorisation of women's experiences in the face of medical 
definitions has been a prime concern of second wave feminism, however the 
ways in which women take up medical categories to frame their experience and 
translate that experience into symptoms have resulted in western women's 
subjective experience of menopause being thoroughly shaped by reference to 
hormones (Hunt, 1994). In an interaction in a doctor's surgery a conversation 
between a middle aged woman and a practitioner which once may have referred 
to a questioning of self and others as the woman faces changing social roles (for 
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example, role loss as children leave home or contemplation of impending old 
age) may now refer unquestioningly to balancing hormone levels so as to 
nun1nuse the detrimental effects of a chemical transition through the 
menopause. 
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The construct 'hormone' has been reified within biomedical literature, beliefs, 
and practices, so that hormones are now considered as real natural entities 
which exert agency within the biological body. The hormonalisation of health is 
an ongoing process which involves an expansion of and contestation over 
beliefs about the nature and function of hormones and their impact on people's 
lives. It has occurred on each of the levels described in Conrad's account of 
medicalisation, and ideas about sex hormones now inform the fundamental 
ways individual subjectivity and identity are formed. Furthermore, developing 
an awareness of the expansion of hormonal discourses within health emphasises 
the link between hormones and the belief in a universal and codifiable human 
biology. Understanding bodies in a way which results from the reductionist 
methods of science, depoliticises and decontextualises them and allows the 
effects of medical mediation of social norms to be obscured behind the screen of 
science. 
Medicalisation and the history of hormones 
Ideas about sex hormones have long and rich histories which are deeply inter-
woven in folk beliefs about masculinity and femininity. Nelly Oudshoorn draws 
on the importance of these histories in the formation of hormones and links 
them to Ludwig Fleck's account of the role of 'pre-scientific ideas' in the 
genesis-of scientific facts. Fleck writes that: 
... whether we like it or not, we can never sever our links with the past, 
complete with all its errors. [The past] survives in accepted concepts, in 
the presentation of problems, in the syllabus of formal education, in 
everyday life, as well as in language and institutions. Concepts are not 
spontaneously created but are determined by their 'ancestors' (Fleck, 
1979: 20). 
It is naive, Fleck argues, to think that we can arrive at a 'fact' simply through 
observation and experiment. Both natural phenomena and current research 
techniques have a history, and traces of these histories can be found in their 
modern manifestations. As I have argued in Chapter 2, the presentation of the 
history of medicine affects our understanding of the scientific know ledge and 
practices utilised by the profession and the biological organisms with which 
they concern themselves. Narratives which show that medical knowledge and 
practice are not geographically or historically fixed, suggest that it is possible to 
85 
bri;g about a shift in the way that science and nature are classified and 
perceived. Fleck argues that it is possible to dispense with the 'natural status' of 
a phenomenon and to speak instead of "symptoms and states, of various patients 
and incidences" (Fleck, 1979: 21). To do this focuses attention on how 
'symptoms', 'states', 'patients' and 'incidences' have been defined as 
meaningful, rather than assume there are pre-existing standards against which to 
measure these categories. In Chapter 2 I showed how the effort to classify 
appropriate patients, physical states and symptoms created a major problem for 
clinicians involved in the Co-operative Clinical Group's trials of venereal 
disease. Similarly, the various and competing identities which sex hormones 
have assumed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries show that the 
formation and deployment of a concept involves an alliance of historical and 
contemporary entities in the creation of meaning. Further, they support the 
contention that the currently held scientific theories do not constitute the 
essential, definitive, or only possible solution to the questions those theories are 
asked to answer (Fleck, 1979: 21-22). 
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Fleck describes the process whereby 'somewhat hazy', 'proto-ideas' which can 
never be substantiated develop over time, becoming more substantial and 
precise, until they become foundational elements of scientific theories (Fleck, 
1979: 23). While the first identifiably 'scientific ' research which can be linked 
directly with theories of sex hormones occurred in the late nineteenth century as 
investigations of the substances dubbed 'internal secretions', this work was not 
the beginning of the sex hormones story. Oudshoorn argues that beliefs about 
sex reaching back to Aristotle were fundamental in informing the early research 
on hormones (Oudshoorn, 1994: 17). The proto-idea of relevance here is the 
reference made in ancient literature to sex organs as sites of a vague and 
mystical power which was not strictly limited to their role in reproduction but 
also involved the formation of the essence of woman and man. In A History of 
Endocrinology Victor Medvei describes debates about the nature of generation 
among Greek natural philosophers (Medvei, 1983). The Pangenesis theory held 
that both female and male seed were formed in all parts of the body while the 
Hippocratic theory held that the brain and/or the marrow were the site of the 
generation of seed and that the testicles and ovaries were only storage areas for 
the seed which came from elsewhere in the body. Two different theories of 
sexual differentiation were that firstly; the right testicle and 'right womb' 
produced male offspring, and the left testicle and left womb produced fe1nales; 
and secondly, the more heat produced in the womb, the greater the chance of a 
male offspring, while a cooler womb signified the likelihood of a female 
offspring (Medvei, 1983: 46-66). For Aristotle the soul, the form and active 
principle of living beings, originated in the male seed while the woman 
contributed only the rude unformed matter (Schiebinger, 1989: 178-79). 
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From the Middle Ages to the end of the nineteenth century farmers throughout 
Europe practised the removal of the ovaries in domestic animals in order to 
increase growth and strength, and as a means of contraception. This custom was 
firmly rooted in contemporary folk beliefs about the powers of the sex organs 
(Medvei, 1983: 46), which again can be traced back to the writings of Aristotle: 
the ovaries of sows are excised with the view of quenching in them sexual 
appetites and of stimulating growth in size and fatness (from History of 
Animals, as cited in Oudshoorn, 1994: 17). 
Although Medvei does not use the term, he evokes dozens of historical snippets 
which lay the groundwork for his belief that 'proto-ideas' about sex hormones 
have always exerted an influence on the human body. For example Greek and 
Roman healers were said to have used mixtures made from goat or wolf testes 
as sexual stimulants, a practice which was revived by Western European 
physicians during the seventeenth century. Early scientific reformers, such as 
the sixteenth century physician Paracletes, used extracts from animal testes in 
the treatment of 'imbecility of the instruments of generation'. Another example 
is the tale of Albert von Bollstadt (1193-1280) (known as Albertus Magnus) a 
Dominican monk who taught in Paris and Cologne and eventually became 
Bishop of Ratisbon. Albertus believed in the power of the sex organs, and 
recommended powdered testis of hog mixed with wine as a remedy for male 
impotence and sexual weakness, and a mixture of powdered womb of hare in 
wine as means of increasing fertility in women (Medvei, 1983: 97). 
In 167 6 the official pharmacopoeia of the London College of Physicians 
included references to the administration of extracts of animal reproductive 
organs as treatment for various illnesses and sexual complaints, however by the 
eighteenth century the physicians of a newly enlightened Europe officially 
dismissed such practices as quackery. The dominant scientific view was that the 
primary cause of most bodily action was the exercise of nervous stimuli (Borell, 
1976), which meant there was no rational basis for administering these extracts. 
Amongst the folk healers and within the popular wisdom of the time, however, 
the practices persisted. 
Such stories have become part of our modern cultural history and they can now 
be recounted with little regard to their original form or meaning. By selectively 
choosing anecdotes from the vast cultural resources, the sex organs can be thus 
historically linked with spirituality, the mystery of reproduction and the 
generation of life, as well as the control of sexual differentiation. This process 
has also allowed the storytelling surrounding modern masculinity to create a 
deep and extensive historical connection between the testes and masculinity by 
linking the testes with longevity, bravery and male sexuality from the 
beginnings of western culture. This tradition has produced a cultural intuition 
from which it does not make sense to seek an explanation of the role of male 
genitals in the formation of masculinity as they are so firmly constituted as an 
essential and unavoidable biological element of male behaviour. 
A point which can be used to delineate the modern history of endocrinology is 
the late nineteenth century work of Charles-Edouard Brown-Sequard who 
brought the belief in the potency of the gonads out of the scientific wilderness. 
In April 1891 Brown-Sequard and his assistant Arsene d' Arsonval presented 
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findings to the Society of Biology in Paris suggesting that animal tissue 
contained powerful substances which were essential to the maintenance of good 
health. They argued that experiments wherein purified extracts from animal 
organ tissue were given to patients suffering from a number of conditions 
should supply the evidence for the existence of substances they called 'internal 
secretions.' If treatment was successful they believed this would prove that the 
condition was caused by an inadequate production of an internal secretion 
(Borell, 1976: 235). 
Treatment with animal organ tissue became known as organotherapy. Brown-
Sequard had originally proposed organotherapy in 1889 when he argued that the 
testes produced a 'dynamogenic' substance which might be removed from the 
testicles of animals and injected into elderly or declining individuals in order to 
restore their strength and sexual performance (Borell, 1976:235). His 
investigation of the effects on male virility of administering extracts from 
animal testicles was both flamboyant and controversial but managed to spark 
the interest of clinical researchers. Borell writes that within weeks of Brown-
Sequard' s publishing this work, "testicular extract was being given to patients 
with every kind of illness" (Borell, 1976: 301). A fad of organotherapy sprang 
up over the next two years so that not only the testes but all organs of the body 
were thought to possess some kind of essence which could be put to therapeutic 
use. On the whole, the scientific community responded sceptically to Brown-
Sequard' s work. His research contravened social taboos around sexuality and 
could not be theoretically justified, appealing instead to beliefs and practices 
which were considered the province of old wives tales and fair ground healers 
(Borell~ 1976: 301; Oudshoorn, 1994:18). At the time Brown-Sequard was a 
medical doctor working at the College de France and was the rival and 
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successor to Claude Bernard an eminent medical scientist, Professor of the 
College de France, member of the Academie Francaise, and first to use the term 
'internal secretion' in relation to his work in the 1850s (Medvei, 1983: 7,709). 
He was not, therefore, without professional standing. Although considered 
contentious by his colleagues, his work complemented contemporary Victorian 
ideas about masculinity and his hypothesis that the 'potent secretions' from the 
testes made their way into seminal fluid was compatible with the notion that 
loss of semen (through sexual intercourse or masturbation) depleted men of vital 
energy (Oudshoorn, 1994: 18). He believed that this occurred because testicular 
secretion provided a vital nutrient to the nerve endings. Retention of semen 
supposedly ensured adequate nutrient reached these nerve endings, resulting in 
high levels of the nervous energy which was, at the time, thought to be the 
major catalyst of bodily motility (Borell, 1976:235). Because of this belief 
Brown-Sequard argued that withholding or abstaining from the release of semen 
should produce an increase in a man's strength and energy (Oudshoorn, 
1994: 18). 
At the beginning of the 1890s the body was still understood as being controlled 
and motivated by the nervous system: indeed, until particular bodily responses 
arose that could not be explained by nervous control, there was no need to look 
at internal secretions as being causally linked to biological function (Borell, 
1985: 10; Oudshoorn, 1994: 16). The first of these substances to be identified 
was secretin, which was isolated in 1902 (Medvei, 1983: 340). Once secretin (a 
fluid excreted by the internal mucosa which triggers a discharge from the 
pancreas) was isolated, research suggested that chemicals as well as nerves 
might invoke a physiological response. Conceptually nebulous in the early 
stages, the term 'internal secretion' referred to a hypothetical biological agent 
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which was necessary for health and well-being. This substance was noticeable 
mostly because its absence was said to result in disease. 'Hormone' on the other 
hand, was more precisely defined and referred to a chemical originating from 
animal tissue which had specific physiological effects (Borell, 1985:5). 
Prescientific ideas about the ovaries as the seat of femininity were incorporated 
into the theory of internal secretions as changes were taking place in clinical 
gynaecology (Oudshoorn, 1994: 18-19). For several thousand years it had been 
assumed, within western intellectual history, that women had essentially the 
same sexual organs as men except that women's organs were inside rather than 
outside the body. The womb was known and described long before the ovaries 
were understood, and by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century it was 
still unclear that the ovaries had been named and identified as a female sex 
organ (Gallagher & Laqueur, 1987: 2). From the middle of the nineteenth 
century, medical researchers began to focus on the role and functions of the 
ovaries. Gynaecologists in particular paid increasing attention to the ovaries in 
the belief that they were responsible for a wide range of conditions affecting 
women's health and well-being (Gallagher & Laqueur, 1987: 27) The shift from 
viewing the uterus as the primary site of female sexual formation to seeing the 
ovaries as fulfilling this function also provided the gynaecological profession 
with a 'paradigm specific' organ. The further development of sex endocrinology 
during the early decades of the twentieth century was crucial to the professional 
delineation of the boundaries between gynaecology and obstetrics (Oudshoorn, 
1994:19). 
As the theory of internal secretions became more widely disseminated 
gynaecologists were able to use it to argue that it might be applicable to the 
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ovaries. The nineteenth century practice of removing women's ovaries as a cure 
for hysteria, epilepsy, nymphomania and other 'nervous disorders' (Russell, 
1995: chapter l; Scully, 1980: 49) allowed gynaecologists to witness first hand 
the effects of the procedure. Observing changes in women following removal of 
the ovaries could be productively combined with Brown-Sequard' s theoretical 
insights; if the ovaries did produce internal secretions then an entirely new 
mechanisn1 for understanding and treating conditions associated with women's 
sexual health could be theorised. Based on this premise, gynaecologists argued 
for a distinction between the ovaries and the uterus which allowed the ovaries to 
became the professional property of gynaecology while obstetrics turned its 
attention to the uterus. Linking female disorders to the ovaries by means of 
these secretions allowed 'women's problems' to became more firmly located 
within the clinical domain of the gynaecologists (Oudshoorn, 1994: 19). 
During the 1890s there was a boom in research investigating internal secretions. 
This included work on the effects of adrenal extracts on vasopressure, the use of 
pancreatic extracts to treat diabetes, and the link between the thyroid gland and 
a number of physical disabilities. Research on the secretions of testes and 
ovaries formed only a small and highly controversial portion of the total 
investigations into internal secretions (Borell, 1976). By 1895 both medical 
practitioners and laboratory physiologists were searching for internal secretions 
in animal tissue, and clinical and physiological studies were undertaken side by 
side. The information from these investigations was sometimes contradictory. 
For instance, extirpation and grafting experiments suggested that the islet cells 
of the pancreas should produce an internal secretion useful in the treatment of 
diabetes, however extracts of the pancreas proved ineffective in addressing the 
symptoms of diabetes in either humans or experimental animals. Likewise, 
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while the physical changes following the removal of the testes or ovanes 
suggested that the gonads might produce internal secretions, many physicians 
remained sceptical about both cures involving oral admission or injection of 
extracts of animal sex glands, and the existence of a physiological mechanism 
that could explain their effects (Borell, 1976: 267). 
The first person to use the term 'hormone' was Ernest H Starling, professor in 
physiology at University College in London. In 1905 Ernest Starling wrote: 
These chemical messengers ... or 'hormones' as we may call them, have to 
be carried from the organ where they are produced to the organ which 
they affect, by means of the blood stream, and the continually recurring 
physiological needs of the organism must determine their production and 
circulation through the body (Starling, 1905, quoted in Oudshoorn, 1994: 
16). 
In the first decade of the twentieth century the study of hormones evolved into 
the professional domain known as endocrinology. According to Long-Hall and 
Glick, endocrinology could not then or now be considered a 'discipline'. They 
suggest instead that from its origins endocrinology has always been a 
multidisciplinary field which, while strongly influenced by clinical experience, 
has been dominated at different times by different disciplinary interests (Long-
Hall & Glick, 1976: 229). For example, the notion of sex hormones served as a 
theoretical catalyst to draw together previously disparate research about sex and 
sexuality. In comparison to gynaecologists, who specialised in sexual medicine, 
physiologists, who worked with the whole body, were relatively slow to 
appreciate the importance of the theory of internal secretions to the sex glands. 
One explanation for this was the taboo surrounding human sex and sexuality. 
Furthermore, the controversy over Brown-Sequard's work on increasing virility 
had sensitised researchers and clinicians to the need for discretion, propriety and 
adherence to the highest standards of scientific inquiry if the emerging area of 
sex endocrinology was to be taken seriously. Because of the cultural sensitivity 
to issues surrounding sex "[p ]hysiologists who took up the study of ovary and 
testes preparations did so cautiously, avoiding association with these therapeutic 
claims" (Oudshoorn, 1994: 20). 
The emergent tension between the clinical applications of the new hormonal 
theories and their development within the laboratory was a significant factor in 
the early formation of endocrinology. The existence of internal secretions, 
although implied by clinical observations, could not be rigorously proven within 
the clinical process. While trying to determine their nature, laboratory scientists 
and clinicians initially found it difficult to agree on which organs produced 
internal secretions (Borell, 1985: 5). Prior to the turn of the twentieth century 
the ovaries (particularly in relation to 'female ailments') had been the concern 
of gynaecologists. With the development of theories of sex hormones 
physiologists had reason to link female disorders with laboratory practice. In so 
doing, the professional boundaries which divided gynaecologists and 
physiologists were redefined to create an ongoing interdependence and tension 
between the two disciplines (Borell, 1985; Oudshoorn, 1994: 20). 
Gynaecologists were interested in the relation between the ovaries and various 
disorders they believed were due to ovarian dysfunction. Physiologists, on the 
other hand, had a broader interest in the overall impact of the ovaries and testes 
on bodily development. 
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The acceptance of the hormonal theory in the biological sciences was fostered 
by the way it complemented a major debate about the sexual development of 
organisms which was raging in the early years of the century. The resolution of 
this debate and the way sex hormones facilitated it will be discussed shortly. 
Michael Callon describes a process of 'enrolment' wherein different theories, 
technological artefacts or processes "enrol a mass of silent others from which it 
draws its strength and credibility" (Callon, 1987: 96). These entities are made 
strong as they position themselves in relation to other accepted or perhaps 
contentious beliefs, objects and practices. The constellation of relationships 
between entities "is durable not only because of the durability of the bonds 
between the points ... but also because each of its points constitutes a durable 
and simplified network [of beliefs, objects and practices]" (Callon, 1987: 96). In 
the early years of the twentieth century hormonal theories were enrolled by, and 
themselves enrolled, physiologists and geneticists who were debating the origin 
of sexual differentiation. Physiologists were arguing for sexual differentiation 
mediated by environmental and physiological conditions during gestation, 
whereas geneticists believed that sex was set at conception by a central agent 
which would later become known as the sex chromosomes. The theory of sex 
hormones seemed to offer a means of resolving this impasse as hormones could 
provide an environmental means of effecting the 'intention' of the sex 
chromosome. Geneticists could retain control of the study of sex determination 
- the establishment of internal conditions which lead to the development of one 
sex or another; and sex endocrinologists could control issues of sex 
differentiation - the development of sexual characteristics over the course of an 
individual's life (Oudshoorn, 1994:21). 
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By 1910 prescientific ideas about the gonads being the agents of sex difference 
had been converted within physiology and gynaecology into a belief that sex 
hormones were the chemical messengers of a dualistic sexual identity, a belief 
which has proven to be remarkably resilient. In the early years of the century 
work on sex hormones affirmed existing commonsense beliefs that the gonads 
were the source of masculinity and femininity. By focusing on the secretions of 
the gonads rather than the gonads themselves, however, endocrinologists 
participated in a gradual cultural reformation of ideas about sexual origin. Prior 
to 1920 it was thought that there were only two sex hormones which 
corresponded with two sexes; the female hormone was thought to originate in 
the ovaries and the male hormone in the testes. This view was an extension of 
contemporary Victorian ideas about sexuality wherein sex was a strictly 
dualistic entity (Oudshoorn, 1994: 22). Female and male were seen as two 
distinct and diametrically opposed categories, and this opposition was not just 
biological, but dominated the social world as well. This 'sex antagonism' found 
support amongst the work of sex endocrinologists in the early years of the 
twentieth century. While earlier work such as that of Brown-Sequard suggested 
only that sex specific hormones were responsible for sex specific characteristics, 
later writers argued that each sex hormone was responsible not only for the 
promotion of the appropriate sexual characteristics, but actively suppressed the 
characteristics of the opposing sex (Oudshoorn, 1994: 23). This reinforced a 
distinction between the sexes and allotted certain behaviours and social roles to 
men and women. In this model, women were defined as being tied to the 
process of biological reproduction which, by the turn of the century, had been 
thoroughly medicalised; constituted as inherently pathological, and requiring 
supervision from the medical profession (Poovey, 1987: 143-145). 
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The 1920s saw a breakdown in this rigid sexual duality and in the belief that sex 
hormones are entirely sex specific in origin and function. Later research 
indicated that both female and male sex hormones were produced by both sexes, 
and that rather than a single hormone for each sex there were a number of such 
hormones. Despite this, coding of hormones as male and female has persisted 
and the association of gendered attributes with the sex hormones continues. In 
addition, new techniques for the extraction and synthesis of hormones pointed 
the way towards the widespread therapeutic use of hormones which has 
occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
In the remainder of the chapter I focus on the role of hormones in sexual 
differentiation of the foetal reproductive tract and brain. My reason for doing so 
is to highlight that from the moment of conception hormones are being used to 
establish a relationship between biology and behaviour which normalises certain 
types of physiological and psychological development. Thus hormones are 
established as entities which can be mobilised into biologically determinist 
arguments to account for the social stratification of the sexes and the 
marginalisation of those who in some way transgress the boundaries of the 
sexual order. 
Prenatal hormones and sexual differentiation 
There is a broad consensus among scientists that biologists have a technically 
accurate knowledge of the development of the foetal reproductive system in 
humans (Longino, 1990: 115). Sexual differentiation is thought to be 
determined at the point of conception by the X and the Y chromosome. The sex-
determining information from the genes leads to the subsequent formation of 
either ovaries or testes in what, to that point, had been a bi-potential embryo 
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(Gordon & Ruddle, 1981: 1265; Naftolin, 1981: 1263). By causing gonadal 
differentiation the genes are responsible for structural features of the sexual 
development and function of the body (Haseltine & Ohno, 1981; Naftolin, 1981: 
1263) however successful differentiation requires exposure to hormones. 
Human embryos of both sexes are believed to share the same developmental 
path until the end of the second month of gestation when the effects of prenatal 
hormones begin to appear and sexual differentiation occurs. Research into 
prenatal hormones seeks to identify the specific nature of these foetal hormones 
and the precise mechanisms by which they affect the process of sexual 
differentiation and development. Investigation includes examining the stage at 
which hormone production starts, which hormones are produced and when, and 
attempting to identify the precise actions and consequences of each hormone. 
The effects of prenatal hormones on foetal development were first substantially 
articulated in the late 1940s by Alfred Jost, an embryologist working at the 
College de France in Paris. Jost was studying the effects of castrating male 
mammal embryos which he found developed "as female". He explained this by 
arguing that the emergence of male characteristics happens only if specific 
hormones produced by foetal testes are present in an embryo. According to 
Jost's hypothesis (which has become an axiomatic principle of sexual 
development) the process of sexual differentiation is "sequential, ordered, and 
relatively simple" (Wilson et al., 1981: 1278). The initial chromosomal sex 
established at conception determines the development of either ovaries or testes. 
If an embryo grows testes and produces normal testicular secretions, the 
resulting hormonal profile brings about male secondary sex characteristics, 
known collectively as the male phenotype. If ovaries develop or if no gonad is 
present, "anatomical development is female in character" (Wilson et al., 1981: 
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1278). Jost's work on foetal castration became the foundation for understanding 
hormonal control of sexual development. Writing in a special edition of the 
journal Science dedicated to the issue of sexual differentiation, Wilson et al., 
comment: 
Stimulated by this paradigm, subsequent investigators have sought to 
identify the specific hormones that are secreted by foetal testes and to 
elucidate the control mechanisms that regulate the secretion of these 
hormones at the crucial moment in embryonic development. They have 
also attempted to characterise, at the molecular and genetic level, the 
mechanisms by which the testicular hormones act to induce the 
conversion of the sexually indifferent embryo into the male phenotype 
(Wilson et al., 1981: 1278). 
Several outcomes have resulted from others' attempts to expand Jost' s model. 
To begin with, a research culture was established where, until the mid 1970s, 
the role of testosterone in sexual differentiation was studied more intensively 
than the role of oestrogen. In the last quarter of the twentieth century this culture 
has changed and oestrogen has come to be seen as more significant than 
previously recognised (Longino, 1990: 115; van den Wijngaard, 1997: 37). In 
addition, prenatal hormones have been ascribed the cultural characteristics of 
masculinity and femininity. For example, the above description posits the 
combination of male hormones as the active agent in sexual formation and the 
formation of female anatomy as the result of a lack or absence of these (male) 
active agents. And it is a lack which is substantiated through the experimental 
mandate of science: 
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The experimental basis for this thesis involved demonstration that 
removal of gonads from embryos of either sex prior to the onset of 
phenotypic differentiation results in the development of a female 
phenotype. Thus, the male is the induced phenotype in that testicular 
secretions cause formation of the male urogenital tract where as female 
differentiation is not dependent on the presence of an ovary (Wilson et al., 
1981: 1280). 
The very notion of sexual origin was in this way based on a description of 
female lack and of unequal agency. As the scientific problem of sexual 
differentiation is considered to be 'closed', it is difficult to suggest that this is 
not the way it 'really' happens or that this description has in fact resulted from 
interaction between the process of differentiation and the discourse through 
which we understand it. Sexual differentiation is seen as a natural pre-given 
process whose discovery reveals its organisation via male agency and female 
absence. 
The comments by Wilson et al., state that the removal of the male foetal gonads 
before phenotypic differentiation results in female anatomical development. In 
addition, it states that the removal of the female foetal gonads also results in 
female development, confirming feminine passivity. But there are alternative 
ways of representing the same findings. Consider instead the following 
description. Rather than describing this as a story of male agency and female 
lack, could it not describe the natural robustness of the female phenotype? 
Could it not be argued that in spite of the removal of its gonads a female 
embryo will develop 'normally', and in spite of the genetic code 'male', 
without the influence of gonadal hormones the female phenotype will dominate, 
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resulting in female anatomical development. This hypothetical re-write touches 
only on the level of representation and seeks merely to demonstrate that sex is 
not a natural pre-given entity and that alternative readings are always possible. 
However were it a dominant representation it would be incorporated at a 
material level into what we know as the process of sexual differentiation. 
Organising sex 
Once phenotypic sexual differentiation has occurred hormones are said to have 
either an 'organising' or an 'activating' effect on the body. Sexual determination 
is the result of the organising effects of hormones while sexual differentiation is 
said to result from their activating effects. An organising ( or developmental) 
effect is one that occurs during gestation or around birth and establishes patterns 
which cannot be changed during the life of an organism. It programs biological 
tissue to respond in specific ways to later events such as the 'normal' 
development of female and male genitalia (that is, the development of 
physically dissimilar reproductive organs which are both structurally distinct 
and which respond differently to various chemical stimuli). Organising effects 
differ from activating effects in a number of ways. Initially, organising effects 
occur only during a specific phase of growth and they tend to be permanent 
although they can be medically managed through procedures such as surgery or 
hormone therapy. Some developmental effects are dependent on the subsequent 
activating effects of sex hormones and may not appear until puberty or in 
adulthood. The way oestrogen levels trigger the release of luteinising hormone 
during a women's menstrual cycle is an example of an activating function 
(Longino, 1990: 112). 
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In Reinventing the Sexes Marianne van den Wijngaard provides an in-depth 
discussion and critique of the organisation theory of prenatal hormones (van den 
Wijngaard, 1997). According to the original formulation of the organisation 
theory, proposed in 1959, the presence of androgens causes permanent structural 
changes in the male brain which directly affect male sexual behaviour (Phoenix 
et al., 1959). During the 1970s and 1980s the theory was modified to include an 
active role for oestrogen in the formation of the brain. These hormonally related 
differences in the brains of men and women have been mobilised to explain 
differences in behaviour and to justify the continuing social advantages men 
enjoy at the expense of women (van den Wijngaard, 1997). 
Prenatal sex hormones are essential for achieving 'healthy' sexual 
differentiation but they can also be the agents of profound sexual disruption. 
Hormonal imbalances during embryonic life can result in problems with sexual 
differentiation which may become apparent at birth or puberty, and include 
problems such as 'aberrant virilisation of sexual phenotype', 'dysphoric gender 
identity' or 'cognitive instability'. Research into the nature, action and effect of 
prenatal sex hormones in humans has been made possible by the clinical 
treatment of individuals thought to be suffering from hormonal abnormalities. In 
other words, conceptualising postnatal hormones as a medical problem has been 
directly linked to endocrinologists' ability to mobilise the institutional setting 
of, and interactions which occur within, the clinic. Exposing animal foetuses to 
sex hormones has been the chief means by which the nature of developmental 
effects has been explored experimentally. Organisational effects, on the other 
hand, are usually investigated when children reach puberty or in later adult life 
(Ehrhardt & Myer-Bahlburg, 1981: 1312). The demarcation between these 
effects is important because it enables the classification of individual 
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experiences according to their degrees of difference from an expected norm, 
while also providing a reference for treating and managing these differences. 
The treatment of intersex infants is a case in point. 
The existence of individuals with ambiguous sexual anatomy, genitals that 
cannot be easily identified as male or female, has been documented throughout 
history (Dreger, 1998; Kessler, 1990: 3). While it is difficult to establish the 
frequency with which intersexuality occurs in the population, according to Anne 
Fausto-Sterling as many as 4 per cent of births are of intersex infants, indicating 
that the boundaries between female and male phenotypes are somewhat flexible 
(Fausto-Sterling, 1993: 22). The medical profession's long history of regulating 
bodies and desires has found ample expression in the regulation of sexual 
ambiguities (see for example Foucault, 1980). This regulation, once carried out 
expressely in conjunction with the church and the state (van den Wijngaard, 
1997: 3), now takes place in the clinic and the surgical theatre. Developments in 
molecular biology during the twentieth century have enabled scientists to 
classify sexual ambiguities as chromosomal or hormonal, and (particularly the 
way hormones affect a biological organism) again suggests a boundary between 
the sexes is not strictly determined at conception but may actually shift over an 
individual's life. Despite this, doctors persist in their "incorrigible belief and 
insistence upon" the model of two diametrically opposed sexes (Kessler, 1990: 
4). As John Money states; 
Ideologically there is practically no place for what is sex-shared or 
ambisexual. The very term, ambisexual, is seldom used, being replaced by 
bisexual. Bisexual does not imply that something is shared in common by 
both males and females, but is used with pejorative overtones to indicate 
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that something appropriate to one sex is incongruously manifested by a 
deviant member of the other sex. (Money, 1988: 52). 
Because of the depth of this cultural committment to two sexes, when a foetal 
hormone condition or other sexual abnormality was diagnosed in an infant in 
the latter half of the twentieth century that child was likely to be entered into a 
program of hormonal and surgical management. Although not ill, such 
treatment is designed to minimise the socially disruptive effects of the 
experience of ambiguous sexual status, and to allow the child to take up a place 
in society as a 'normal' heterosexual male or female (see for example Fausto-
Sterling, 1993; Groveman, 1998; Kessler, 1990). Whilst the aims of these 
'management' policies are humanitarian, attempting to enable people to fit in 
socially, the assumptions which underlie them (such as the belief that it is 
preferable to expose a child to the perils of major surgery and ongoing drug 
therapy, rather than expose them, their family and their peers to the challenge of 
negotiating their unusual sexual status) remain unstated and largely 
unquestioned. The clear wish that there be only two sexes and that these be 
assessed by a heterosexual norm of both biological and psychological sex are 
not articulated (Fausto-Sterling, 1993: 22). 
An example of this can be found in the classification of male foetal 
abnormalities. As part of his formative work on phenotypic sexual 
differentiation Alfred Jost argued that two secretions from foetal testes, 
Mullerian-inhibiting substance and androgen, are essential for normal male 
development. He believed that either a failure to produce Mullerian-inhibiting 
substance or an inability of the tissue to respond to the hormone would result in 
a condition known as 'persistent Mullerian duct syndrome', a condition in 
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which genetic and phenotypic males have fallopian tubes and a uterus as well as 
a Wollfien duct (part of an embryonic penis). An externally visible feature of 
this condition is the failure of the testes to descend into the scrotum (Wilson et 
al., 1981: 1280). Why is this considered a pathological deviation? Is it because 
of a physical appearance which does not correspond with a dominant 
expectation (thus rendering appearance a major determinant of male sexuality)? 
Is it because the 'genetic potential' cannot be met in expected ways (thus 
implying the validity of a nuclear model of sexual differentiation)? Is it because 
of the biological ambiguity of possessing internal male and female reproductive 
organs (thus highlighting the fundamental transgression of the expectation of a 
clear-cut model of two sexes)? Is it to do with lowered fertility rates (thus 
emphasising the role of procreation in the construction of masculinity)? The 
answers to each of these questions provides a different account of where the 
boundary around 'normal sex' may lie. The closing years of the twentieth 
century have seen medical specialists develop an increased tollerance for 
allowing their patients to live with the ambiguities of intersexuality, however 
many treatments and the ethical issues they invoke remain hotly contested 
(Howe, 1998; Wilson & Reiner, 1998). 
Organising gender 
In the previous section I discussed how the processes of biological sexual 
differentiation have been represented in terms which were coded with gender, 
and the medical responses provoked when differentiation did not comply with a 
strictly two-sex model. The categories of gender assumed in this process are 
connected to behavioural patterns which have also been attributed to the 
biological influences of sex hormones. 
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The study of the behavioural effects of prenatal hormones was originally limited 
to questions about sexual conduct, but during the 1970s it was extended to 
include a broader range of human and animal activities (van den Wijngaard, 
1997: 62). In their seminal work Man and Woman, Boy and Girl, Money and 
Ehrhardt argued that in humans ( and animals) prenatal androgens affect sexual 
preferences, grooming and the choice of clothing, career ambition and 
intelligence, and cause an increase in energy expenditure ( as measured through 
indices such as outdoor play, athletic skills and social aggression). Without the 
stimulation of androgens they held children developed a feminised identity in 
which doll play and mothering featured, along with a liking for pretty dresses, a 
lack of career ambition and a generally lower IQ (Money & Ehrhardt, 1972). 
Van den Wijngaard notes that although Money and Ehrhardt' s later work made 
more modest claims about the effects of prenatal hormones on sexually 
din1orphic behaviour (including a withdrawal of claims that prenatal hormones 
affected sexual orientation and IQ), their early work had a profound impact and 
its influence continues to be felt (van den Wijngaard, 1997: 62). 
As an example of research which addresses the link between prenatal hormones 
and behaviour I will examine a review article by Ehrhardt and Myer-Bahlburg 
that appeared in the special issue of Science, mentioned earlier, dedicated to 
scientific explanations for the differences between the sexes (Ehrhardt & Myer-
Bahlburg, 1981). Eharhardt and Myer-Bahlburg identify four main areas of 
research into the effects of prenatal sex hormones on gender related behaviour. 
These are self classification of gender identity (based on the concept of a 
dimorphic femininity and masculinity), gender-role behaviour (how people 
adhere to these gender dimorphisms), sexual orientation (as measured by erotic 
responsiveness to one sex or the other, whether hetero, homo, or bisexual), and 
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intelligence and cognitive sex differences (such as abilities related to sex 1n 
'normal' subjects) (Ehrhardt & Myer-Bahlburg, 1981: 1314). 
The category 'gender identity' is only relevant in humans. While animal models 
are available for the measurement of sex dimorphic behaviour, sexual 
orientation, cognition and intelligence, no equivalent animal models exist for 
investigating gender identity. Ehrhardt and Myer-Bahlburg argue that as 
development of gender identity depends largely on the process of learning, 
studies of children who were born with discrepancies between biological 
indicators of sexual differentiation and the sex assigned to them during 
childhood are particularly useful for unravelling the complexities of gender 
acquisition (Ehrhardt & Myer-Bahlburg, 1981). These are usually children who 
have been comprehensively medicalised; they have been identified at birth and 
entered into treatment programs. A few have grown up as one gender, only to 
become the subjects of intense medical scrutiny when they experience changes 
at puberty which contrast with their original gender formation (Fausto-Sterling, 
1993). Ehrhardt and Meyer-Bahlburg claim that gender identification usually 
follows the pattern of the gender assigned during infancy and childhood. Just as 
by the age of five most children have assimilated the principles governing their 
native language, so too have they acquired an identification with one or other 
sex which has become an essential and intransigent part of their self identity. 
Because of this, an experience of 'gender disorientation', whereby a girl grows a 
beard or her clitoris begins to take on the dimensions of a penis, is seen as 
pathological and disturbing, warranting immediate correction. Ehrhardt and 
Myer-Bahlburg claim that if an occun·ence such as this remains "uncorrected" 
individuals may develop "gender identity doubt", a situation which may take 
years to resolve (Ehrhardt & Myer-Bahlburg, 1981: 1313). Such cases can 
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provide a stark example of the links between prenatal hormones and the 
psychosocial expression of gendered behaviour. 
On a less dramatic scale Ehrhardt and Myer-Bahlburg refer to two studies on 
children who had surgery and hormone treatment as a result of their ambiguous 
sexual status at birth: 
In both samples, the behaviour of the prenatally androgenised girls 
differed significantly from that of the controls in that they typically 
demonstrated: (i) a combination of intense active outdoor play, increased 
association with male peers, long-term identification as a 'tomboy' by self 
and others, probably all related to high energy expenditure; and (ii) 
decreased parenting rehearsal such as doll play and baby care, and a low 
interest in the role rehearsal of wife and mother versus having a career. 
The characteristic pattern was not transient or limited to a brief phase, but 
was long-term throughout childhood and was not considered abnormal for 
female behaviour in our culture (Ehrhardt & Myer-Bahlburg, 1981: 1314). 
Here are girls exposed to male sex hormones displaying behaviours that are 
socially defined as masculine. Although it is stated that such behaviours are not 
necessarily abnormal, the authors nonetheless imply that they are at odds with 
expectations. What constitutes normal or aberrant activities in each of these 
areas follows stereotyped gender models ( such as those reified by Money and 
Ehrhardt' s early work) wherein boys are active and aggressive while girls are 
passive and nurturing. 
For feminists and others with an interest in the construction of biology and 
gender these studies, with their unsophisticated deployment of phallocentric 
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assumptions, are easy and deserved targets for criticism. However their 
significance lies not only in the findings of any one study, but in the research 
trends embedded in them, and the way they contribute to a larger range of 
beliefs and practices and the reification of a dimorphic behavioural model of 
biologically determined sex and gender. As Emily Martin points out, it is an 
ongoing challenge to 'wake up' the 'sleeping' metaphors in science, those 
metaphors which are hidden within the scientific and technical content of texts 
(Martin, 1996: 40). In an intellectual tradition in which denouncing a study's 
methodology is a common form of critique, it is also necessary to draw attention 
to the cultural inscription of such methods. Doing so robs them of their ability 
to "naturalize our social conventions" (Martin, 1996: 40). 
Conclusion 
In the closing years of the twentieth century sex hormones appeared as real 
natural entities and are active players in the manufacture of personal 
subjectivity, social gender identity and biological sexual difference. 
Controversies surrounding the role of sex hormones in the definition or 
treatment of life-events are a familiar part of modern life. In addition to the 
examples discussed in this chapter, consider the pathologising of women's 
reproductive functions, beginning with the stories that at puberty girls undergo 
massive hormonal changes which render them emotionally unbalanced, 
representations of premenstrual, pregnant and post natal women as ill and 
irrational, and the definition of menopause as an oestrogen deficiency disease 
and the postmenopausal woman as lacking an essential element of femininity 
(see for example Ripper, 1991; Ripper, 1994). In the narratives surrounding 
each of these, female subjectivity is constituted as biologically determined and 
110 
inherently morbid, and that morbidity is the result of hormones. The linking of 
male aggression to testosterone again mobilises hormones in the construction of 
masculinity. One final controversy which warrants mention involves debates 
about the 'feminisation of nature' as plastics break down to produce oestrogen-
like substances which wreak havoc with the reproductive capacity of males (be 
they alligators in the swamps of Florida or baby boys in Denmark). The debate 
mobilises particularly lurid imagery wherein the uncontrollable consequences of 
post-industrial society somehow become manifest as a mutant emasculating 
woman ( see for example Cadbury, 1997; Colborn et al., 1996). The meanings 
attached to these examples, and the numerous other instances where hormonal 
explanations shape discourses about sex and gender, may appeal to cultural 
stereotypes, but they also have a foundation within scientific literature. 
In this chapter I have sought to describe how hormones were produced as 
biological and medical entities in the twentieth century. The evolution of sex 
hormones went hand in hand with the development of medical technologies which 
allowed for their clinical use. The subsequent expansion of the significance of 
hormones has rendered them a potent causal explanation for a wide range of 
biological, social and environmental events in contemporary life. In examining 
scientific representations of sex hormones, signs of their production can be 
detected - in particular in the way they have incorporated historical and 
contemporary cultural assumptions about sex and sexual morality. The next 
chapter discusses the tamoxifen breast cancer trial and draws out the ways in 
which it is predicated on ideas about a stable female biology which is constructed 
as hormonally pathological and in need of medical surveillance. 
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CHAPTER4 
The Breast Cancer Prevention Trial 
Thus far I have discussed how the ideals of scientific realism form part of the 
foundation upon which biomedicine is based and investigated the link between 
scientific and medical realism and the historical construction of current accounts of 
the human body (particularly with regard to the way discourses about hormones 
have been written into modern biology and psychology). This and the following 
chapter examine a specific set of RCTs which mobilise both the rhetoric and 
practice of science in medicine in the construction of the female body through 
hormonal discourses. These clinical trials examine the effectiveness of the 
hormonal drug tamoxifen as a prophylaxis for breast cancer. 
Background to the trial 
The reproductive capacity of women and patterns of menstrual bleeding have been 
linked with changes in breast tumours since the early 19th century. In 1836 British 
doctor Sir Astley Cooper reported that the growth of breast cancers sometimes 
fluctuates with the phase of the menstrual cycle. By the 1890s a German physician, 
Schinzinger, had reported that breast cancers grew more slowly in postmenopausal 
women and argued for 'castration' as a means of slowing tumour growth in women 
who had not yet reached menopause (Donegan & Spratt, 1988: 10; Pearce et al., 
1993: 227). In order to explain these observations doctors argued that there was a 
sympathetic relation between breast cancer and the ovaries, and as the science of 
endocrinology developed, this relationship came to be described as one based on 
the actions of female sex hormones. In 1896 Thomas Beatson, a Scottish surgeon, 
wrote that he had performed oophorectomies on several women and claimed that 
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this resulted in the temporary regression of their tumours (Beatson, 1896; Donegan 
& Spratt, 1988: 10). By the end of the 19th century oophorectomy had become an 
important part of the management of breast cancer, despite being beneficial in only 
limited numbers of cases and providing only temporary remissions (Pearce et al., 
1993: 227). At this time the theory of internal secretions was gaining ground and 
gynaecologists were beginning to theorise a link between the sex organs and 
women's well-being. Oophorectomy was also being used as a treatment for female 
psychosis (Russell, 1995: 49; Scull & Favreau, 1986; Scully, 1980). 
During the twentieth century surgical management, radiation therapy and 
chemotherapy gradually rose in significance to their present status as the primary 
mainstream therapeutic response to breast cancer (Pearce et al., 1993: 227). 
Hormonal therapies such as removal of the ovaries and use of drugs based on 
hormone manipulation play an important part in modern treatment regimes. 
Hormone therapy for breast cancer was initially employed in premenopausal 
women to reduce circulating levels of oestrogen, however, its use has expanded 
and it is now also thought to be appropriate for menopausal and postmenopausal 
women. Since the mid 1970s, two major types of hormone therapy have been 
developed: those based on surgical removal of the ovaries, adrenal and pituitary 
glands, and medical treatment with oestrogens and androgens. The three major 
types of medical hormone therapies currently available for cancer treatment are 
anti-oestrogens; progestins and the aromatase inhibitors; and aminoglutethimide 
and 4OH-androstenedione which work by blocking oestrogen and oestradiol 
secretion in the ovaries and adrenal glands (Namer, 1996). Such treatments are 
typically given as combined hormone therapy or as a treatment to complement 
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other types of therapy such as surgery (which includes surgical manipulation of 
hormones through the removal of glands) and chemotherapy. 
Tamoxifen and the treatment of breast cancer 
Tamoxifen is a non-steroidal, anti-oestrogenic drug first synthesised in 1966 
(Legha, 1988: 219) at the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) by pharmacologists 
trying to develop hormonal contraceptives. While tamoxifen was found to be an 
effective contraceptive in some animals, (De Gregorio & Weibe, 1994: 28) there 
was evidence that it stimulated fertility in humans (Laurence & Weinhouse, 1994: 
122). During these contraceptive trials tamoxifen showed an anti-oestrogenic 
effect which researchers took as an indication that it might be useful in the 
treatment of breast cancer (De Gregorio & Weibe, 1994: 27-28). 
Tamoxifen was first evaluated for the treatment of advanced breast cancer 1n 
Britain in 1970. Following the reported success of the British experiments, clinical 
trials were begun in the USA in 1974 to study the effectiveness of the drug as a 
secondary (adjuvant) therapy given in addition to other standard treatment 
regimes. The use of tamoxifen as an adjuvant treatment for women with advanced 
breast cancer became common during the mid 1970s and by the early 1980s it was 
also being used in the treatment of early breast cancer (Ford et al., 1994: 2727; 
Jordan, 1992: 231). In 1978 ICI Pharn1aceuticals began manufacturing and 
marketing tamoxifen under the under the trade name Nolvadex, thereby 
committing the multinational' s resources to the continued development and use of 
the drug. In the thirty-odd years of the dn1g' s existence there has been a gradual 
expansion of the frontiers of tamoxifen therapy until it is now amongst the most 
commonly used breast cancer treatments in the world (Batt, 1994: 113). 
Tamoxifen is most frequently used in combination with chemotherapy for women 
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with breast cancer, although it also used for other forms of cancer, including 
prostate cancer (Pineta et al., 1995). The precise action of the drug is still under 
dispute (Legha, 1988: 220), but it is believed that it may block the process of 
'endocrine promotion' (Powles, 1992: 1145) by affecting the hormone receptors 
(Cohen et al., 1994). Tamoxifen is thought to work by binding to the 'oestrogen 
receptor' sites, a type of protein found in some breast cancer cells, forming an inert 
complex thereby reducing the stimulating effects oestrogens have on those breast 
cancer cells. When oestrogen (which is synthesised predominantly by the ovaries) 
comes in contact with these proteins it binds with the receptors and triggers cell 
growth. When circulating oestrogen levels are reduced (for example, at menopause 
or when the ovaries are removed) these receptor-positive cancer cells do not 
receive as much oestrogenic stimulation. If a drug such as tamoxifen can interact 
with the oestrogen receptor without causing cell growth, the cell is effectively 
'blocked off' from the stimulating effects of oestrogen even when the hormone 
remains present in the blood. Hence the description that tamoxifen has 'anti-
oestrogenic' effects. 
There are different types of breast cancers, not all of which are stimulated by 
oestrogen, and tamoxifen is not as successful in the treatment of cancers which are 
'oestrogen-receptor negative'. But that is not the end of the story. Although 
tamoxifen has been in use for over thirty years it is currently being promoted as a 
pioneering example of a new class of drug known as Selective Estrogen Receptor 
Modulators (SERMs), drugs which act like an oestrogen on some tissues while 
blocking the hormone to others (Batt, 1998: 4). This double identity allows it to 
maintain anti-oestrogenic effects while mimicking some of the beneficial effects 
attributed to oestrogen such as lowering cholesterol and preventing bone density 
loss (Laurence & Weinhouse, 1994: 122). 
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Sex hormones are essential to the ways in which medical research conceptualises 
tamoxifen. Descriptions of the drug's efficacy and appropriate use always refer to 
hormonal factors. For example, in women with breast cancer, tamoxifen is 
generally believed to improve both 'disease-free' survival and 'overall' survival for 
those aged 50 years and over (Early Breast Cancer Trialists Collaborative Group, 
1992: 6-7). The highest success rates are reported amongst postmenopausal 
women with hormone dependent, oestrogen receptor positive breast cancer (Bush 
& Helzlsouer, 1993: 242; De Gregorio & Weibe, 1994: 27). It is not recommended 
as a standard treatment for premenopausal women with oestrogen receptor 
negative cancers (Clinical Oncology Society of Australia et al., 1994: 17). In 
addition, if a woman has tumours in one breast, tamoxifen supposedly reduces the 
risk of a recurrence after initial treatment, and further reduces the risk of 
developing tumours in the other breast (van Leeuwen et al., 1994: 448). Tamoxifen 
is considered to be safe and effective, particularly in comparison with other forms 
of cancer treatment such as chemotherapy, radiation or surgery. Indeed Adriene 
Fugh-Berman, of the US National Women's Health Network, comments that when 
put alongside toxic cancer treatments tamoxifen 'looks like a vitamin' (cited in 
Batt, 1994: 121). For all these reasons oncologists see tamoxifen as an attractive 
treatment option. 
In 1992 a series of RCTs were set up in North America, Italy, the UK, Australia 
and New Zealand to investigate the effectiveness of tamoxifen in the prevention of 
breast cancer. The evidence cited above suggests that the rationale for prevention 
trials is as follows: because tamoxifen is apparently safe, can reduce recurrence of 
malignancies in the originally treated breast, and reduce the chance of malignancy 
in the 'healthy' adjacent breast, it might also decrease the occurrence of 
malignancies in healthy women deemed to be at 'high risk' of developing breast 
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cancer. A subsidiary justification not widely publicised, was that individual 
doctors were already prescribing tamoxifen for prevention 'off label' and it was 
necessary to evaluate this clinical practice (Smigel, 1991: 1212; Smigel, 1992b: 
1692). That clinicians were already contravening the recommended guidelines by 
prescribing tamoxif en for breast cancer prevention is another example of the 
tension between clinical and theoretical expertise discussed in Chapter 2: by 
conducting the trial the research community was attempting to rein in and place 
conditions upon a clinical practice for which they believed there was little 
supporting evidence. The North American trial was stopped in April 1998, several 
years ahead of schedule, because the organisers believed they were so successful 
that it was unethical to withhold the beneficial treatment from women taking the 
placebo. This early closure, which was criticised by the UK and Australian trial 
organisers, will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
The breast cancer prevention trials (BCPTs) targeted healthy women who did not 
have breast cancer but were considered to be at high risk of developing the disease. 
The trials were set up as two-armed double-blind RCTs in which half of the 
women were randomised to receive a placebo and half received the active agent. 
The regime under investigation involved predicting the likelihood of a group of 
healthy but 'high risk' women developing breast cancer, then giving women in the 
treatment group 20mg of oral tamoxifen per day for a period of five years, before 
calculating whether they have a lower occurrence of breast cancer than women 
taking the placebo. Each national trial was a multi-centre trial, which was 
coordinated through a central administrator and research body, yet was carried out 
in a number of different institutions throughout the three continents. The 
Australian and New Zealand trial sought to enrol 3000 women but after extending 
the original two year recruitment period only registered about 1500 participants. 
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Although administratively autonomous, the findings from the Australian research 
will contribute toward a larger UK based trial which was aiming to gather a total 
of 15 000 women (including the Australian I New Zealand contingent). Due to 
difficulty meeting recruitment targets this number has been reduced to 7000 and in 
late 1998 enrolment was still ongoing (Pritchard, 1998). The North American trial 
aimed to recruit 16 000 women (Bush & Helzlsouer, 1993: 235) but stopped when 
it reached 13 388 (Batt, 1998; Pritchard, 1998).2 The Italian trial was eventually 
cancelled because of a high drop-out rate (Batt, 1998). 
Taken at face value, the smaller than expected numbers suggest that the findings of 
the trials may be weaker than anticipated, but the trial organisers have sidestepped 
this potential criticism by claiming that tamoxifen has a stronger effect than 
expected which has allowed them to rework their statistical calculations and still 
achieve statistically significant outcomes with the smaller groups (CancerNet 
News, 1996). That the trialists were able to do so highlights the flexibility of 
numerical measures which have been constituted as stable objective tools and the 
ease with which they can legitimately be altered when the context in which they 
are deployed changes. 
Although the primary aim of the trials was to test the effect of tamoxifen in 
reducing the occurrence of breast cancer, the drug is also thought to slow the loss 
of bone density and improve vascular health. Consequently additional goals were 
included in the trials' protocols. The way these are expressed varies: for instance 
researchers working on the Italian trial hoped to bring about a 50 per cent 
2 The North American trial was sponsored by the National Adjuvant Surgical Breast and Bowel 
Project (NASBP) and known as the 'Breast Cancer Prevention Trial' (BCPT). The Australian, New 
Zealand and UK based trial is called the 'International Breast Cancer Intervention Study' (IBIS). 
My analysis of the trials is applicable to both trials so for convenience sake I refer to both trials 
under the acronym 'BCPTs'. Where I am referring specifically to one of the trials it will be 
identified in the text. 
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reduction in the number of breast cancers reported and a 30 per cent reduction in 
the incidence of coronary heart disease (CHD), as well as an unspecified reduction 
in osteoporosis (Vanchieri, 1992: 1555). The North American trial, on the other 
hand, was looking for a 30 per cent reduction in cancers (Fugh-Berman & Epstein, 
1992: 1143) and a 20 per cent decline in the incidence of CHD (Bush & 
Helzlsouer, 1993: 235). The UK trial aimed to achieve at least a 30 per cent 
reduction in the incidence of cancers over a ten year period. The trialists believe 
such a reduction is the minimum difference that would justify using tamoxifen as a 
prophylactic among the general population (Faulder, 1992: 30). At the time the US 
trial was stopped organisers were claiming a reduction in predicted cancer 
incidence of close to 50 per cent (Baum, 1998: 8). While this claim sounds 
spectacular, it cannot be taken at face value as the means by which it was arrived at 
requires careful consideration. 
Not without dissent 
Whilst it is assumed that these RCTs would resolve the question of whether 
tamoxifen can help prevent breast cancer they have, in fact, been dogged by 
controversy. This ranges from the question of whether they should proceed at all, 
to the early closure of the North American trial, and the interpretation of current 
findings. The major source of contention in the early planning stage was the 
proposition that the prevention trials would subject healthy women to a potentially 
toxic drug. The way commentators have articulated this criticism can be divided 
into two broad types of problems; social and ethical issues on the one hand, and 
biomedical and technical questions on the other. This in turn facilitates a 
demarcation among those who are empowered to join in the debate about different 
aspects of the trials and emphasises the medical research community's belief that 
119 
only those who are initiated into the workings of clinical trials and the human body 
should be allowed to speak about the biological success or failure of the trial. 
Broader social and ethical debate about the trials may be discussed by those 
outside the profession, as they are not seen as being of direct relevance to the 
biochemical question of whether tamoxifen prevents breast cancer. If, however, 
one adopts a social constructivist position on science it is impossible to maintain a 
division between 'technical success' and 'ethical appropriateness'. Any line drawn 
to differentiate instrumental and moral judgments is "artificial, temporary, and 
convenient to the purposes of the person or group drawing the line" (Cozzens & 
Woodhouse, 1995: 541). For example, outcomes of the trials make no sense unless 
we have some means of assessing the social benefits of preventing breast cancer in 
high risk women. In order to do this one needs to question the role, function and 
moral obligations of modern medicine; should medicine serve individuals or 
society? Should it serve governments or the corporate dollar? In the case of the 
tamoxifen trial researchers are morally obliged to offer individual women 'best 
practice' on the one hand, while, on the other, they are promoting a commitment to 
the greater social good by servicing the requirements of the RCT. 
The ethical benefits which a successful trial would entail (be they individual or 
communal) are essential components of the conditions under which it was 
originally justified. At the same time the technical terrain within biomedical 
research is crucial to the state of the ethical debate. For example, within modern 
medicine the idea of a 'risk-benefit analysis' is premised on empirical information 
which is assessed in conjunction with moral judgements about what research areas 
are appropriate to prioritise. As this empirical environment fluctuates (with 
changes in the success rate of a given procedure, the cost or availability of a piece 
of hardware, or the existence or otherwise of screening technology), so too will the 
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social and moral consequences of decisions being made. The remainder of this 
chapter discusses some of the ways in which the construction of technical 
indicators for 'risk' are contingent on moral and political suppositions, and 
elaborates how these beliefs are obscured when presented in scientific debate. 
The terms 'risk / benefit ratios' or 'risk / benefit equation' are shorthand for 
referring to the assessment of the risks and benefits of a proposed treatment. The 
development of risk / benefit calculations is a necessary prerequisite for any 
clinical trial. Within western medicine the process of developing a risk / benefit 
ratio will ref er to statistical equations derived from assumed characteristics of the 
treatment, disease, condition or procedure in question. As the criteria nominated 
for consideration vary, so does the resulting risk / benefit ratio; for example, 
consideration may be given to a comparison of factors such as the types of studies 
used to arrive at these relative risk levels, a breakdown of the trial populations, a 
more precise account of drug dosage, and duration of a treatment. These factors are 
rarely directly comparable and are usually mediated through some form of 
statistical analysis which is supposed to reduce the impact of the biases of 
particular researchers and the differences between the categories which are being 
compared. But such calculations are meaningless without the ability to form moral, 
ethical or political judgements about which decisions to prioritise; is it better to 
reduce rates of coronary disease, or is it instead preferable to reduce rates of breast 
cancers? 
Developing a risk/ benefit analysis requires juggling multiple factors which exist 
in complex relation to each other: 'certainty' in risk / benefit ratios is contingent 
upon the instance in which it is calculated and is never directly transferable to 
other instances without some form of qualification. Despite this, the language and 
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the ideals of certainty are highly prized and feature prominently in the presentation 
of medical research. Even when researchers are talking about the statistical 
probability of different events occurring, great pains are taken to represent the 
probability of those events as exactly as possible. These are formulated by using 
empirically derived statistical information about the way in which illness and 
treatments occur. Theodore Porter's comment that 'all science is measurement' 
(Porter, 1995: 204) emphasises the importance of finding ways of codifying 
scientists' judgements and assumptions into numerical form, and implies that 
decision making by numbers, rather than by personal and professional experience, 
will protect the objectivity and integrity of the decisions being made. 
When dealing with accepted treatments the formulation of risk / benefit ratios 
involves a process of weighing up the statistical likelihood of one event against 
another where there is an assumed consensus on the frequency with which the 
different events occur. In experimental medicine, however, there are no definite 
indications of how the relationship between risks and benefits may ultimately pan 
out and it is the very possibility of these events that is in question. Risk / benefit 
ratios are built upon hypothetically generated outcomes which may not eventuate, 
or which themselves may become the focus of controversy. Further, one of the 
problems traditionally associated with experimental medicine is that of depriving a 
patient of the known benefits of an accepted treatment in favour of the 
questionable (and potentially hazardous) effects of the regime being tested. This 
deprivation of known benefits to an individual is incorporated into the rhetoric of 
biomedicine as being a necessary part of the experimental process if the 
know ledge and practices being produced are going to have any scientific integrity 
and ultimately produce a deferred benefit to humanity. Risk / benefit ratios and 
their statistically calculated confidence intervals are never the bottom line when it 
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comes to working out the safety of a proposed trial. Performing such calculations 
always involves a loss of information about possible choices and possible 
outcomes, and resulting equations do not account for the processes through which 
they were arrived at (Porter, 1995: 44). 
The net expected benefit of the tamoxifen prevention trials is defined in the trial 
protocols as the difference between the predicted beneficial events (ie. adverse 
events prevented) and the number of detrimental events (ie. adverse events 
induced) within the treatment group. This net benefit depends on balancing a 
number of factors. The 'beneficial events' would be a lower than predicted 
occurrence of breast cancers, myocardial infarctions and bone fractures within the 
treatment group. These will be judged against an assumption that tamoxifen 
increases a woman's risk of developing endometrial cancers, liver cancers, 
thromboembolic blood clots, and a number of other less immediately menacing 
side effects (Bush & Helzlsouer, 1993: 236). While the trials were being 
established and while they are being run, the medical aspects of the controversy 
revolve around specifying entrance criteria, determining the factors that are taken 
into account when developing this risk / benefit ratio, and the way different events 
are prioritised and valued when monitoring the risks and benefits. For example, is 
one tamoxifen-induced death by thrombosis equivalent to one breast cancer death 
prevented? How many cataracts induced by tamoxifen offset how many fractures 
prevented? What are the financial implications of the savings on heart disease 
compared with the expenditure of additional screening needed to monitor women 
taking the drug? And so on. At the end of the trials the conclusions drawn will be 
contingent upon how the proponents and advocates negotiate their way through 
such considerations, and the extent to which those running them can persuade their 
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critics that they have accurately accounted for potential advantages and problems 
in their numerical representation. 
Defining risk in the BCPTs 
In medical discourse 'risk' is used to denote as specifically as possible the 
likelihood that individuals or groups will experience a nominated health condition. 
However, this is only one of the meanings the term has taken on and is set against 
a background in which the identification of risk is a potent form of political 
critique. In Risk Society Beck describes the rise of risk discourse as a consequence 
of modernisation. As the promises of modernity fail to materialise and as the 
modernist vision begins to crumble, its hazards come to the fore forcing us to 
examine values and assumptions previously taken for granted (Beck, 1992: 14-21). 
Although Beck focuses largely on the meaning associated with environmental risk, 
his critique applies equally to biological and medical hazards. He states that much 
of the debate about risk "is still being conducted exclusively or dominantly in the 
terms of natural science" with the result that social, cultural and political values 
inherent in the way we conceptualise risk are unrecognised (Beck, 1992: 24). As 
long as debates remain technocratic and naturalistic the cultural roots of risk can 
be obscured by the rhetoric of modernism (Beck, 1992: 24-25). For Beck the rise 
in risk discourse has a social explanation. He describes the articulation of risk as 
essentially a reflexive process involving cultural reflection, a questioning of 
current social structures and practices, and the exercise of moral judgements. In the 
field of health, both researchers and policy makers place great faith in the ability to 
quantify and evaluate risk, as the construction of risk in the BCPT illustrates. 
Indeed, medical risk discourse and the rise of the ethos of prevention has provided 
an important strategy for social regulation in contemporary societies (Petersen & 
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Lupton, 1996: 19). Regulation has moved from a focus on ameliatory and 
corrective interventions to the calculation of risk profiles. This allows medical 
intervention to be justified not simply on the basis of actual concrete dangers, but 
also on an expert assessment of an increased likelihood that an unmanageable 
event may occur and that some medical intervention could prevent it. This shift 
dramatically increases the potential for intervention, since one need not exhibit 
symptoms of pathology or abnormality, but simply display a characteristic that 
experts have nominated as a risk factor (Castel, 1991: 288). Moves to quantify a 
woman's risk of developing breast cancer should be interpreted in this light. 
In the late 1980s researchers at the US National Cancer Institute developed a 
model for calculating individual women's likelihood of developing breast cancer 
(Smigel, 1992a: 670}. The availability of such a model was a necessary 
prerequisite for a breast cancer prevention trial. According to the team who 
developed the model, an increased public awareness of breast cancer risk factors 
and the need to provide valid information to women who were contemplating 
medical management of their risk through interventions such as mammographic 
screening or prophylactic mastectomy were the main catalyst for their work (Gail 
et al., 1989: 1879). They write: 
Increasing public awareness of breast cancer risk factors, such as having a 
relative with breast cancer, has created a demand for informed counselling of 
patients at elevated risk. A woman's decision to embark on a program of 
intensive surveillance with mammography, or even to undergo prophylactic 
mastectomy, depends on her awareness of the medical options, on personal 
preferences, and, very importantly, on an individualised estimate of the 
probability of her developing breast cancer in a defined period. Such an 
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estimate is also useful for designing prevention trials in high-risk subsets of 
the population and in targeting screening and prevention efforts (Gail et al., 
1989: 1879). 
The above quote implies the authors were motivated by the service-oriented, 
responsive nature of the medical profession; it is 'individual women' in a 
collective 'public' who have created the 'demand' for an informed risk model. 
However, while an individual woman's risk of developing breast cancer remains 
an abstract calculation, the process of articulating a risk model has material effects 
on the practice of medicine. Doctors may now use the Gail risk model to counsel 
against surveillance they consider to be of statistically marginal benefit. However 
they can also use it to heighten their own awareness of a specific set of potential 
risks and to identify women who may have been previously unconcerned about 
their personal risk of developing breast cancer, and introduce them to personal and 
medical management of that risk. As the BCPTs would not have been possible 
without a standardised risk model the very existence of the trials is an example of a 
direct change in the material practices of medicine brought about by the 
articulation of hypothetical risk. 
Deborah Lupton identifies two major types of health risks which are represented in 
public health discourses: the risks of environmental factors, such as pollution or 
hazardous exposures (for example, workplace conditions), and risk associated with 
lifestyle choices, which can be mediated by the self-regulating subject (Lupton, 
1993: 426-427). A third type of risk which features in the BCPTs is that of one's 
genetic predisposition to develop a condition. This is an 'embodied' or 'corporeal' 
risk which is located within the body of an individual but cannot be controlled by 
that individual (Kavanagh & Broom, 1998: 438). Through employing scientific 
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techniques in a systematic manner, health practitioners believe they are able to 
discern 'rational' means of making decisions about health hazards. Although 
medical risk is always anchored in statistical probability, in the instance of 
controversy it is treated as a force whose existence is real and whose impact is 
certain. 
Gail's technique for attaching population statistics to individual bodies was first 
published in 1989 in The Journal of the National Cancer Institute. His model was 
described in an article titled 'Projecting individualised probabilities of developing 
breast cancer for white females who are being examined annually'. Its title and 
place of publication (the official journal of the US National Cancer Institute, a 
bastion of cancer orthodoxy) reflect something of the professional and political 
assumptions upon which it has been constituted. The markers considered to signify 
'high risk' of developing breast cancer in the Gail model are specifically biological 
in origin, rather than dietary or environmental. They are calculated on the basis of 
a woman's genetic make-up, as determined by family history and her lifetime 
hormonal exposure. A woman's eligibility for the BCPT, and by extension her risk 
of developing breast cancer, is calculated with consideration of the number and 
'degree' of her relatives who have had breast cancer, her age and reproductive 
history ( as measured by hormonal factors such as age at first menarche and 
menopause, number of children, and contraceptive history). To enter the trials a 
woman's risk must be equal to that of a 60 or 65 year old ( depending on the trial), 
or four times greater than average (Lancet, 1992: 735, editorial). These markers 
apply to individuals, not groups. They make exclusive reference to 'white women' 
despite the repeated calls of the major research and regulatory bodies in the USA 
for inclusive design and special efforts to encourage participation by 'minority' 
groups (a call echoed by the organisers of the BCPT). They apply to the self-
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regulating medicalised subject who is accustomed to ongoing medical 
surveillance. And finally they reify breast cancer as a sex specific disease, failing 
to acknowledge that the disease afflicts men or to consider risk profiles for men. 
One criticism levelled against the trial organisers is that they have cast too wide a 
net in their definition of 'high risk'. According to Marcia O'Keefe, a founding 
member of the Victorian based Breast Cancer Action Group, the fourfold increase 
nominated by the trialists provides too general an indication of risk to accurately 
identify an 'at risk' population or to indicate which of the numerous risk factors 
tamoxifen may help reduce.3 Further, although articulated as straightforward 
biological events or probabilities, it is clear these markers of risk are also signifiers 
of a certain ideological construction of medicine and the medical subject. When 
the BCPTs began recruiting, the Gail model had not been validated and if the trials 
are ultimately successful they will contribute towards its acceptance as a reliable 
standardised tool in the fight against cancer and the further entrenchment of the 
values it embodies within the clinical setting. But if these values are inherent in the 
Gail risk model, what effect might this have on the BCPTs? 
Entrance criteria 
By turning a sociological gaze at any technical aspect of the BCPTs it is possible 
to tease out a story about the politics which underpin them; the entrance criteria are 
a case in point. Because the incidence of breast cancer increases with age, women 
older than 65 in the UK and Australian trials, and 60 in the North American trial, 
are automatically eligible for entry. For younger women, eligibility is mediated 
both by age and an assumed strength of a woman's genetic predisposition towards 
developing breast cancer. If a woman is aged between 45 and 65 she may enter the 
3 Personal interview, February 1995. 
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trial if she fulfils one of the following criteria: she has at least one 'first degree' 
relative with breast cancer diagnosed under 50 years of age (where 'first degree' 
denotes mother or sister); a first degree relative who has had breast cancer in both 
breasts; two first or second degree relatives (where 'second degree' refers to aunts, 
grandmothers and nieces) who have had breast cancer; no full term pregnancies 
and an affected first degree relative of any age; a confirmed carcinogenic lump or 
'atypical' lump in the breast or a biopsy finding of proliferative disease and breast 
cancer in a first degree relative of any age. 
As premenopausal breast cancer is considered a stronger marker of a genetic 
predisposition towards the disease, women with relatives under the age of fifty 
with breast cancer are classified as being at higher risk (where fifty is nominated as 
signifying a shift in menopausal status). A woman aged between 35 and 44 is 
eligible if she has a first-degree relative with bilateral disease diagnosed younger 
than age 40, two first degree relatives diagnosed younger than 50, or a carcinoma 
established by biopsy. The effects of tamoxif en during pregnancy are unknown so 
pregnant women or those "at risk of pregnancy" will not be recruited (Clark, 1993: 
168). A familial history of male breast cancer or any other type of cancer, do not 
feature as an indicator of elevated risk. Other generally identified risk factors 
incorporate specifically hormonal factors. These include an onset of menstruation 
at age 12 or younger, onset of menopause age 55 or later, and first child after age 
30, or no biological children (De Gregorio & Weibe, 1994: Seeger, 1988 #202: 
475). All of these refer to a woman's 'lifetime exposure' to female sex hormones. 
The entrance criteria listed above construct a woman's risk of developing breast 
cancer as a question of bodily function and, with the exception of reproductive 
choices, as the result of the natural pathology of her body which is beyond her 
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control. The only factor mentioned above which may be within a woman's control 
is timing of childbirth and number of children borne, and the perfectly rational 
choice to limit family size or postpone or avoid pregnancy is said to increase 
women's individual risk. Outside the BCPTs the rhetoric of unfulfilled 
reproductive destiny features prominently as a potential risk for breast cancer, with 
early and multiple pregnancies combined with breast feeding being promoted as 
offering a protective effect (see for example Donegan & Spratt, 1988: 58-59; 
Kesley et al., 1993). A particularly interesting example of this is the literature on 
abortion and increased risk of breast cancer. It would seem that pregnancy alone is 
not sufficient to offer this elusive protection; it must be pregnancy carried to term. 
Artificial termination of pregnancy exposes the female body to the very hormones 
which, if allowed to follow their natural path (pregnancy to term), are beneficial 
but which when left with nothing to do fester and literally become malignant. 
Women who suffer natural abortion need not fear, however, as this causes a 
different pattern of fluctuating hormones with which the body is able to cope 
(Brind, 1999).4 
Locating risk so firmly in an exclusively biological discourse in which 
reproductive function is the dominant theme highlights an inability to recognise or 
consider the way embodied subjectivity affects physical embodiment. In the first 
instance biological risk categories encourage research which obscures any 
interaction between biological and social reality; the actions and effects of 
hormones on breast tissue, something which can be studied in the controlled 
environment of the laboratory, become the pressing research question, while the 
4 The relationship between abortion and breast cancer remains unclear with different studies 
reporting both an association, inverse association and no association (Kesley et al., 1993: 41). 
Despite this lack of clear evidence claims of a link continue to surface as an argument against legal 
termination (Editorial, 1996a: 83-84; Smith & Broom, 1999: 73). 
'1 
130 
life experiences which may ( or n1ay not) influence the production of those 
hormones and breast tissue (factors which appear to be more difficult to control 
and account for in a definitive fashion) are sidelined. Addressing similar concerns, 
Melbourne based women's health activist Mary Draper commented that if giving 
birth at a young age and breastfeeding truly offers protection, it then follows that 
the cancer establishment should be exercising pressure at a policy and research 
level for increased child support, better maternity leave conditions, more adequate 
breastfeeding facilities throughout the community and a greater availability of 
quality childcare so that the decision to bear children young does not disadvantage 
and socially marginalise women.5 Pursuing (or even acknowledging) such 
explicitly political consequences of medical research requires that doctors 
recognise the inescapable nexus between society and biology. Such a move is in 
direct contradiction to medicine's self-proclaimed grounding in the natural 
sciences and the claims that grounding precipitates about social disinterestedness 
and professional objectivity. 
Professional interests and the tamoxifen controversy 
The hazards identified in the Gail model are not the only threats to the healthy 
breast. With the strong emphasis on familial history, it is reasonable to speculate 
that other aspects of family demographics could provide insights into disease 
patterns as family life is a base for a number of common exposure factors. There is 
also evidence for the significance of factors such as socioeconomic status, diet and 
environmental exposures in the occurrence of cancer (Kelsey, 1993; Rimpela & 
Pukkala, 1987). Why have the trialists chosen to uphold such a negative account of 
women's agency in mediating risk when alternative accounts are available? A 
5 Personal interview, February 1995. 
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partial explanation can be found in the disciplinary identity and interests of those 
running the trial. 
Although there are opponents and advocates of the trials who are members of the 
same medical speciality, one feature of the debate is the extent to which the high 
profile advocates of the trials are specialist oncologists while those opposing them 
come from a mixture of disciplinary backgrounds and include epidemiologists, 
economists, other health professionals and social commentators. The design and 
operation of the trials reflect this and have produced the cognitive and cultural 
resources of oncologists as the most appropriate tools for addressing the question 
of breast cancer prevention. Take for example the question raised in the preceding 
paragraph. Factors such as socioeconomic status, diet, environmental exposures, 
and so on, exist outside the control of biomedical oncology: they cannot be 
precisely accounted for, assessed, monitored or altered by the cognitive 
expectations or disciplinary practices available within that subculture. Should 
exposure to potential toxins such as low-frequency radiation or food preservatives 
prove significant, effective prevention lies with policy and regulatory bodies rather 
than in the medical clinic. Further, acknowledging the importance of these factors 
poses a threat to the disciplinary and political interests of the trialists by elevating 
the epistemological and cultural authority of rival professionals. The construction 
of risk proposed by the prevention trials, on the other hand, appeals to beliefs arid 
habitual performances which have a strong history within the discursive field of 
oncology. In other words the prevention trials take exemplars from within the area 
and seek to extend them so as to demonstrate, through reference to recognisable 
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and well established professional norms, the reliability of their relationship with 
the natural world (Pickering, 1982: 125-6).6 
Professional interests operate on a number of levels in any controversy. Consider 
this statement by Adriene Fugh-Berman, commenting on the fact that oncologists 
and surgeons designed the trial: 
... to them tamoxifen is like a vitamin - it's the least toxic drug they deal 
with ... But those of us in preventive health and medicine have different 
standards about what kinds of things you should unleash onto a healthy 
population (cited in Raloff, 1992: 267). 
In more broad-based public health it is essential that the toxicity profile of any 
drug used in a preventative setting be extremely low, as the vast majority of those 
taking the drug will not benefit from its use. It is not at all clear that tamoxifen fits 
this description. Oncologists are used to consulting patients who are facing an 
ultimately terminal condition and treating them with extremely toxic subs~nces 
whose unintended consequences can be far-reaching and debilitating. Critics point 
out that this has allowed the trialists to have an unrealistically high tolerance for 
acceptable risks and dangerously low expectations of safety for the tamoxifen 
prevention trials. According to Fugh-Berman "[w]e're afraid these tamoxifen 
intervention trials are really going to set a precedent for experiments in disease 
substitution - a concept we don't like" (cited in Raloff, 1992: 267). Until the 
drug's long-term safety has been proven the National Women's Health Network, 
(USA), of which Fugh-Berman is a board member, will object to tamoxifen's use 
in healthy women. Here the macro-interests of different parties can be seen in 
6 For examples of the role of interests in the growth of scientific knowledge see (Barnes, 1977; 
Barnes & McKenzie, 1979; Bloor, 1976; Cozzens & Woodhouse, 1995) 
133 
operation. When crossing the divide between oncology and public health 
tamoxifen prevention ceases to be a rational option. 
Another example of disciplinary interests inherent in the design of the trials can be 
seen in their reference to hormones as mediators of health and illness. Karen 
Smigel, a journalist with the National Cancer Institute, writes of the hormonally 
focused prevention trial: 
Why look to hormones? The genetic and dietary factors that may also play a 
role in the genesis of breast cancer are not clearly understood or cannot be 
easily manipulated. But oestrogens and other hormones, the chemicals that 
make females female, are substances that researchers can and have 
influenced for years (Smigel, 1991: 1211). 
Unlike toxic waste, food quality or work place safety, hormonal risk factors fall 
within the realm of laboratory based research, and appeal to a bioreductionism by 
focusing on internal biological agents as responsible for breast cancer. But more 
than that, they make reference to established tools that cancer researchers "can and 
have influenced for years". The assumed causal relationship between hormones 
and the proliferation of cancer cells serves as an exemplar, a communally held 
model or example (Kuhn, 1970: postscript) within the cancer research community. 
In addressing the challenge of breast cancer prevention the trialists have modelled 
their hypothesis on its analogical similarity to a communally taken-for-granted 
problem solution. In so doing they have imported cultural standards and practices 
which are already a regular feature of the discipline (Pickering, 1982: 126). These 
practices prioritise and strengthen the notion that cell proliferation can be 
responsible for overall health status and subordinate social, political and cultural 
factors to the processes of biological functioning. In this sense professional 
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interests operate in the deployment of technical know ledge and expertise so as to 
appear to be removed from larger political interests, while actually contributing to 
the destabilisation of arguments offered by the trialists' opponents by rendering 
critiques based upon alternative explanations illegitimate. 
Tamoxifen and its associated risks and benefits are different things to different 
individuals and groups, and it is the ability to exert one's own definition of the 
drug and its actions which drives the controversy. In the BCPTs a primary 
consideration surrounds the question of subjecting 'well women' to the potential 
risks of an unknown treatment. Should the trials prove successful there is a further 
concern about treating large numbers of healthy women with the potentially toxic 
drug for a relatively rare condition. This concern is expressed predominantly as a 
philosophical or ethical question rather than a political one (see for example Bush 
& Helzlsouer, 1993; Faulder, 1992; Smigel, 1992b). While every medical 
experiment involves similarly intractable 'ethical' judgements, the preventative 
nature of the tamoxifen trial throws this question into stark relief. The women in 
the trial are currently healthy and symptom free, and the manifestation of any 
actual disease is only hypothetical. Although tamoxifen is generally considered to 
be safe and free from significant side effects, this judgement is usually made when 
considering it alongside other cyto-toxic anti-cancer treatments, many of which 
wreak a very heavy toll on the body, and with the assumption that a patient 
actually has cancer. Making a judgement about a treatment option when one is told 
they have an 'increased risk' of developing a life threatening condition is very 
different from making such a decision when one is told they have the condition. 
This makes an already problematic process all the more difficult to decipher. 
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The perceived 'safety' of the drug, and consequently the way in which it is 
understood to be 'effective', changes dramatically in accordance with the trial 
population and disease state under consideration. A risk / benefit ratio calculated 
when addressing the treatment of advanced breast cancer with tamoxifen will not 
be appropriate when assessing the treatment of early breast cancer, let alone 
healthy 'high risk' women. The positions taken up in the dispute about the trials 
demonstrate the extent to which tamoxifen is differently constituted according to 
the political and professional position from which it is viewed. For example, for an 
oncologist tamoxifen may represent the benefits of possible cancer prevention to 
an individual woman, while for a women's health activist it may stand for the 
hundreds of women experiencing nausea as a result of the treatment. 
When addressing whether a treatment is ethical, it is often assumed that there is a 
disembodied standard against which one can judge. Beaglehole and Bonita identify 
four basic principles of biomedical ethics: 
autonomy, the respect for human rights, dignity and freedom; non-
maleficence, the principle of not harming; beneficence, the principle of 
doing good; and justice, the principle concerned with equity, fairness and 
truth telling (Beaglehole & Bonita, 1997: 137). 
These criteria are based on a liberal humanism which assumes the existence of a 
'human nature' that should be guaranteed rights, dignity and freedom, as well as 
the existence of extrinsic criteria by which to judge the benefits or hazards 
resulting from medical treatment, or the extent to which they reflect an abstract 
notion of justice. In much the same way that the rhetoric of science seeks to 
naturalise and universalise the n1aterial world, the rhetoric of medical ethics seeks 
to naturalise and universalise certain moral assumptions, and in so doing, to erase 
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the connection between decision making in the political sphere and the ethics of 
biomedicine. The controversy around the BCPTs, however, shows that the 
question as to whether the trials are ethically acceptable varies according to the 
forum in which they are being presented and that the factors necessary for a 
resolution of this ethical debate also vary according to who is speaking and for 
what purposes. Argument over the ethical acceptability of both the trials and any 
subsequent use of prophylactic tamoxifen is central to feminist concerns about the 
trials, but feminist commentary also places issues of ethical acceptability alongside 
political questions about the treatment of women in medicine and the 
conceptualisation of female biology and identity. This will be taken up in the 
fallowing chapter. 
In conjunction with the previous chapter on hormones, this chapter has provided a 
brief history and description of the context in which it was possible for the 
tamoxifen prevention trials to take place. A detailed account of the aims and 
structure of the trials, coupled with a discussion of the way the trials construct and 
measure 'risk', begin to raise questions about the interests which have been and 
stand to be served by the design and execution of the trials. In particular, 'risk' in 
the BCPTs has been medicalised. It is constituted as resulting from the 
pathological effects of female hormones, entities which in other social and 
medical discourses are described as essential for normal female sexuality and 
subjectivity. This is not a beneficial medicalisation, as is arguably the case for 
premenstrual tension or postnatal depression where there is an existing distress 
which women seek to have validated and from which they seek relief. Instead the 
only thing that is validated in the medicalisation of breast cancer risk is a woman's 
fear and her need to self-regulate. The most a woman can do to control her deviant 
hormones is to start young in having lots of children (all of whom should be breast 
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fed), or to put herself in the hands of medical specialists who will manipulate her 
hormones chemically, provided she is prepared to commit herself to the ongoing 
expense, surveillance (such as mammography, endometrial biopsy) and other 
potential unwanted effects. The following chapter continues the discussion of the 
BCPTs and focuses more specifically on the role of scientific literature in 
controversy in science and medicine. 
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CHAPTERS 
Representations of the Tamoxifen Controversy 
Chapter 4 outlined the origin and organisation of the tamoxifen prevention trials 
and began an analysis of the impact on the types of know ledge being produced of 
the actions of various groups with interests in the trials. I discussed the supposed 
scientific rationale for the trials and argued that, no matter how strong and 
persuasive it appeared, it did not provide an adequate explanation for their 
occurrence. Instead, there were numerous political and material reasons for the 
successful launch of the BCPTs, including the compatibility of their design with 
the social organisation of certain sectors of the medical profession and its appeal to 
cognitive and practical traditions within those medical subcultures. The trials also 
coincided with a historical moment in the women's health movement which saw 
grass roots activism in the late 1980s and 1990s as women protested against the 
inadequate treatment of breast cancer and lobbied for more research money and an 
improved access to quality services (Laurence & Weinhouse, 1994: 14-138). 
Chapter 5 extends the discussion of the dynamics of controversies within science 
by looking in detail at disputed claims about the side effects of tamoxifen. The 
reason for including this level of detail is to illustrate the form controversy takes in 
the published medical literature and to demonstrate that almost no aspect of the 
trials can unequivocally be taken for granted but can instead be challenged through 
reference to a complex array of subsidiary hypotheses and research. The role of 
professional and ideological interests in shaping scientific controversies was 
discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter published accounts documenting 
the controversy will be examined in order to draw out how the identity and 
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interests of the advocates and opponents of the BCPTs are expressed in the 
literature. This shows once again that there are problems with the practical 
application of the commonsense assumption that clinical trials resolve medical 
controversy; as Steven Epstein has shown in relation to AIDS trial, rather than 
resolving uncertainty clinical trial can become a source of uncertainty (Epstein, 
1996: 312). 
The Dynamic of Debate in Science 
Controversy in science and medicine normally occurs when groups and individuals 
disagree over rival fact claims. If a disagreement escalates to the point where it 
involves the attention of a community of specialists, or a number of such 
communities, resolution of competing fact claims will provoke a diverse range of 
social manoeuvrings, including questioning a person's or group's right to speak 
authoritatively about the issue at hand. When this occurs scientific knowledge and 
procedures become debates about the appropriate boundaries of professional 
expertise. Negotiating a settlement involves asking questions: Where are the 
borders between specialist scientific disciplines? Which disciplines are scientific? 
What practices are scientific? Who is authorised to speak as a scientist? (Jasanoff 
et al., 1995: 389). 
Such questions can be expressed in a number of different f arums ranging from 
routine unstructured interactions in the workplace, through semi-formal exchanges 
such as written correspondence and conference presentations, to formal peer-
reviewed published accounts. At the start of this project I hoped to analyse some of 
the informal articulations of the controversy through interviewing the organisers 
and clinical researchers associated with the Australian trial and perhaps to gain 
access to some of the administrative and historical documentation associated with 
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it. To this end I approached organisers on a number of occasions during 1995. 
While attempts to contact consumer and feminist health activists were 
enthusiastically received, with the exception of Professor Martin Tattersall, a 
member of the Australian Breast Cancer Clinical Trials Group (the board 
overseeing the trial), I was unable to gain access to any of those officially 
associated with the trial. I believe there are several reasons why my requests were 
unsuccessful. My motive for choosing the trial was based primarily on the way it 
embodied the application of scientific values in the practice of experimental 
medicine - the issues raised by a specifically gendered technology aimed at 
prevention rather than palliation added interest but were not my first concern. I 
was not initially aware of how politically sensitive the trial was at that time. There 
has been an unusual amount of commentary about the trial both within the research 
community and in the broader community, much of which has been critical. 7 As I 
was unable to gain direct access to the trialists and their account of events, I felt I 
could not rely heavily on interviews and other personal commentary from people 
who were critical of the trial. In order to minimise the bias inherent in my own 
narrative and create some degree of symmetry in my reporting I have limited my 
analysis of the controversy to publicly available published accounts. Despite this 
limitation and the convention in scientific writing to erase the social context from 
which such work emerged, it is possible to use published accounts to explore the 
social processes of scientific controversy. 
7 Following allegations of falsification of data in another breast cancer trial, recruitment had been 
temporarily suspended in the US in February of 1994, and the MRC in the UK publicly expressed 
concern about endorsing the BCPT. The consent forms had to be re-written in both the US and UK. 
In Australia, the ethics committee at Newcastle University also refused the original informed 
consent forms put forward by the trialists (Dr Paul Craft, Director of Oncology Royal Canberra 
Hospital, personal correspondence, Saturday 19th August, 1995). 
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Texts are linguistic mediations of thoughts, actions and experiences, and the use 
and strategic deployment of textual representations can be a technique for 
persuading readers about the benefits of one's own position (Jordanov~, 1986: 17). 
They contain information about the genre in which they are written, the 
relationship between reader and writer and the identity of the author. All of this 
information contrives to locate the meaning of a text within a set of social 
relations. In addition, the content of a text also gives insights into what is not being 
said, or cannot be said within any particular discourse. This in turn reveals much 
about the conscious and unconscious constraints, models and sources writers 
employ and the relationship they create between the form and content of their 
arguments (Jordanova, 1986: 19-20). The act of writing can, therefore, be seen as 
an attempt to establish a relationship between author and reader, although this can 
by no means be fully determined by the author. In addition, the act of writing as a 
'scientist' makes presumptions about the kind of relationship being established, 
and the authoritative basis of that relationship. As Jordanova comments: 
To write is to assume a position of authority. To write as a scientist doubles 
the authority, because an authoritative account of reality is being established. 
Scientists and medical practitioners who put pen to paper are claiming to 'tell 
it as it really is' (Jordanova, 1986: 20-21). 
Despite tendencies to differentiate between various modes of literature, it is 
important to stress that scientific texts contain traces of the social context from 
which they originate. Accordingly, the daily goings-on within scientific 
laboratories are arguably "the organisation of persuasion through literary 
inscription" (Latour & Woolgar, 1979: 88). Latour and Woolgar hold that 
scientific activities are aimed at transforming possible concepts and entities which 
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must be linguistically justified, into statements of 'fact' which require no such 
qualification. When this transformation occurs, know ledge claims lose all vestiges 
of having ever required qualification and appear, instead, to be naturalised within 
an existing body of beliefs (Latour & Woolgar, 1979: 106). The processes and 
types of linguistic strategies used to make the context of production vanish is part 
of the ordering work of everyday science (Law, 1994: 31). While these strategies 
can never be precisely reconstructed, they can be alluded to through an analysis of 
scientific texts, so investigating the published scientific papers relevant to a 
controversy can shed light on the preoccupations and interests of scientists and 
impacts these have on ways controversy is shaped (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983: 
10; Pinch, 1986: 31). 
In studies of controversy, the tamoxifen debate (in the context of the BCPTs) is 
slightly unusual because it was not originally the outcome of the experiment which 
was being contested, but whether the experiment should take place at all. This 
effectively displaced the emphasis away from the facts produced by the trials onto 
the facts used to justify the trials: what criteria should be used to draw up 
procedural boundaries for the operation of the experiment and what criteria should 
be used to measure and quantify its success or failure? The early closure of the 
North American trial has shifted this focus back to a debate over the results of the 
trial. In this chapter I canvass representations of contesting claims about the 
positive and negative effects of tamoxifen and the strategies used to legitimate 
those claims. 
In 1990 the UK Coordinating Committee on Cancer Research held an international 
symposium to discuss the conduct of a tamoxifen breast cancer prevention trial. 
According to the organisers, that one-day meeting thoroughly aired and settled all 
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relevant ethical issues with the international guest list (all of whom were medical 
professionals) reaching the conclusion that "the rationale for doing a tamoxifen 
chemoprevention trial was no longer controversial" (Faulder, 1992: 29). That 
conclusion proved to be unwarranted. Despite the best efforts of the proponents to 
make the trials seem like technical and ethical imperatives and to suggest that all 
the contentious issues had been resolved, the dissent which marked the planning 
stages of the trials has continued to the present time. 
In response to initial proposals, the British Committee on Safety of Medicines 
officially approved the trial in February 1992 and study leaders began organising 
recruitment (Lancet, 1992: 735, editorial). The US Food and Drug Administration 
also approved the trial at this time. On the 12th of March, however, the British 
Medical Research Council (MRC) withheld its endorsement because of evidence 
indicating tamoxifen caused liver toxicity in rats and because of the ethical issues 
involved with giving an anticancer drug to healthy women (Laurence & 
Weinhouse, 1994: 123; Raloff, 1992: 266). Dr Dai Rees, the secretary to the 
Council, stated that "the MRC has no wish to spread alarm amongst women taking 
ta1noxifen for proven cases of breast cancer ... " for whom tamoxifen "is a well-tried 
and effective treatment" (Raloff, 1992: 266). But as the trial sought to use the drug 
in well women it was advisable to proceed with caution pending the availability of 
adequate research to better inform risk/benefit calculations (Lancet, 1992: 735, 
editorial). The misgivings of the MRC were mirrored to a lesser degree by the 
Imperial Cancer Research Fund and the Cancer Research Campaign, both of which 
maintained provisional support for the trial contingent upon the UK Department of 
Health re-examining and approving the trial design (Raloff, 1992: 266). This 
official apprehensiveness flagged growing concerns among peak women's health 
organisations and sectors of the medical research community as close scrutiny of 
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the feasibility and accuracy of claims being made by the trialists pointed towards 
contradictory results. Chapter 4 examined how this concern was directed at the 
construction of risk and the entrance criteria nominated by the trialists, and claims 
about the ethical acceptability of the trials. Disagreement also arose over specific 
elements of the evidence used to justify the trial and its predicted outcomes (both 
negative and positive). 
Contesting claims about effects and side effects: Contralateral breast 
studies 
Initially Fugh-Berman and Epstein criticised the trials by arguing against the 
reasons used to justify them. Although Fugh-Berman and Epstein acknowledge 
eight RCTs which show tamoxifen reduces the incidence of contralateral tumours 
among women with breast cancer by 30 per cent, they believe this did not warrant 
a chemoprevention trial. Proponents of the trials have assumed that a woman's 
'healthy' breast can act as an experimental control when she is given tamoxifen for 
diagnosed breast cancer. Fugh-Berman and Epstein argue that a reduction in 
contralateral tumours is not a relevant marker for women who have never had 
breast cancer since the effects of tamoxifen may hinder the growth of existing but 
undetected contralateral tumours rather than stop the development of new tumours. 
As both breasts of a woman with breast cancer have been exposed to identical 
pathogens, be they genetic, reproductive, hormonal, or environmental, there is no 
scientific basis for regarding the contralateral breast of a woman with breast cancer 
as a normal, healthy control (Fugh-Berman & Epstein, 1992: 1143). They also cite 
evidence that when tumours do occur in the contralateral breast of women taking 
tamoxifen, they are more virulent and associated with a higher mortality. Using the 
contralateral breast cancer studies as a justification for the BCPTs produces the 
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subjects of the trial as breasts removed from women and bodies. The trialists 
attempt to separate breasts from whole body systems wherein they are the 
materialisation of a woman's history. In so doing breasts become objects which can 
be studied in isolation - isolation not only from a woman's life, but also from her 
other breast. 
Conflicting predictions 
According to the claims outlined in the North American protocol, if that trial were 
to have gone to plan, 38 endometrial cancers and up to 13 pulmonary embolisms 
would have been induced in the experimental population as a result of tamoxifen 
treatment. These would, however, be outweighed by the prevention of 62 breast 
cancers and 52 myocardial infarctions (Bush & Helzlsouer, 1993: 236) and by a 
"significant" increase in postmenopausal bone density (Powles, 1992: 1145). In 
contrast with these figures, breast specialist Richard Love calculated that in the 
same trial population there would be 58 breast cancers and 10 fatal and non-fatal 
heart attacks prevented and a total of nearly 300 unspecified negative events 
induced (cited in Laurence & Weinhouse, 1994: 124). In a letter to The Lancet, yet 
a different claim appears. According to Nicholson, an American clinician who 
sought to 111n a similar trial, 40 cases of breast cancer per 10000 woman-years 
should be expected among the women with a risk equivalent to those taking part in 
the trial. Treatment with tamoxifen should reduce this number by 6.6 breast 
cancers per 10000 woman-years (Nicholson, 1992: 1551). 
Producing written representations of a phenomenon is an activity which occurs in a 
context, and the social orderings favoured by that context are borne out in the 
resultant text. In the case of a medical research paper or other scientific publication 
these orderings are likely to include attempts to hide the context of production 
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(Law, 1994: 31-33). It may be appealing to ask which of the predicted outcomes 
for the prevention trial is accurate, but it is perhaps more profitable to point out 
that such claiming and counter claiming demonstrates the flexibility with which 
statistical data are generated. The source of this flexibility is not specified in the 
papers cited above but brings to the fore the fact that even when standardised 
statistical packages are used to predict outcomes and interpret data, judgements 
must be made about the characteristics of the population and diseases to which 
they are applied: who is a representative member of any trial population and what 
are the normal rates at which they will experience a condition? It is part of the 
mundane work of science to resolve differences about, and gloss over, these 
judgments. When controversy occurs, strategically targeting an opponent's 
assumed points of reference highlights and disrupts this seldom acknowledged 
process and opens the way for debate about those assumptions. 
Bone protection 
In the previous chapter I discussed how the relative values attributed to the various 
risks and benefits of the trials remain a source of contention. Negative side effects 
not considered in the risk / benefit equations include hot flushes, depression, 
vaginal discharge, and menstrual changes. In addition, the effects of tamoxifen on 
the eyes are noted in the protocol but were not thought significant enough to 
include as numerically weighted risks (Bush & Helzlsouer, 1993: 235). The 
inclusion of claims about the benefits of tamoxifen for hearts and bones has been a 
crucial element in marketing the positive effects of the trial. According to Fugh-
Berman and Epstein, however, the evidence for these positive predictions has been 
exaggerated. Fugh-Berman and Epstein refer to eight studies on osteoporosis, five 
of which identified no effect of tamoxifen on bone density. Two of these studies 
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were retrospective series, (Fornander et al., 1990; Love et al., 1988) and three were 
prospective investigation (Fentiman, 1989; Gotfredson et al., 1984; Powles et al., 
1989). Three prospective studies found tamoxifen increased the bone density of 
lumbar vertebrae however spinal osteoporosis, unlike hip fractures, is not 
associated with increased mortality (Love et al., 1992; Turken et al., 1989; Wolter 
et al., 1988). They also assert that no study has shown a protective effect of 
tamoxifen on the cortical bone in the femur, or a decrease in hip fracture rates, and 
it is hip fractures which are responsible for most of the serious morbidity and 
mortality associated with osteoporosis. Accordingly, the expected advantages of 
tamoxifen for bone density are actually less than the trialists make them out to be 
(Fugh-Berman & Epstein, 1992: 1144). 
Cardiovascular benefits 
The cardiovascular benefit of tamoxifen also comes under scrutiny. Fugh-Berman 
and Epstein argue that although conjugated oestrogens consistently decrease low-
density lipoprotein and elevate high-density lipoprotein (HDLs) cholesterol (with 
the effect of improving the condition of the blood vessels that supply the heart), 
the picture with tamoxifen is unclear. It is variously reported to decrease, maintain, 
and increase HDLs (Fugh-Berman & Epstein, 1992: 1144). Effects of tamoxifen 
on total cholesterol are also unclear. Most studies have shown a reduction in total 
cholesterol; however one found no change. Fugh-Berman and Epstein refer to 
reports that tamoxifen occasionally leads to a striking increase in total cholesterol 
and triglyceride concentrations. In addition, although the risk for men of 
cardiovascular disease increases with total cholesterol concentrations over 5.2 
mmol/1 (200 mg/ l00dl), women's risk does not appear to increase until their levels 
reach 7 mmol/1. Since low HDL levels are thought to be a reliable predictor of 
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cardiovascular disease in women, reducing total cholesterol without increasing 
HDL may not be beneficial. Further, only one out of eight RCTs on tamoxifen 
reported a decrease in cardiac disease and this finding can be discounted since 
there is no indication that accurate baseline cardiovascular risk factors were 
gathered (Fugh-Berman & Epstein, 1992: 1144). 
Summarising the data on cardiovascular protection resulting from tamoxif en use, 
Bush and Helzlsouer reported on one study in which deaths from myocardial 
infarction among the treatment subjects were approximately half those in the 
control group. There was, however, no significant difference in overall deaths from 
other cardiovascular events such as strokes and chronic ischaemic heart disease. 
They argue that 
[ w ]hile this finding is somewhat encouraging, there were methodological 
problems [ with the trial] that could have affected the validity of the results 
(Bush & Helzlsouer, 1993: 238). 
After listing several such problems, they concluded that 
[g]enerally, these suggestive but limited findings on the effects of tamoxifen 
on lipids and cardiovascular events would be insufficient to justify a full-
scale clinical trial of tamoxifen use for cardiovascular disease prevention in 
women (Bush & Helzlsouer, 1993: 238). 
Note the recourse to the rhetoric of methodological prec1s1on: the research, 
although suggestive, was methodologically flawed and therefore cannot be 
considered conclusive. So, again, it would seem that the empirical evidence for the 
benefits of tamoxifen for osteoporosis and heart disease can be strategically 
deployed both to defend and criticise the trials. 
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Endometrial cancer 
An elevated risk of developing endometrial cancer is one of the generally accepted 
effects of tamoxifen use. Because of the association between endometrial 
carcinoma and unopposed exogenous oestrogen (which emerged in the 1970s 
among women taking HRT) it is thought that the oestrogenic actions of tamoxifen 
are responsible for this link (Magriples et al., 1993: 487-488). This aspect of the 
controversy seems to revolve not around whether there is some causal link 
between tamoxifen and endometrial cancer, but rather around attempts to define 
this relationship precisely. Issues which have been raised include the frequency 
with which women taking tamoxifen develop endometrial cancer, the dose at 
which cancers develop, and the effects this information should have on calculating 
risk-benefit ratios for the prevention trials. Nayfield et al cite a fivefold increase in 
the occurrence of endometrial cancer in women being treated with tamoxif en 
(N ayfield et al., 1991). Advocates of the trials claim that this increase is on par 
with that expected in those taking oestrogen therapy at menopause, however critics 
argue that this is inaccurate given that the prescription of high-dose oestrogen 
replacement became less common in the late 1970s precisely because of the risk it 
posed of inducing endometrial cancer (Harlap, 1992; Kaufert & McKinlay, 1985: 
117-119). While the risk of developing endometrial cancer might be an acceptable 
trade-off for a woman facing the recurrence of breast cancer, the same may not be 
true for a woman who has not had the disease. A tiny change in the perceived 
frequency rates could have a devastating effect on the success of the trials, as could 
a shift in the perceived severity of the disease. 
This indeed occurred when data relating to the incidence of tamoxifen-induced 
endometrial cancer prompted the US National Cancer Institute to order clinicians 
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working on tamoxifen research to rewrite consent forms and ask participants to re-
sign them (Seachrist, 1994: 910). Bernard Fisher was chief investigator on a study 
of tamoxifen therapy for cancer which began in 1981 as well as being a chief 
investigator with the IBIS prevention trial. In December 1993 findings from 
Fisher's earlier study prompted his group to send out warnings to all clinics 
participating in the BCPT to the effect that updated information about the risk of 
tamoxif en-induced uterine cancer meant that consent farms would require revision. 
Recommendations for a revised version were sent out on January 14th, 1994. The 
NCI issued similar advice to doctors using tamoxifen in treatment trials two days 
earlier (Seachrist, 1994: 910). Following this development the NCI agreed to give 
800 of the women in the trial yearly endometrial biopsies so as to obtain more 
detailed information on the effects of tamoxifen on the uterine lining. 
Although oestrogen was first linked to en dome trial cancer in 197 5 (Zeil & Finkle, 
1975), oestrogen induced cancers have been seen as an acceptable risk because on 
the whole they can be contained by available treatment options. They are described 
as 'low-grade' cancers because they are comparatively easy to detect and can be 
treated relatively successfully. It is this understanding of endometrial cancer which 
has informed the development of the trialists' risk / benefit equation and has led to 
the belief that a certain number of endometrial cancers are inevitable and are an 
acceptable trade-off for a reduction in breast cancers. For example, Ford et al, 
write that tamoxifen 
may cause thromboembolic reactions and endometrial cancer. . . These risks 
are small and are clearly outweighed by the agent's benefits in the adjuvant 
setting (Ford et al., 1994: 2728). 
They continue that in the prevention trial 
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[i]f tamoxifen use were to double the risk of endometrial cancer and 
thromboembolic disease, the suggested 33% reduction in invasive breast 
cancer and the 20% decrease in myocardial infarction still would translate 
into a significant net benefit for tamoxifen therapy. 
Further, Jordan et al, state that 
Metastatic breast cancer is invariably fatal, whereas endometrial cancer is a 
curable disease. In light of the extensive use of tamoxifen, the overall 
incidence of endometrial carcinoma is rather modest and is probably less of a 
concern than is the administration of estrogen to healthy postmenopausal 
women ... (Jordan, 1992: 232). 
Critics of the trials responded to the assertion that endometrial cancer is an 
acceptable risk by questioning the medical profession' s ability to effectively 
manage the iatrogenic consequences of its treatment practices. They point out that 
it is unrealistic to expect that all endometrial cancers resulting from tamoxifen 
treatment will be identified and treated successfully. There are margins of error in 
current detection techniques, and treatment, while comparatively effective, is not 
free of costs and risks. Further, to assume that cancers will be detected and treated 
is to assume that women in the trials will be prepared to subject themselves to an 
additional degree of medicalisation and surveillance by learning to monitor for the 
appearance of suspect symptoms and by submitting to endometrial biopsy, 
hysterectomy and other treatments and interventions which are painful and 
otherwise distressing (Raloff, 1992: 267). But the possible effects of the trials on 
individual autonomy do not make a strong argument within the logic of 
biomedicine. The stakes are raised more strategically by opponents of the trials 
who have put forward the claim that the endometrial cancers induced by tamoxifen 
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are an unusually virulent hybrid which lack the characteristics of normal 
endometrial tumours. This new iatrogenic menace, rigorously documented by 
laboratory and clinical scientists, are 'high-grade' tumours, not as responsive to 
treatment as 'low-grade' tumours on which the risk / benefit calculations were 
based (Magriples et al., 1993), so the risks calculated by the trialists are 
understatements. 
Liver problems 
The effects of tamoxifen on the liver present another area of contention. 
Laboratory studies in animals have found an association between tamoxifen and 
hepatic cancer. Liver cancers occurred in 11.5 per cent of rats fed low doses of 
tamoxifen, and when exposed to high doses as many as 71.2 per cent developed 
cancer (N ayfield et al., 1991: 1450). In order to explain and discredit this result 
researchers have argued that oestrogen receptors in rat livers more readily bond 
with and absorb oestrogen than do receptors in human livers. There are differences 
in the way the drug affects rats and humans and although there has only been 
anecdotal evidence of a link between tamoxifen and hepatic cancer in humans, the 
possibility has not been ruled out and remains the subject of ongoing attention 
(Fugh-Berman & Epstein, 1992: 1144). 
Existing know ledge is crucial for assimilating and understanding new findings, 
and according to the dominant view within oncology there is no demonstrated link 
between liver disease and tamoxifen. Because advanced breast cancer frequently 
metastasises to the liver, there is the potential for cancer actually caused by 
tamoxifen to be attributable to the progressing breast cancer. Critics of the trials 
claim that when a woman receiving tamoxifen develops abnormal cell proliferation 
on the liver doctors simply assume it is a metastasis. In order to differentiate 
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between the spread of breast cancer to the liver and new independent liver cancers 
possibly resulting from tamoxifen, liver biopsies must be performed, but this 
seldom happens. Here, again, critics are strategically highlighting the 
shortcomings in current medical management as a way of problematising the 
assumptions of the trialists. Limited financial resources, time constraints and 
existing beliefs all work against documenting the possible link between liver 
cancer and tamoxif en. Aside from cancer, there is evidence that tamoxif en may be 
associated with other forms of liver disease or damage to liver function. The 
Committee on the Safety of Medicine in the UK has attributed four deaths to liver 
failure resulting from tamoxifen use, and has implicated five cases of tamoxifen 
induced hepatitis, one of which also resulted in death (Ching et al., 1992; De 
Gregorio & Weibe, 1994: 50). In addition, animal studies have indicated that 
tamoxifen breaks down in the liver in such a way as to act like a chemical 
carcinogen rather than to produce the expected hormonal action and further, can 
cause damage to liver DNA (Raloff, 1992: 268-69). 
Effects of long-term use 
Little is known about the long-term side effects of tamoxifen as few women have 
been given it for more than five years. The advent of the prevention trials makes 
extended treatment likely. While the trials were originally expected to run for five 
years, a new American trial which began when the NASBP trial was stopped (and 
is recn1iting from its population) will extend tamoxifen treatment for a further five 
years. And should the BCPTs be considered successful, women will be encouraged 
to keep taking tamoxifen indefinitely so as to maintain the drug's preventative 
effects. The fact that women may be medicated for life has not been widely 
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reported. In my research I have found few references which make this implied 
consequence of the trials explicit. For example, Ford et al write that 
[t]umor regrowth does occur when tamoxifen treatment is discontinued, 
indicating that long term tamoxifen therapy may be needed for the continued 
suppression of breast tumours (Ford et al., 1994: 2728). 
And later, while referring to the women on the trial, Ford writes; 
All subjects will be followed for the remainder of their lives (Ford et al., 
1994: 2729). 
This continued use of the drug adds another layer of concern when considering the 
long-term implications of the trials, as many questions about extended tamoxifen 
treatment remain unanswered. In the early 1970s evidence pointed towards a 
'conservative course' of one year's treatment because tamoxifen exposure 
sometimes made tumours resistant to hormone treatment and even stimulated 
malignant cell growth. The long term effects on the endocrine system were also 
unknown. Research undertaken during the 1980s indicated that more lengthy 
treatment is warranted, however there are no clear guidelines as to optimal 
treatment duration (Saltman, 1994: 7). This raises the possibility that if women are 
regularly exposed to prophylactic tamoxifen and develop breast cancer, their 
tumours may be hormone resistant and therefore more difficult to treat (Raloff, 
1992). 
Eye damage 
While tamoxifen has been associated with various eye disorders these problems 
have usually been linked with significantly larger doses (240mg per day) than 
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those being given in the BCPTs (20mg per day) [De Gregorio, 1994 #206; 51; 
Kaiser-Kupfer, 1978 #457]. Despite this, a prospective chemotherapy trial 
involving sixty three women who received the same dose of tamoxifen as is being 
used in the prevention trials, found that low dose tamoxifen can also induce eye 
problems (Pavlidis et al., 1992). Retinopathy resulting from exposure to 
tamoxifen is not necessarily reversible when treatment stops. As mentioned earlier, 
eye problems were not included in the trialist' s risk / benefits equations and were 
not prioritised as a source of controversy when the trial was being established 
(Fugh-Berman & Epstein, 1992: 1144). When the North American trial was 
stopped trialists found a statistically significant increase in the number of women 
taking tamoxifen who developed cataracts (574 vs. 508), while the number of 
those opting for cataract surgery among the tamoxifen group was nearly twice that 
of those taking the placebo (114 vs. 73) suggesting the drug also increased the 
severity of the problem (1998a; 1998b). 
Blood clots 
Perhaps the most serious short term side effect of tamoxifen is the risk of 
developing blood clots (Saltman, 1994: 8). Thromboembolic disease has been 
reported to be up to seven times more common in tamoxifen treated patients, and 
in an earlier NASBP trial there were two deaths from thromboembolisms among 
women treated with tamoxifen while none occurred in the control group (Fugh-
Berman & Epstein, 1992: 1144). At the early conclusion of the North American 
trial researchers were claiming that the rate of blood clots forming in the lungs rose 
from 9 to over 25 in every 10000 women (Gibbs, 1998: 15). While proponents of 
the trial argue this increase is inconsequential compared to the risk of breast 
cancer, the tamoxifen-related death count among trial participants tells another 
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story. Sharon Batt reports that five women died from breast cancer in the placebo 
group while six died in the intervention group; three from breast cancer and three 
from blood clots in the lung (Batt, 1998: 3). In light of these data, it appears that 
the benefits of tamoxifen may be seriously eroded by its side-effects and the 
success claimed by trial proponents may be premature. 
Weighing up the effects 
All of the conditions reviewed so far are effects of tamoxifen. The relative values 
which should be attributed to each of these conditions, how they should be 
monitored and how they should affect entrance criteria were fiercely contested 
between 1991 and 1994 as the trials were being established and practical aspects of 
their operation were being fine-tuned. The previous discussion has shown how the 
medical controversy (spearheaded by epidemiologists in the US National Women's 
Health Network) took the form of a methodological attack and a re-calculation of 
the risks and benefits of the US trial (which were far less optimistic than the 
trialists' predictions). This was accompanied by citing and counter-citing scientific 
articles published in reputable journals as a way of undermining the credibility of 
the assumptions made by those running the trials, and questioning the medical 
profession's ability to effectively monitor and treat the undesirable outcomes. 
Making claims about the ethical merits of the trial was another useful tactic. The 
National Women's Health Network had some limited success, forcing a 
congressional hearing into the trial in October 1992, and publicising the risks of 
endometrial cancer. But their lobbying did not stop the trial. 
The way each of the above effects - whether intended or unintended - was 
weighted tells a story about the meaning of women's bodies and women's health to 
the advocates and opponents of the trials. For instance, low level, less serious side 
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effects were discussed, but were not counted in the risk / benefit ratios calculated 
by either group. These effects include nausea, early onset of menopause in 
premenopausal women, and exacerbation of menopausal symptoms such as hot 
flushes, depression, vaginal discharge, headaches, dizziness and irregular menses 
in postmenopausal women (Bush & Helzlsouer, 1993: 235; Oakley, 1991: 6). All 
these symptoms are associated with fluctuating hormone levels. The majority of 
attention has focused on the link between tamoxifen and life-threatening 
complications such as cancer and thrombosis. While these are significant, other 
side effects are more common, will affect more women, and are more likely to 
impact on quality of life and women's willingness to take up and maintain 
tamoxifen treatment. According to Ann Oakley, the most common complaint 
women make about their health is that doctors do not listen to them (Oakley, 1991: 
6). Understanding how tamoxifen affects quality of life is just as important as 
understanding how it affects length of life. The fact that these symptoms are not 
even mentioned in the risk / benefit equations reflects the fact that trial organisers 
assumed they can be medically managed (by the prescription of anti-nausea 
tablets, HRT, analgesics, etc,) or simply ignored. But it also raises questions as to 
how seriously research clinicians will regard women's experiences of these 
symptoms, and suggests that the trialists may believe these maladies are a normal 
part of life for those living in the inherently pathological female body. 
Paradoxically, the experience of precisely these symptoms could be responsible for 
the success or failure of the trials. Nicholson reports that when faced with an 
existing breast cancer, less severe side-effects contributed to about 5 per cent of 
women abandoning tamoxifen treatment for diagnosed breast cancer, and to 25 per 
cent of participants abandoning the pilot study which preceded the prevention 
trials (Nicholson, 1992: 1552). The figure of 25 per cent drop out suggests such 
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symptoms may have a major impact on the willingness of women to stay with the 
trials, and therefore on the outcomes of the trials. Indeed the Italian prevention 
study had to be stopped because of its drop out rate of 26 per cent (Batt, 1998). So 
it would seem participants do not regard these symptoms as normal or acceptable. 
Informed consent 
The positioning of 'less severe' side effects, and debate about side effects generally, 
raises the question of how informed consent is constructed within both 
experimental and routine medicine. Writing before the reissuing of UK consent 
forms, Carolyn Faulder (a member of the British Medical Research Council review 
committee) claimed that the information and consent form being offered to women 
entering the Marsden pilot trial was "a travesty of what seeking informed consent 
should be about" (Faulder, 1992: 32). The form mentioned only two side effects 
(mild nausea and headaches) and omitted both the more common hormonally-
related side effects and the risk of endometrial cancer and eye problems outlined 
above. It did not mention a woman's right to withdraw from the trial at any time 
and concluded with the caveat "having fully explained to you the risks of 
participating in the trial, I must emphasise that the decision whether to participate 
must be entirely yours" (Faulder, 1992: 32). A draft consent form for the UK 
BCPT was presented to the MRC in November 1991, and while it was an 
improvement on the form used in the pilot, the organisers were still asked to 
produce a new, more explicit version. Faulder commented that her personal 
criticisms of the trial consent form "may seem trivial but [I] suspect quite a 
number of women might share [my] personal distaste for serious information being 
presented in first reader sty le and decorated with flowers in the manner of a 
tampon leaflet" (Faulder, 1992: 32). 
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Also discussing the trials before they commenced, Ann Oakley wrote that if 
"women in the tamoxifen trial are clearly informed about the possibility of such 
symptoms as hot flushes, headaches, depression [and] dizziness ... , then they may 
be better informed than those who are being prescribed it outside a trial." She cited 
a survey by a British cancer support group of women with breast cancer being 
treated with either tamoxifen or another drug, 75 per cent of whom said they had 
been given no information about side effects (Oakley, 1991: 6). In Australia as in 
the USA, individual research centres are responsible for drawing up consent forms. 
During the 1992 US congressional hearing which took place after the trial had 
begun recruitment, 268 different consent forms were reviewed and more than two 
thirds required alteration (Ms., 1994: 21, editorial). 
Even proponents of a tamoxifen prevention trial have reservations about the 
execution of the BCPTs. Dr Richard Love, American Cancer Society professor of 
clinical oncology at the University of Wisconsin, believed that a tamoxifen 
prevention trial should go ahead, but he argued that it should be more cautiously 
designed than the BCPTs. Love's own proposed prevention trial, rejected by 
funding agencies in favour of the NASBP trial, called for a pilot study involving 
2000 postmenopausal women before a major trial, limited to women over 60, got 
underway. He felt the BCPT' s design pre-empted many unresolved issues which 
need to be properly investigated but that Bernard Fisher, the NASBP director, was 
opposed to delaying the trial or launching subsidiary studies. In his opinion the 
trials treat women as "chattel" and represent "a dangerous trend towards 
medicalising prevention" (cited in Laurence & Weinhouse, 1994: 123-24). 
According to critics, one of the points on which the trial organisers should have 
been more cautious was the inclusion of premenopausal women (Fugh-Berman & 
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Epstein, 1992: 1143-44). The published data available before the trials began 
suggested that tamoxifen is beneficial to postmenopausal women but the only 
evidence that premenopausal women might also benefit comes from an NASBP 
study whose results had not yet been published or subjected to the peer review that 
publication in a reputable journal supposedly elicits. And when the NASBP study 
was made available for scrutiny critics argued it should not be extrapolated to the 
tamoxifen prevention trials because of technical differences in the study 
populations (women in the NASBP trial were excluded if they had an oestrogen-
receptor-negative tumour, while no such exclusions could be made in the 
prevention trials). When a premenopausal woman develops breast cancer she 
stands a greater chance than a postmenopausal woman that it will be receptor-
negative, and these types of tumours are more frequently resistant to tamoxifen 
than are receptor-positive tumours (Fugh-Berman & Epstein, 1992: 1143-44). 
While the clinical evidence stacks up in favour of tamoxif en for some types of 
breast cancers in women over 50, in women under fifty the data are unclear. 
Roughly 20 per cent of breast cancers occur in women under 50 and in this group 
tamoxifen "is still just a research thing" (Richard Peto, quoted in Raloff, 1992: 
266). At the start of the trials there were no clear data indicating the benefits of 
tamoxifen treatment in younger women, but proponents of the trials clearly 
believed it would have the favourable effects observed in older women. For 
example, when asked to speculate about the effect of tamoxifen in women under 
50, Peto, director of the cancer studies unit at Oxford University, responded that he 
"suspect[s] the answer will be much the same as in older women" (cited in Raloff, 
1992: 266). The fact that the trials were open to women aged 35 and over 
highlights again its scientific fragility: if the rationale for the trials is tenuous in the 
first instance (as its critics would have us believe), it is even more tenuous when it 
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comes to the inclusion of younger women. If the trials are deemed an unequivocal 
success they will help reconstitute tamoxifen as efficacious in treating younger 
women, but if results are more ambiguous, then adjusting the statistical analysis to 
exclude younger women will be one strategy open to those wishing to protect their 
perceived validity. 
Younger women have at once more to lose and more to gain depending on the 
outcome of the trials. Assuming the drug does prevent breast cancer in some 
women, women whose cancers are prevented in their thirties or forties will 
theoretically benefit from a greater increased life expectancy than will women 
whose cancers are prevented in their sixties or seventies. Younger women will, 
however, also suffer the potential hazards of tamoxifen and the ongoing medical 
surveillance associated with its use for longer than their more elderly counterparts. 
Further, they stand to bear a greater financial burden. The estimated annual cost of 
the drug alone is between 600 (Butler, 1997: 304) and 700 [Glasziou P, 1994 
#521: 10] Australian dollars. Ignoring inflation, the cost for five years (the 
equivalent of the trial) is between A $3000 and A $3500 per individual, and this 
amount does not include the price of subsidiary interventions which are likely to 
result from the treatment, such as endometrial biopsy. During the trial the drug was 
supplied free of charge to participants. In the UK and Australia it is possible that 
prophylactic tamoxifen may eventually be listed on the pharmaceutical benefits 
schedule. In the meantime, however, those wishing to continue treatment after the 
closure of the trials will bear the expense themselves. 
Pregnancy - perpetuating neglect? 
Finally, pregnancy is contra-indicated when using tamoxifen, and pregnancy or 
intention to become pregnant is grounds for exclusion from the trial (Bush & 
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Helzlsouer, 1993: 235). In Chapter 2, I discussed some of the issues surrounding 
the involvement of women in clinical trials and the potential problems associated 
with becoming pregnant while participating in such a trial. These issues are 
mirrored in the BCPTs through concern about the extent to which the trialists can 
control whether women become pregnant while on the trial and the effect of 
tamoxifen on children exposed in utero. In a letter to the Lancet, Goodare 
con1Illents on a report that among the 85 women known to become pregnant while 
taking tamoxifen no foetal abnormalities have been detected. Rather than using 
this figure to indicate that taking tamoxifen during pregnancy is safe, she argues it 
indicates women will continue to become pregnant while taking the drug, despite 
official warnings. Goodare cites diethylstilboestrol (DES), once used to prevent 
morning sickness, and now linked with vaginal and testicular pathologies in those 
exposed before birth, as an example of a drug which initially appeared benign. As 
with the harmful effects of DES, she concludes that "[i]t may be twenty years 
before such problems [with tamoxifen] come to light" (Goodare, 1993: 444). 
Despite this, the exclusion of potentially pregnant women highlights a concern 
which is central to the status of women in medicine generally and in clinical trials 
in particular: the assumption that women's bodies and social agency are intimately 
and unavoidably tied to their reproductive capacity while men exist unhampered 
by their reproductive abilities. Consider the implications of systematically 
excluding pregnant women from the tamoxifen trial. If the possible outcomes of 
the trial include a more widespread use of the drug in the community (which they 
surely must) then is it unrealistic to assume that no women in this group will 
become pregnant. Testing drugs in pregnant women is an extremely sensitive and 
difficult task which requires balancing the potential risks and benefits to the 
woman with maintaining maximum protection of the foetus. Recognising and 
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respecting a woman's autonomy and right to make decisions about her body during 
pregnancy has not been a feature of the history of clinical trials. In addition, 
ensuring the safety of drugs used by pregnant women requires long-term and 
systematic follow up, something which usually appears to be beyond the financial 
and practical capacity ( and often the interests) of a research community 
increasingly motivated by a 'publish or perish' mentality. The sensitivities of 
involving pregnant women in clinical trials has resulted in the paradox that 
pregnant women who require medical treatment are likely to be exposed to drugs 
and procedures which have not been adequately tested (Merkatz et al., 1993: 295). 
Although I am not advocating testing tamoxifen on pregnant women, their 
exclusion from the trial population perpetuates the problems I have just outlined. 
In addition, no parallel exclusion clauses exist for men participating in trials who 
plan to or may impregnate women. This double standard not only implies that men 
are less intimately involved in the process of reproduction, but also points to the 
assumption that experimental drugs are less likely to affect the integrity of sperm 
than of an ovum or foetus. In this way male reproductive capacity is constituted as 
largely irrelevant to the workings of scientific medicine as opposed to female 
reproductive capacity which continues to be treated as a problem and used to 
justify exclusionary practices at all levels of medicine. 
The 'gold standard' revisited? 
Once the trials got underway, public debate over tamoxifen for prevention more or 
less subsided, and for about six years it was business as usual for the trialists (with 
the exception of new UK consent form in 1994 ). In April 1998, controversy 
erupted again when the North American trial was stopped early because trialists 
believed that tamoxifen was proving so successful that it was no longer ethical to 
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withhold it from women in the placebo group. Findings were leaked to the press 
before they could be peer-reviewed, causing intense world-wide media attention 
(Ault & Bradbury, 1998: 1107; Batt, 1998; Baum, 1998). After an average of 4 
years on tamoxifen, 85 of the women in the North American treatment group had 
developed breast cancer compared with 154 women in the placebo group. This 
represented a substantial reduction. But while one disease had been prevented 
others had been induced. Women who took tamoxifen had significantly more cases 
of three potentially fatal conditions: endometrial cancer (33 in the experimental 
group vs. 14 in the placebo group), pulmonary embolisms ( 17 vs. 6) (Ault & 
Bradbury, 1998: 1107), and deep vein thrombosis (30 vs. 19) (Smigel, 1998: 647). 
In addition, more cataracts occurred among tamoxifen users (574 vs. 507) (1998b). 
Tallying the total death rate was also problematic: five women in the placebo 
group had died ( of breast cancer), while six from the treatment group had died (3 
from breast cancer and 3 fron1 blood clots) (Batt, 1998). Claims about the 
cardiovascular benefits of tamoxifen also came to nothing with no difference being 
reported in the number of heart attacks between the two groups (Smigel, 1998: 
648). 
When the trial was halted, it was unblinded so women in the control group could 
be given the opportunity to take tamoxifen. The trialists also encouraged 
participants to enrol in a new prevention trial in which tamoxifen is being tested 
against another hormone drug, raloxifene. Although declared an unequivocal 
success by the trialists, the North American tamoxifen trial has not generated 
definitive solutions to the question of breast cancer prevention, so more scientific 
research must still be done but it will be difficult to conduct in the wake of the 
BCPTs. Instead, in the new RCT, tamoxifen, with all its uncertainties and 
unanswered questions, will be stabilised as the 'control' treatment against which 
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the unknown effects of raloxif ene will be compared. The new trial will also be a 
large multi-centre study and despite problems of achieving the initial target of 
16000 subjects for the NASBP prevention trial, organisers are confident of 
recruiting 22000 women (Gibbs, 1998: 15). 
The unexpected early conclusion of the North American trial not only took other 
international tamoxifen researchers by surprise, but has led to their public 
condemnation of the conduct of American colleagues (Ault & Bradbury, 1998: 
1107). The separate trials, although autonomous, were very much part of an 
international collaboration and the combined subject numbers and time-frame 
originally agreed upon were considered to be the minimum necessary to gather 
reliable data. Michael Baum, Professor of Surgery at University College London, 
describes the manner in which the findings were released as a 'subversion of the 
scientific process' and claims that: 
[t]he raw data, although interesting and encouraging, was associated with so 
much hyperbole and jingoism it would have been almost impossible for the 
uninformed lay public to avoid over-reaction, and it is highly likely that 
many frightened women with a familial predisposition to breast cancer are 
now demanding prescription of tamoxifen ... (Baum, 1998: 8). 
As the North American trial has been unblinded and results confounded by the 
invitation of subjects to participate in the tamoxifen vs. raloxifene trial, its 
outcomes cannot now contribute to any picture of the long term beneficial or 
detrimental effects of the drug. British researchers suggest that fifteen years of 
follow-up would be necessary to detect whether tamoxifen has a genuine 
preventive effect and the viability of this follow-up may now be in jeopardy as 
participants, hearing about American findings, may withdraw from other trials and 
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seek tamoxifen prescriptions. "If this should happen world-wide" writes Baum, 
"then 20 years of research development for the prevention of breast cancer 
mortality might come to nothing." (Baum, 1998: 7). Preliminary results from the 
IBIS trial suggest no reduction in the incidence of breast cancer, or at least a more 
modest reduction, (Pritchard, 1998:80) and researchers, in consultation with 
consumer advocacy groups, have decided to keep to the original protocol in the 
belief that it will provide the only reliable data on the ultimate worth of tamoxifen 
prevention (Ault & Bradbury, 1998: 1107; Baum, 1998: 7; Pritchard, 1998: 81). 
Attempting to find an explanation for what he believes to be the scientifically 
untenable actions of his American and Canadian colleagues, Michael Baum looks 
to cultural factors, describing the litigious and commercial pressures facing 
American medicine as contributing to the early closure of the trial. He believes that 
fear of litigation, rather than a confidence in the authenticity of tamoxifen' s 
apparent preventative actions may have prompted the release of findings once 
significant differences started to appear between the two groups: 
One can easily imagine what might happen in five years time if a woman on 
the placebo arm developed breast cancer and it was discovered that the 
clinical trialists knew that tamoxifen prevented cancer many years earlier 
(Baum, 1998: 7). 
In addition, he points out that the patent on tamoxifen has run out in Europe and 
does not have long to go in the USA, suggesting that a speedy release of positive 
findings may be the most profitable way for ICI Pharmaceuticals and its stock 
holders to benefit from the trial (Baum, 1998: 7). In Baum's account there is no 
scientifically explicable reason for the early closure of the trial. Instead, he uses 
sociological explanations to account for the corruption of the scientific process. In 
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this way the 'gold standard' of scientific evidence-based medicine remains 
untarnished. 
Contesting claims and replication 
In Chapter 1 I discussed the belief that scientific know ledge can be codified into a 
set of unambiguous instructions which can be transferred between scientists and 
applied in order to reproduce the results of another's experiment (see Collins, 
1982). I also discussed the role of 'replication' in the confirmation of scientific 
findings, and argued that 'replication' has a different meaning for an RCT than it 
does for more laboratory-oriented science. Like the tamoxifen prevention trials, 
many RCTs are large population-based interventions where 'replication' is both 
duplication of the effects of a drug or procedure at an individual level, and the 
production of the statistical likelihood with which a treatment effect can be 
generalised to broader populations. Treatment in every patient represents a mini-
replication, in terms of the effects of tamoxifen in a specific subject, and 
collectively these contribute to the replicability of the trial as a whole. In the case 
of the BCPTs, the duplication of the trial in different centres and in different 
countries also constitutes a form of scientific replication. 
This chapter has shown that medical researchers have numerous strategies through 
which they can question the accuracy of clinical studies. Strategies which involve 
contesting technical details or making claims about methodological rigour, will be 
underdetermined by assumptions about the role of replication in science. For 
example the critics of the BCPTs can argue that replication will not be valid by 
claiming the trialists have not adequately represented the effects of the d1ug within 
individual women nor accounted for unspecified side effects in the monitoring 
protocol. Disagreeing with the definition of appropriate subjects for the trial and 
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consequently the relevance of the outcomes for broader populations of 'high risk' 
women is another way of problematising replication. These criticisms identify 
problems with ensuring replication of the actions of the drug in individual women. 
Further complications arise in light of the fact that the trials are carried out in 
numerous locations in multiple centres, all of which highlight the potential 
problems of ensuring the consistency of physician practices, treatment procedures, 
and monitoring throughout the different trial sites. From the perspective of a 
sociology of medical knowledge, the question of replicability within different 
centres has not been problematised except through the issue of ensuring quality 
control. This is, no doubt, largely because the multi-centre trial is an accepted 
institution within medical research, and is based on the premise that the rules of 
experimental procedure can be transferred without the loss of information. To 
question the effect of multiple study sites on the outcomes of the trials would raise 
deeper methodological questions about medical research practices (for example, 
see Timmermans & Berg, 1997). Finally, the current disagreement between the 
IBIS and the NASBP trial organisers over the early termination and the usefulness 
of continuing the remaining trials disrupted the replication of the trial across 
national boundaries. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that there are no easy answers to the problem of breast cancer 
prevention, and tamoxifen may provide a partial solution. But what does this mean 
for the current prevention trials and the heated controversy they have provoked? 
The authority attached to different types of written accounts can become central to 
the interaction between participants within scientific debates. In particular, the 
extent to which various critiques and commentaries appeal to a scientific 
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grounding in establishing their claims or negating the claims of their opponents 
demonstrates the high esteem with which objective knowledge is regarded and its 
status as a tool for legitimation. Mapping specific controversies in the 
establishment and execution of the trials shows that even within debates about 
technical aspects of the trials operation or assessment, those debates have not been 
dependent upon disembodied scientific standards. Despite this, the rhetoric of 
adherence to such standards, coupled with deference to empirical data - the 
symbolic materialisations of those standards - has been a feature of the medical 
controversy. Further, the professional interests of the trialists have resulted in a 
specific constitution of prevention in the trials. 'Prevention' has become an entity 
which should be administered by biomedical specialists, without regard for 
economic, social or political concerns, and something in which nutritionists, 
public health experts and most especially, women's health experts, should have 
minimal input. In addition it is constituted as something in which the profit motive 
plays a part. 
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CHAPTER6 
Hormones, Masculinity and Men's Health 
The previous chapters have argued that social values are naturalised and become 
incorporated into the practices of medicine and the human body through the RCT: 
the actions and effects of female sex hormones have been produced as a natural 
constituent of certain types of femininity, and assumptions about the relationship 
between the female body, sex hormones and sexual identity this entails were 
incorporated into the tamoxifen prevention trials. This chapter shows that similar 
dynamics are also at work in the construction of masculinity through discursive 
practices involving male hormones and cancer medicine, although the genders 
reified through male hormones are quite different from those at work in the 
construction of femininity. Examining prostate cancer as an example of a sex-
specific disease which is currently represented as dependent on male sex hormones 
provides a good parallel case study for my work on breast cancer because: 
1) prostate cancer is an exclusively male disease, like breast cancer's construction 
as a women's disease; 
2) hormones dominate representations of the causes of and risk factors for prostate 
cancer as they do breast cancer; 
3) prostate cancer is a high profile issue around which advocates of men's health 
have organised in much the same way that breast cancer has been the focus of 
activism by the women's health movement; 
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4) the effectiveness of screening and detection technologies is controversial and, as 
with breast cancer, these ambiguities highlight the way technologies, beliefs and 
practices are constituted in relation to one another; 
5) the research agenda is predominantly controlled by and serves a similar range of 
professional interests to those served by breast cancer research ( orthodox cancer 
specialists at the expense of allied health workers addressing issues such as the 
link between diet, lifestyle and environmental exposures and prostate cancer); and 
finally, 
6) a hormone-based prostate cancer prevention trial is currently underway. 
Men's health and gender 
While questions about the gendered nature of power have been well rehearsed, to 
date the majority of thinking about gender and health has been fostered by the 
women's health movement and feminist scholarship (Sabo & Gordon, 1995: 3), 
and reflects a feminist orientation (Connell, 1992: 736). Consequently, when 
'gender' is flagged as a health issue there has been a tendency to assume both that 
one is talking about women's health and that men are ungendered or that the 
construction of masculinity is unproblematically beneficial for men. Since the mid 
1980s, however, debates about gender have broadened and a men's critique of 
gender has emerged. This shifting terrain of gender studies has facilitated a 
recognition of the special health needs of men. Apart from sex-specific conditions, 
such as testicular and prostate cancer, statistical data on morbidity and mortality 
rates for conditions affecting the whole population consistently reveal that being 
male is a health risk. This risk is evident across a wide spectrum of life events; 
males have a higher perinatal and early childhood death rate, suffer more 
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congenital birth defects, have a greater likelihood of experiencing recessive sex-
linked disorders, are more prone to be injured intentionally or as a result of an 
accident, and have a higher incidence of behavioural and learning disorders than 
females (Harrison et al., 1992: 271). The age-specific death rate for men and 
adolescent boys is also higher than for women and adolescent girls: young men are 
more likely than young women to die from accidents, suicides and drug 
dependency, while older men die from heart disease and many common cancers at 
higher rates than older women (Fletcher, 1996). 
In order to understand the poor health status of men and boys in our community a 
number of issues must be considered. These include questions about the health 
effects of biological differences between the sexes, the availability and quality of 
health services directed towards the needs of men and boys, and the relationship 
between patterns of socialisation and gender identity and well-being. Throughout 
this thesis I have argued that any knowledge of biological sex is available only 
because of the cultural and historical production of certain kinds of bodies and 
gendered subjectivities. Because of this it is crucially important not to assume that 
the statistics on men's pathologies speak for themselves. Instead they should be 
viewed as a product of the broader social climate which influences the provision of 
health services and the lived experience of those pathologies. For example, most 
Australian men have access to quality basic medical care but some evidence 
indicates they are less prepared than women to use it (Lawrence, 1995: 7). Why 
should this be the case? The effects of current constructions of masculinity provide 
a partial answer. 
The notion of hegemonic masculinity remains important for discussions of men's 
health as it provides a reference for articulating a culturally honoured or desired set 
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of gender traits for men against which the multiplicity and fluidity of 
contemporary masculinities can be contrasted. According to Connell, examining 
the diversity of men's experience of gender and the ways these are enacted in daily 
life often identifies contradictions in men's desires and behaviour. The tensions 
between perceived gender identity and the enactment of that identity provide a 
point for identifying changing expectations about gender (Connell, 1997: 15). As 
such, they can also provide a point at which to direct strategic health interventions. 
For example, consider the health implications of the following descriptions of 
masculinity. Harrison et al., claim that traditional western masculinity encourages 
men to be "non-communicative, competitive and non-giving, and inexpressive, 
and to evaluate life success in terms of external achievements rather than personal 
and interpersonal fulfilment" (Harrison et al., 1992: 272). Connell stresses the 
importance of images of masculinity in the formation of an Anglo-Australian 
identity: images which posit the masculine as self-sufficient, egalitarian, rough-
and-ready man's man of the Anzac legend (Connell, 1997: 15). The enactment of 
such masculinities translates into a tendency for men not to seek medical help 
when they are ill (Buchbinder, 1996: 41). Michael Kimmel writes that "'Real men' 
don't get sick, and when they do, as we all do, real men don't complain about it, 
and they don't seek help until the entire system begins to shut down" (Kimmel, 
1995: vii-viii). Health is an area in which the hazardous effects of hegemonic 
masculinity are clearly evident, so addressing the problems of men's health 
requires an investigation of, and possibly a challenge to, the way men participate 
in contemporary masculinities. The high rate at which young men are involved in 
road accidents is a case in point. When young men engage in dangerous driving, 
such as speeding or driving when drunk, they are preforming a specific form of 
gender practice. According to Connell: 
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They are acting that way in order to be masculine. The dangerous driving is a 
resource for their making of masculinity. Here the active construction of 
masculinity is a key to the risk-taking behaviour, and to strategies of 
prevention (Connell, 1997: 17). 
That risk-taking by young male drivers is a means of producing masculinity is 
suggestive of the multiple gender positions available to men and the way these are 
embedded within the social and historical worlds. Young western men may utilise 
the resource of risky driving because of peer group identification with a globalised 
'car culture' (Connell, 1997: 17). But the symbolic meanings attached to the car 
vary geographically, historically and throughout an individual's life. In 
communities where access is limited, or among middle aged or elderly men, the 
car may not assist the preformance of masculinity, or may warrant the preformance 
of a different masculinity. Since men are not an undifferentiated group with equal 
access to social and personal power, they experience the exercise of social power, 
including patriarchal domination, differently (Connell, 1992: 736; Sabo & Gordon, 
1995: 12-13). So road safety campaigns will theoretically be most successful if 
they account for this diversity and use it to moderate risk-taking behaviours among 
men with a range of social identities. Changing the way young men drive is, 
therefore, no small task as it actually involves refiguring gender identity. 
According to Sabo and Gordon: 
Men's roles, routines, and relations with others are fixed in the larger 
historical and structural relations that constitute the gender order. Critical 
feminist perspectives remind us that any realistic agenda for the 
transformation of the self and gender relations has got to go beyond 
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therapeutic visions and practices ... without changing the political, individual 
[change] will erode and fade away (Sabo & Gordon, 1995: 16-17). 
As with early struggles to define and understand 'women's health', developing an 
appreciation of the relationship between contemporary masculinities and health, 
will need to be accompanied by a more specific investigation of the types of 
masculinity assumed within orthodox medicine and the way medical discourse 
reinforces and reinvents those masculinities. In particular, how have 
representations of the vulnerability of male bodies to disease influenced the 
expectation of individual patients and practitioners (both male and female), the 
intention and type of research being carried out, and policy decisions and the 
provision of services? Further, how have these medical discourses been expressed 
within the social sciences and epidemiology, and how do they account for specific 
factors which are seen to bring about men's apparently poorer health status? What 
factors in social life might contribute towards or alleviate men's health problems or 
our understanding of them? In much the same way that discourses about female 
sex hormones provide a tool for understanding women's health, so too can the 
multiple representations of male sex hormones provide a focus through which the 
questions above can be addressed. 
Feminist critiques of health which focus on the effects of gender on women's 
health status can provide a starting point for investigating the impact of 
masculinity on men's health, and indeed, such approaches seem to have been 
widely adopted. Writing within men's studies, Donald Sabo and David Gordon 
state: 
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We owe our intellectual origins to the sociocultural model in mainline social 
science, feminist theory and research, and the incipient efforts of feminist-
identified men to rethink men's health issues (Sabo & Gordon, 1995: 4). 
Further they argue that their work contributes towards the development of an 
"'inclusive feminism' that facilitates systematic study of men and masculinity" 
(Sabo & Gordon, 1995: 4). As well as theorising the frailty of the human body, 
feminist scholarship has engaged productively with certain constructions of 
femininity, bringing about a social movement to improve women's health. In order 
to achieve similar goals, theorists working in men's health have attempted to 
modify feminist theory and practice to account for the different relations of 
privilege and power among men (Sabo & Gordon, 1995: 12-13). 
It is, on the whole, a positive development that the theoretical and methodological 
insights of feminism are sufficiently nuanced to be able to contribute toward 
understanding the diverse health experiences of men. Nevertheless, the 
appropriation of feminist perspectives by men's health scholars poses some 
problems. Critical feminism is built on the premise that social inequities 
profoundly inform the lived experience of gender. Unless explicitly drawn out, 
these inequities can appear to be naturally occurring. Feminist concerns about 
women's health centre on the belief that biomedicine is male-centred in both its 
epistemological foundations and its material operations. In light of the centrality of 
the assumption that medicine privileges men, the application of feminist thinking 
to developing an agenda for men's health appears problematic. If, as feminist 
theories of health argue, both the beliefs and practices of medicine are inherently 
male oriented and it is the task of feminism to reveal and redress this orientation, 
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how can feminism hope to off er any insights into men's special health needs? And 
should not, according to this premise, those needs already be catered for? 
The claims that masculinity and male sexuality are socially constructed rather than 
biologically determined in the strict sense, are a constituent part of feminist 
theories about the social complexities of sex. Despite this, examination of the 
specific differences between men and the situations and social parameters within 
which they exercise or experience dominance raise particular issues about the ways 
gendered power is linked to other forms of authority (Ramazanoglu, 1992: 339). It 
is now becoming apparent that men and boys are inadequately served by a medical 
system that does not acknowledge the relevance of male gender identity to health. 
At the same time, however, the androcentrism of medicine has resulted in research, 
funding and treatment regimes which advantage males (Fletcher, 1996: footnote 
14). Areas which need not be specifically sexed yet continue to have a distinct 
male bias include the provision of services such as veterans hospitals and 
occupational health programmes, and specialties such as cardiology, sports 
medicine (Connell, 1997: 14). Urology is another example. 
Masculinity continues to symbolise social power. Feminism has used a righteous 
anger against male oppression of women to organise women into demanding social 
equity. The study of masculinity, however, has too often been fuelled by the guilt 
men feel when recognising the illegitimacy of women's continued social 
subordination or by a defensive anti-feminism (Ramazanoglu, 1992: 339; Tacey, 
1997: 23). In light of this, men who resist hegemonic masculinity are undertaking 
a distinctly different activity from women who resist femininity. Adopting the 
approach taken by Nancy Hartsock (Hartsock, 1990), Ramazanoglu describes the 
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critical study of masculinity as being similar to the concept of the coloniser who 
resists the process of colonising: 
He will not behave like other colonisers, but he cannot become one of the 
colonised. In a comparable argument, men who resist masculine dominance 
cannot become women, they become failed men and betrayers of 
masculinity... [T]his form of resistance makes political activity difficult 
because there is no basis for mass support. The possibilities for change may 
then be seen as lying at the level of men's personal growth, emotional 
freedom, and restructured relationships (Ramazanoglu, 1992: 34 7). 
But finding themselves in conflict with dominant masculinities need not leave men 
who engage with the gender order disenfranchised. Moves within poststn1cturalism 
and postmodernism have allowed current feminist critiques of health to 
acknowledge that the exercise of power is highly fluid and gender is not simply 
imposed through structured forms of socialisation. Rather, individuals actively 
participate in the construction, reconstruction and maintenance of gendered power 
relations. Because it endeavours to account for the fluidity of particular cultural 
relationships of power, feminism does offer tools which can help understand 
masculinity and the multiple ways it affects health status. But as feminist 
empiricism and standpoint feminism show, men have never occupied the same 
political position as women. Nor do they share women's embodied experience of 
sex or gender. Scholars and activists who attempt to mobilise a men's health 
movement should not expect to fulfil the same function as the women's health 
1novement or the feminist scholars and activists who continue to maintain a watch 
should the injustice and discrimination of the past resurface. To be useful for 
understanding men's health status, critical feminism must be used reflexively with 
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due consideration to its historical and political origins. With this caveat in mind, it 
is worth noting that an emphasis on the gendered nature of men's health 
encourages service providers and policy makers to take gender seriously as a 
health concern; a move which must surely benefit women's health. In addition, 
women's health also stands to benefit from the insights gained in the critical 
analysis of a men's health (Broom, 1994 404; Broom, 1998). 
Masculinity and hormones 
In Chapter 3 I discussed the construction of androgens as crucial for sexual 
differentiation of foetuses, the subsequent triggering of secondary sex 
characteristics in boys at puberty, and the differentiation of the brain structure, 
contributing to supposed gender differences in patterns of cognition and cognitive 
ability. I showed that the evidence offered to support each of these hypotheses has 
been coded and inscribed to reflect cultural assumptions about gender. A third 
crucial site at which masculinity, men's bodies and hormones intersect is in the 
construction of sexuality. 
When considering the role hormones play in the development of masculinities, one 
immediately confronts the literature linking male biology with physical aggression 
and social dominance. Males, it would seem, be they laboratory rats (Kriegsfeld et 
al., 1997), adolescent criminals (Dabbs et al., 1991), or participants in chess 
tournaments (Mazur et al., 1992), are driven by their hormones to seek status 
through confrontation. According to authors such as Barash and Goldberg, this 
desire for competition and conquest is as a result of their hormones, the male 
birthright. Should women acquire these qualities it will never be to the same extent 
as men, in whom such characteristics are naturally predetermined (Barash, 1979; 
Goldberg, 1993). 
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When it comes to relations between the sexes, the male tendency toward 
aggression and competition can take the form of male sexual domination of 
women. The role of male sexuality in perpetuating male power came under intense 
scrutiny by feminists during the 1970s and the early 1980s when it became viewed 
as fundamentally linked to male dominance. Authors such as MacKinnon, 
Dworkin, Morgan, Griffin and others, argued that male sexual dominance was 
central to all other power relations in society (see Segal, 1990, second edition 
1997: 207-8). It was not just feminists, however, who have viewed the 'phallic 
imperative' as an organising social force. According to Steven Goldberg; 
There is an enormous amount of evidence which demonstrates beyond doubt 
that the testicularly-generated foetal hormonalization of the male central 
nervous system promotes earlier and more extensive maturation of the brain 
structures that mediate between male hormones and dominance behaviour; 
this makes the male hypersensitive to the presence later on of the hormones 
which energise dominance emotions and behaviour, and result in his stronger 
tendency to respond to the environment with dominance behaviour 
(Goldberg, 1993: 79). 
This tendency, argues sociobiologist David Barash, results in a wide range of 
behaviours, including a propensity towards social dominance and a tendency 
towards criminal activity. These can be manifest in behaviours such as reckless 
driving, lynchings, modern warfare, and even genocide (Barash, 1979). A more 
recent, more modest and better researched version of this view can be found in the 
work of Theadore Kemper who argues that a 'socio-bio-social' feedback 
mechanism is responsible for the production of testosterone and its behavioural 
effects, which are manifest primarily through a tendency towards aggression and 
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dominance, or 'eminence-seeking behaviour' (Kemper, 1990). Despite the 
ambiguous scientific status of these works, Fausto-Sterling, a biologist who has 
extensively analysed gender bias in the biological sciences, believes the ideas they 
perpetuate are very alluring: 
[t]he idea that male hormones make men more competitive, better at sports, 
go-getters in the business world, and ready to fight to defend their honour 
and family certainly captures the popular imagination (Fausto-Sterling, 
1985: 126). 
But more than simply 'capturing the popular imagination', these discourses also 
express and replicate dominant cultural beliefs about sexuality. According to Segal 
the new 'scientific' study of sex that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century (a 
discourse in which hormones featured prominently) formalised depictions of 
masculine sexuality as a natural, overpowering and insatiable force (Segal, 1990, 
second edition 1997: 208). As discussed in Chapter 3, first male internal secretions 
then sex-hormones, were 'written in' to science's rendering of sex. This portrayal 
of male sexuality has continued throughout the twentieth century, producing 
males' need for sexual dominance and continual pursuit of procreative 
opportunities as seemingly self-evident truths (Segal, 1990, second edition 1997: 
209). The dichotomies which permeate scientific writings about sex ( dichotomies 
such as 'masculine / feminine', 'active / passive' and 'conquest / submission') 
contribute to the construction of heterosexual intercourse as the foremost moment 
of male domination and female submission, and as inevitable (Segal, 1990, second 
edition 1997: 209). In the current milieu the phallic status of the heterosexual male 
body pervades cultural representation of the male body (Waldby, 1996) and 
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performance, penetration and conquest are important forms of male symbolic 
capital (Cameron & Fraser, 1994). 
While the phallus remains a site at which cultural and biological meanings 
converge, the nature and articulation of those meanings are highly contentious. 
This is particularly evident within medical discourses about prostate cancer 
because hormones are physiologically necessary to achieve an erect penis. 
Negotiating the boundaries between medicine, male bodies, masculinities and 
hormones highlights the fragility of the phallus and suggests a number of arenas in 
which its significance is being re-constituted. Male bodies are, therefore, a site at 
which knowledges and practices are changing, and possible embodied, 
technological and professional futures are being constituted. 
The medical picture of prostate cancer 
The prostate is a walnut sized gland located below a man's bladder and 
surrounding the upper end of the urethra. It is part of the reproductive system, 
necessary for the production of viable semen, and does not reach maturity until 
after puberty. In developed Western countries prostate cancer, the malignant 
enlargement of the gland, is the second most common cause of cancer deaths 
among men (after lung cancer), and the most common cause of specifically male 
cancer death (Smith et al., 1998: 3; Wasan & Waxman, 1992: 477). 
Prostate cancer is said to be a disease with remarkably low virulence; the majority 
of men who develop prostate cancer will die with it rather than of it. It is unique 
among human tumours in that the number of confirmed invasive cancers found 
during autopsies exceeds the number of cases which are confirmed during life. In 
other words, death from 'other causes' is likely to occur before the clinical 
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symptoms of prostate cancer develop (Australian Health Technology Advisory 
Committee, 1996: 15). Autopsy studies have shown that more than 30 per cent of 
men over the age of 50 have evidence of incidental prostate cancer at death 
(Brawley et al., 1994).8 
Like most solid tumour cancers, prostate cancer becomes more common as men 
age. It is relatively rare in men younger than 45 but the risk increases dramatically 
by the time a man reaches 60 years of age (Brawley et al., 1994). In 1994, 2590 
Australian men died of prostate cancer. Over 62 per cent of these deaths occurred 
in men aged 75 years and over, and 41 per cent occurred in men aged 80 years and 
over (Australian Health Technology Advisory Committee, 1996: 5). Until the age 
of about 45-50 the size of the prostate stays fairly constant, however as men age 
the gland often becomes enlarged and can constrict the urethra causing blockage 
and pain while urinating. In most cases these enlargements are non-cancerous, a 
condition known as benign prostatic hyperplasia (BHP), which is thought to 
indicate an elevated risk of developing prostate cancer. 
As with breast cancer, the incidence and mortality rates of prostate cancer have 
increased in the last two decades, although the incidence is increasing faster than 
mortality (Feigl et al., 1995: 161). There is speculation that the reported increase in 
incidence rates may be an artefact of greater medical surveillance and the 
proliferation of new diagnostic techniques (Australian Health Technology 
Advisory Committee, 1996: 17). Although improvements are being made to 
existing treatments, the past two decades has seen no substantial reductions 1n 
1nortality rates. 
8 Despite this, in Australia the five year survival rates for men with clinically confirmed prostate 
cancer (78.9 per cent) is not substantially better than the five year survival rate for women with 
breast cancer (76.8 per cent) (Smith et al., 1998). However, it tends to occur at later ages. 
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In the past, prostate cancer was often diagnosed at an advanced stage after tumours 
had metastasised, but the development of prostate-specific antigen screening 
(PSA) is believed to have improved the detection of earlier stage malignancies. 
PSA testing came into use in the mid 1980s and has dramatically altered diagnosis 
and treatment options. Before the widespread use of PSA the only method for 
detecting tumours, digital rectal examination of the prostate (DRE) with follow-up 
needle biopsy, meant that tumours had to be large enough to feel through surgical 
gloves and the wall of the rectum, and therefore tended to be larger and more 
advanced than tumours which can now be detected using PSA and needle biopsy. 
Like mammography, the primary objective of PSA is early detection of tumours, 
and like mammography, developing acceptable, appropriate and reliable base lines 
of the specificity and sensitivity for diagnosis has proven to be difficult. 
The full impact and worth of PSA testing is yet to be clarified, however one 
outcome is that treatment may be 'moved forward' relative to the age and stage of 
tumour development. While this opens up new opportunities for researching the 
effectiveness of treatments and the natural history of the disease (Grove, 1996: 37), 
it also changes medical and broader community perceptions of prostate cancer, 
masculinity and men's bodies. The writings of Margrit Shildrick provide a means 
of articulating some of these changes. In her work Leaky Bodies and Boundaries, 
Shildrick draws attention to a strategy used by lobbyists from the disabled 
community who encourage the 'healthy' majority to recognise they are "merely 
temporarily able bodies" (Shildrick, 1997: 60). While the lobbyists intended to do 
no more than highlight the indeterminacy of the physical body, Shildrick argues 
that the approach they used also accentuates the permeability of the boundaries 
between health and ill-health, and abled and disabled bodies. More precisely, it 
shows that: 
185 
the regulatory and disciplinary regimes which impose and maintain 
normative standards of bodily and mental well-being are necessary precisely 
because of the inherent leakage and instability of categories, because the 
spectre the other always already lurks within the selfsame (Shildrick, 1997: 
60). 
The adoption of screening technologies such as PSA at once draws attention to the 
delicacy of the male body while also invoking normative standards of male 
embodiment which largely disavow the possibility of physiological or 
psychological frailty. Previously understood as a disease of older men, the 
possibility of prostate cancer now looms over men at ever earlier ages. While 
prostate tumours are not always life threatening, the side effects of treatment, 
which include incontinence and impotence, can be severe. In addition to the 
physical consequences, a diagnosis of elevated serum levels or prostate cancer will 
result in a man confronting and often transgressing a number of elements central to 
contemporary masculinities. A diagnosis will focus an individual's attention on the 
degeneration of his body; an early diagnosis means this happens at a younger age. 
It will propel a man into a relationship with the medical profession through his 
perceived need for more testing, monitoring and possibly treatment. It can also 
constitute the boundaries of younger or middle aged bodies as permeable, as they 
are performed upon by those involved in the medical diagnosis, treatment and 
surveillance. And individuals may find their bodies leaking and have their 
sexuality compromised as they live with the consequences of being responsible 
medicalised subjects. 
Along with this leakage of the corporeal body comes a leakage from the category 
'male'. Within modernity it is 'woman' whose borders are thought to be permeable 
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both physically and as rational subjects (Shildrick, 1997). Men are constituted as 
more stable and self-contained while women lack containment, being instead 
indeterminate 'other' occupying an ambiguous boundary position where nature 
and culture flow into each other (Grosz, 1994; Ortner, 1974). According to Ortner, 
women's role in 'species life' and the physicality this entails, is one factor which 
may have contributed to the culturally constructed conviction that women are 
closer to nature than men (Ortner, 1974). Because of this physicality the female 
body cannot be discreetly contained, instead the inside leaks out ( during 
menstruation, birth and lactation), and the outside or 'other' enters within ( during 
heterosexual intercourse and pregnancy). With the flows to and from the female 
body comes the possibility of physical and symbolic pollution or contagion as the 
boundaries of the subject are transversed (Douglas, 1984; Ortner, 1974: 70-72). In 
contrast, the idealised phallic (heterosexual) male body serves as a prophylactic 
against the types of contamination to which the bodies of women and gay men are 
subject (Waldby, 1996). This phallic body is an immunologically perfect body 
without orifices, impenetrable both physically and as a symbolic representation of 
a cultural ideal. And this idealised heterosexual male body is only possible because 
of a disavowal of receptivity in dominant configurations of masculinity which 
displaces anal and oral receptivity and passivity onto women and gay men 
(Waldby, 1996: 13-14). The incontinent, impotent, man who is subjected to the 
medical penetration of his orifices may find himself unceremoniously called into 
an intense relationship with his corporeal body. In so doing he deviates from the 
normative standards of 'maleness', and takes up an embodied subjectivity 
traditionally occupied by women and (at least since the emergence of AIDS) gay 
men. 
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Understanding and constructing prostate cancer risk 
At the moment there is no technique equivalent to the Gail model ( discussed in 
Chapter 4), which can be used to calculate an individual's risk of prostate cancer, 
and researchers consider developing such a model to be a priority (Feigl et al., 
1995: 161). 'High risk' groups are, however, generalised as being those with a 
strong family history of prostate cancer, African and Afro-American men, or men 
with certain types of benign prostatic abnormalities. The factors which identify 
these risk groups are not adequately understood but, analogous with breast cancer, 
are represented as being hormonally and genetically based. Family history refers to 
a genetic link (and may indicate a tendency towards hormonal risk), being black 
refers to the racial differences in the production of testosterone, and benign 
prostatic abnormalities may be a precursor to malignant disease and result from 
either of these sources. There is a reported ninefold increase in the odds ratio 
observed in men who have first degree relatives with prostate cancer. Genetic 
prostate cancer appears to affect younger men, with reports indicating that 43 per 
cent of men with prostate cancer diagnosed before the age of 55 years have 
relatives with the disease (Brawer & Ellis, 1995: footnote 21; Giovannucci, 1995: 
1772). A prostate cancer-specific gene has not been identified although research 
attempting to identify one continues. More controversial indicators of elevated risk 
include diet, geographical location of the population in question, vitamin D 
deficiency, and whether a man has had a vasectomy. But in general, risk factors 
remain hazy and imprecise and follow the trends of risk categories associated with 
the breast cancer and other solid tumour cancers. Brawer & Ellis write that "[e]ven 
with the identification of these high-risk groups, given the incidence of prostate 
cancer, ultimately all men constitute the potential population for prostate cancer 
prevention protocols" (Brawer & Ellis, 1995: 1784). 
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Racial and ethnic variation in prostate cancer rates are considered important for 
understanding the disease. Previously, autopsy information indicated that rates of 
indolent prostate cancer in Afro-American and white American men were similar, 
despite racial differences in symptomatic prostate cancer. This finding led 
researchers to assume that serum testosterone levels (reported to be 15 per cent 
higher in black men compared with white men), were responsible for the increased 
incidence of prostate cancer among black men (Ross et al., 197 6). More recent 
research indicates that African and Japanese are less likely than American men, to 
develop clinically significant prostate cancer (Brawley et al., 1994). Because of 
their increased risk compared to white American men, Afro-American men are a 
particular target group for both screening programs and prevention trials. 
When cancer researchers treat racial and ethnic variations as significant, they tend 
to reify assumptions about the essential difference these categories entail. For 
example, in their study of the hormonal basis of variation in prostate cancer rates, 
Ross et al., give a detailed breakdown of rates among African Americans, whites 
(either Latino or non-Latino) and Japanese and Chinese Americans. They write: 
We long have believed that understanding the racial-ethnic variation in risk 
was critical to achieving a general understanding of prostate cancer aetiology 
and of prevention strategies. There are compelling reasons to believe that 
androgens are involved intimately in prostate cancer development and in the 
racial-ethnic variation in risk (Ross et al., 1995: 1778-9). 
In this instance racial and ethnic difference is a proxy for a quantifiable average 
biological difference. This study compared circulating testosterone levels in young 
men who the researchers identify as being in the same ethnic group with known 
rates of prostate cancer. They conclude that differences in the production of 
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prostatic 5-a-reductase could contribute to racial differences in prostate cancer 
rates (Ross et al., 1995: 1778-9). Such an explanation solidifies the boundaries 
which contain racial categories, reduces those categories to a question of 
dichotomous measurable biological difference (rather than considering the cultural 
aspects of ethnicity) and thereby naturalises them. Despite attempting to remove 
the question of racial variation in prostate cancer rates from social and cultural 
explanation, Ross and colleagues def er to the causative role of male sex hormones 
which (as this thesis has shown) invokes historically constituted discourses about 
the construction of male sexuality. 
Major 'environmental risks' implicated in prostate cancer are dietary patterns and 
geographical location. Professional opinion is divided as to whether diet genuinely 
influences prostate cancer, however regional and cultural difference in diet might 
offer an explanation for national, and international variation in incidence. Some 
argue that the evidence supporting a link between diet and prostate cancer is 
"circumstantial at best" (Brawer & Ellis, 1995: 1784), while others believe that 
dietary factors "appear to hold the most promise for primary prevention" although 
they acknowledge that the precise factors and mechanisms must be better 
understood (Giovannucci, 1995: 1766). One hypothesis about a link between diet 
and prostate cancer is that the breakdown of dietary fat increases production of 
testosterone in men, thereby elevating risk (Hill et al., 1979). As with the breast 
cancer literature, this move constitutes 'environmental risk' as meaning 'personal 
biological environment' and erases reference to broader socially orchestrated 
exogenous environmental factors. Despite the lack of consensus, a correspondence 
between national per capita fat intake and prostate cancer incidence has been 
documented wherein the higher the fat intake the higher the national incidence of 
prostate cancer (Brawer & Ellis, 1995: 1784). According to Giovannucci, the 
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incidence rate of clinical prostate cancer varies substantially between countries. 
Although much of the 120-fold variation he refers to may be due to different 
national patterns of cancer detection and hence not 'real', it is clear that significant 
regional variations do exist (Giovannucci, 1995: 1766). 
Finally, vitamin D exposure and whether a man has undergone a vasectomy have 
also been implicated as a risk factors. Rates of prostate cancer increase the further 
one travels from the equator and serum levels of vitamin D have been reported to 
be lower in men with prostate cancer than in the general population. Together this 
data suggests that exposure to natural sunlight and synthesis of vitamin D may be 
important. Giovannucci et al., have identified an apparent increase of relative risk 
of 1.56 in men who had a vasectomy (Giovannucci, 1995). However subsequent 
research has failed to confirm a clear association between vasectomy and prostate 
cancer (Brawer & Ellis, 1995). 
With the exception of vitamin D deficiency and vasectomy each risk factor listed 
above makes reference to sex hormones. Since the late nineteenth century there has 
been speculation that malignant prostate cells can flourish and grow only in the 
presence of androgens (White, 1893). Although the precise role androgens play in 
causing prostate cancer remains unclear (Brawley et al., 1994: 595), the existence 
of a link is widely accepted, and standard treatment now involves implementing 
some form of androgen deprivation. While androgen deprivation eases the 
symptoms in up to 85 per cent of men it does not improve survival, and once 
prostate cancers have metastasised current treatments are not curative but aim 
instead for an improvement in quality and length of life (Wasan & Waxman, 1992: 
477). Hormonal treatments do not focus solely on androgens; oestrogens were 
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introduced to prostate cancer regimes in the early 1940s and continue to have an 
ongoing role in treatment (Wasan & Waxman, 1992: 477). 
As with breast cancer, prostate tumours may become hormone resistant after 
several years of treatment with hormonal drugs (Brawley et al., 1994: 596). 
Nonetheless, advocates of hormonal manipulation argue hormones may be an 
effective form of chemoprevention even if prostate cells become androgen 
insensitive following treatment. As the mechanism of tumour resistance is thought 
to follow principles of Mendelian genetic replication the patient may still benefit 
from a regression of their tumour even if androgen insensitive cells do survive the 
process of hormone treatment (Brawley et al., 1994: 596). Tumour regression does 
not necessarily correspond to increased life expectancy or a reduction in the 
virulence of the disease, but it may diminish symptoms. Current hormonal 
treatments are thought to show promise as preventive agents were it not for their 
negative impact on sexual functioning (Brawley et al., 1994: 596). The hormones 
which are said to be most dangerous to the prostate are testosterone and 
dihydrotestosterone (DHT). 
Preventing prostate cancer 
Because of the difficulties of treating later stage cancers, increasing attention is 
being directed toward early detection and prevention of prostate cancers (van der 
Meijden, 1999). While there are a number of possible strategies for the prevention 
of prostate cancer they have not yet been fully explored and, like the strategies for 
preventing breast cancer, researchers believe there are substantial practical 
problems associated with them. These include investigating the link between 
environmental toxins, various risk-taking behaviours, the administration of 
chemoprevention agents, and prostate cancer prevention (Brawer & Ellis, 1995: 
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1784). No clear cut environmental toxins have been identified, which rules out the 
first of these options. Other than being male, the risk categories for prostate cancer 
are not clearly defined, so modification of risk-taking behaviour is also 
impractical. A possible exception to this is the strategy of altering diet, but the 
cancer industry remains sceptical that large, long term trials based on behaviour 
modification are feasible. According to Brawer and Ellis: 
Problems with dietary modification include patient compliance, the probable 
need for long-term change, and the possibility that dietary changes must 
begin very early in life... [S]tudies to show the efficacy of such changes 
would require very large cohorts (Brawer & Ellis, 1995: 1784-85). 
Because of these difficulties Brawer and Ellis believe such trials are not possible. 
It should be noted that the number of participants required by both the BCPT and 
the PCPT must be considered as 'very large cohorts'. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the design and operation of dietary trials do not fall within the conventional 
professional domain of oncology and would need to be administered in 
conjunction with (if not exclusively by) primary health educators and nutritionists, 
epidemiologists and biostatisticians. As patterns of food consumption are presently 
the only identifiable 'risk-taking behaviour' open to manipulation, in the eyes of 
the cancer establishment the problems of administering behaviour modification 
trials n1le out documenting dietary intervention as a viable prevention strategy. 
This leaves chemoprevention - prevention through the administration of 
chemically based drugs - as the most viable option for preventing prostate cancer. 
As my discussion of the BCPTs showed, this approach places most organisational 
control in the hands of a centralised group of cancer researchers; it will be 
193 
administered to the public by oncologists and will marginalise the professional 
skills of other health service providers. 
A prostate cancer prevention trial (PCPT) began enrolment in the USA in October 
1993. It is a double-blind placebo controlled clinical trial in which half of the 
participants are given an active agent (the enzyme-blocking drug finasteride) while 
the other half are given a placebo. The trial is being overseen by the Southwest 
Oncology Group. It involves around 220 sites across the USA, and is sponsored by 
the US National Cancer Institute which is providing approximately $60 million 
towards the trial expenses. Unlike the BCPT, the PCPT had no problems enrolling 
the 18 000 men it required. The trial is expected to take 10 years, with 3 years for 
enrolment and analysis, and 7 years for the treatment phase during which time men 
on the active arm of the trial will be asked to take 5 mg per day of finasteride 
(Allerton et al., 1998: 65; Coltman et al., 1999: 546; Reynolds, 1993: 1633). 
Finasteride 
Finasteride (trade name Proscar) is a drug which has been used to treat men with 
symptomatic non cancerous enlargement of the prostate, that is, benign prostatic 
hyperplasia (Brawley et al., 1994: 596). Following animal studies which suggested 
the drug has few negative side effects, a phase III Benign Prostatic Hypertrophy 
Trial was run in North America in which 895 men were treated with either 
placebo, 1 mg of finasteride per day, or 5 mg of finasteride per day. The results, 
which were published in 1992, were favourable, and the only side effects reported 
were a decrease in libido and a decrease of ejaculatory volume among those taking 
finasteride (Gormley et al., 1992). The FDA approved finasteride for the treatment 
of BPH in the same year (National Cancer Institute, 1999). Finasteride is a 'young' 
drug compared to tamoxifen, and it is possible that long term side effects are yet to 
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surf ace. It is a promising candidate for preventing prostate cancer because of its 
low toxicity and because it reputedly slows the growth of prostate cancer cells in a 
laboratory setting by blocking 5-a-reductase (Szarka et al., 1994: 41). 
Finasteride was the first 5-a-reductase inhibitor to enter clinical trials (Brawley et 
al., 1994: 596), and is thought to control BPH by reducing local levels of 
dihydrotestosterone (DHT), the major androgenic compound found in the prostate 
gland (Szarka et al., 1994: 40). DHT is a compound produced from testosterone by 
the enzyme 5-a-reductase which binds with androgen receptor cells in the prostate 
resulting in cell growth. Although both testosterone and DHT can bind to the 
androgen receptor cells, DHT is thought to be a more powerful stimulant for cell 
growth: "When compared to [testosterone], DHT exhibits a higher binding affinity 
for and lower dissociation rate from the androgen receptor" (Brawley et al., 1994: 
596). An absence or reduction of 5-a-reductase, as occurs in some types of male 
pseudohermaphroditism, is thought to result in an underdeveloped prostate gland 
and lower rates of both BPH and prostate cancer (Szarka et al., 1994: 40). The 
inhibition of 5-a-reductase hampers the conversion of testosterone into DHT. 
The hypothesis behind the PCPT is that if finasteride can reduce the level of DHT 
in the prostate, it might also reduce the incidence of prostate cancer. Edward De 
Antoni and David Crawford write that: 
[s]cientific evidence for this hypothesis is circumstantial at best, with no 
proof that the pathogenesis of the disease can be affected by the 
manipulation of DHT. Nevertheless, this clinical trial is an important first 
step (De Antoni & Crawford, 1994). 
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The PCPT is far from being a 'first step' as it involves 18 000 men and costs over 
US $60 million. Interestingly, the link between diet and prostate cancer is also 
"circumstantial at best" (Brawer & Ellis, 1995: 1784) but the advocates of the 
PCPT still hold that in that instance the 'scientific evidence' does not warrant a 
clinical trial. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, treatments used in prevention must be well tolerated 
and largely free of side effects. Two of the researchers directly involved in the 
PCPT trial write: 
In a number of clinical trials for the treatment of BPH, finasteride has been 
demonstrated to be a very safe drug with minimal side effects. Given its 
excellent safety profile and the possibility that it may also prevent BPH, 
finasteride would be very suitable for long-term administration as a cancer 
chemopreventive agent (Brawley et al., 1994: 596-7). 
At 5 mg per day taken orally finasteride causes a 75 per cent decrease in serum 
DHT levels, an 80 per cent decrease in intra prostatic DHT, and a 10 per cent 
increase in serum testosterone. While high levels of testosterone can interact with 
androgen receptors in a manner similar to D HT (Placido et al., 1990: 1165-1171), 
Brawley and Thompson discount this elevation of testosterone as insignificant in 
causing prostate cancer growth (Brawley et al., 1994: 596). Given its ability to 
reduce serum DHT and its reported minimal side effects, in the eyes of the trialists 
finasteride fulfils the safety requirements for a preventative drug. Merck and Co., 
Inc. (Whitehouse Station, N.J.) will provide the drug and matching placebo free of 
charge for the duration of the trial (Reynolds, 1993: 1634). 
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Treatment and monitoring 
In addition to testing whether finasteride can prevent prostate cancer, subsidiary 
objectives of the trial are to investigate the side effects associated with the drug, 
the frequency with which they occur, and to gauge whether its long term use by 
healthy men will be acceptable. Further, the effects of finasteride on the two major 
tests used to diagnose prostate cancer are unknown, so the trial will also evaluate 
the drug's impact on both the sensitivity and specificity of DRE and PSA 
screening (Feigl et al., 1995: 150-51). 
A feature which stands out in medical discussions of the PCPT is the emphasis 
placed on the impact of the drug on sexual functioning. In the BPH study 
mentioned previously, proportionally more men taking finasteride than placebo 
experienced decreased libido, ejaculatory disorders, and impotence (Gormley et 
al., 1992: 1189-90). When discussing the design of the PCPT, Feigl et al., single 
out sexual function as the side effect requiring particular attention. It is reasonable 
to assume, they argue, that a negative impact on sexual function resulting from 
finasteride will be less tolerable in healthy men and perhaps younger men, than in 
men suffering the symptoms of BPH (Feigl et al., 1995: 158). That is, men may 
tolerate side effects if they have a medical condition but it is another matter for 
healthy men. This, in tum, may affect the compliance of participants. 
Side effects will be specifically evaluated in the first 1800 men randomised into 
each arm of the trial, with both clinical and self-reported assessment being taken 
twice a year throughout the trial (Feigl et al., 1995: 158). Despite ongoing 
controversy over the accuracy of prostate needle-biopsy (Australian Health 
Technology Advisory Committee, 1996), at the end of seven years all trial 
participants will have a biopsy to establish whether they have prostate cancer, and 
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if so, what stage their cancers have reached. The cost of the analysis of blood 
samples for annual PSA tests and the analysis of the biopsy at the end of the trial 
will be covered by the NCI trial funding and a cholesterol screening test will also 
be provided, however participants are expected to cover the costs of annual DRE 
and PSA screening which are considered to be a normal part of health care 
(National Cancer Institute, 1999). In the 'Questions and Answers about the PCPT' 
sheet prepared for general readership and prospective participants, the trialists 
write that: 
The only charges to the participants will be for routine health care that all 
men in this age group should have. Physician, medical examination, and 
general clinical costs, including DREs and drawing blood for PSA testing, 
will be charged to the participant in the same way as if he were not part of 
the trial. However, the costs for these tests may be covered by a participant's 
health insurance. If cancer or other prostate problems are discovered during 
the regular exams, the participant will be referred to his personal physician 
for appropriate care. Costs for diagnosis and treatment of prostate problems, 
prostate cancer, or other medical conditions during the seven years of the 
study are also the responsibility of the participant (National Cancer Institute, 
1999). 
This quote indicates a number of assumptions that underpin the design of the trial. 
Initially, DREs and PSA sampling are requirements of the trial. Regardless of 
whether these measures are usually routine, they are factored in as mandatory 
monitoring points and men participating in the trial must bear their expense. 
Although in a biomedically ideal world all men over the age of 55 would routinely 
undergo annual examination, this is not the case in practice. In their report on 
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prostate cancer screening, the Australian Health Technology Advisory Committee 
did not establish a base line of the percentage or number of men being screened, 
suggesting that, in this country at least, these figures are not known or that 
screening is not currently standard practice (Australian Health Technology 
Advisory Committee, 1996). To include these procedures under the auspices of 
'routine health care' obscures the controversies surrounding their use (see, for 
example, Small, 1993). As mentioned earlier these controversies include not only 
concern over the accuracy of screening techniques but also questions about the 
value of early detection of cancers given the limits of current treatments. 
By utilising DRE, PSA screening and needle biopsy, the organisers of the PCPT 
are attempting to stabilise a specific instance of know ledge production through the 
application of standardised, broadly accepted measuring tools. The use of 
standardised tools aims at making the actions of scientists comparable "over time 
and space" (Timmermans & Berg, 1997: 273). The trialists are, then, attempting to 
link the 220 different trial sites by providing clinicians with highly mobile 
resources that, as Latour says, "make action at a distance possible" (Latour, 1987: 
287). But in doing so the trialists are simultaneously working towards stabilising 
these uncertain technologies as unproblematic and transferable units of meaning, 
and, in order to achieve this, they are 'tinkering' with them to make them fit the 
local context (Casper & Clarke, 1998; Knorr-Cetina, 1981). 
Consider the following problems surrounding the routine use of PSA screening in 
the prevention trial. The effects of finasteride will be measured using PSA to 
detect serum dihydrotestosterone levels. Although it is not universally accepted, 
the PSA blood test is becoming increasingly widespread as a screening tool. A 
PSA level above 4 ng/ml is typically used as an indication that further exploration, 
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such as a biopsy, is warranted. In the dose used in the PCPT, finasteride is reported 
to reduce sen1m PSA levels by approximately 50 per cent over the period of one 
year (Guess et al., 1993). As many as one third of men over the age of 50 are 
thought to have some histologic evidence of prostate cancer (Australian Health 
Technology Advisory Committee, 1996) so the use of PSA screening within the 
trial would need to be sensitive to a reduction in serum PSA resulting from 
finasteride, while not assuming this indicated an absence of any prostate 
abnormality. Failure to acknowledge the effect of the drug on PSA levels could 
result in a disproportionately small number of the men taking finasteride reaching 
the PSA level at which further exploration is recommended. If this occurred the 
cancer detection rate in the finasteride arm of the trial would be artificially low 
(regardless of whether finasteride actually prevents cancer) simply because men 
taking the drug would not be referred on for biopsies, and it is through biopsy that 
the presence of tumours is confirmed. If cancers were overlooked in men taking 
finasteride, the preventative effectiveness of the drug would be overestimated 
(Feigl et al., 1995: 152). By adjusting the use of PSA screening to account for 
these contingencies the standardised diagnostic technology is being made to fit the 
local context of knowledge production. 
Similar ambiguities exist about the use of DRE among men taking finasteride. 
When given for six months finasteride is reported to reduce the size of the prostate 
by approximately 20 per cent. This reduction in prostate size has the potential to 
confuse clinicians administering DREs, as the size of a man's prostate is an 
indicator of its health. If the prostate shrinks at an even rate, resulting in a gland 
that is smooth to the touch, cancers may not be detected. If, however, the prostate 
contracts unevenly clinicians may detect lumps and bumps which they consider 
need follow-up. The result may be an increase in the number of tumours detected 
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with needle biopsy which would affect the outcome of the trial (Coltman et al., 
1999: 545). Again, 'fine-tuning' the relationship between prostates, clinicians and 
needle biopsies, will be needed in order to sustain the DRE as a viable screening 
procedure. 
The finasteride trialists have attempted to account for the ambiguities surrounding 
DREs and PSA testing by incorporating a numerical estimate of their effects (see 
for example Allerton et al., 1998; Coltman et al., 1999: 545). It should be noted, 
however, that these are estimates only, and in using these screening tools to 
monitor the impact of finasteride the trial sets up a relation between three 
technologies, all of whose effectiveness is currently uncertain. In so doing the trial 
helps institute the use of DRE and PSA as standard diagnostic tests for prostate 
cancer. In much the same way that the BCPTs relied on unstable technologies, 
such as the Gail risk model, the design of the PCPT is facilitating a 'locking in 
place' of these technologies so that each will benefit by its association with and 
reliance on the other and will appear 'more certain'. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has used the importance of gender for a notion of men's health to 
launch a discussion of the biomedical representation of prostate cancer. I argued 
that, once again, sex hormones are an important tool for the medical researchers 
trying to imagine a relationship between the body's interior environment and the 
occurrence of disease. But hormones are also a device which bridges this interior 
environment and the social and psychic constitution of masculinity. Because of 
this, technical discussions about specific risk profiles, the effectiveness of specific 
screening technologies, or the actions of drugs (which in the instances cited make 
reference to hormonal markers) are also discussions about the biomedical 
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construction and deployment of masculinity. As with the hormonally constituted 
subjectivity mobilised within the breast cancer prevention trials, this is a gendered 
identity which is specifically constrained by the mandate of science. The 
differences between the femininities and masculinities produced within the breast 
and prostate cancer literatures is the subject of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Some reflections on gender difference in the medical construction of prostate 
cancer and breast cancer 
The previous chapter has shown that there are many similarities between debates 
about the significance of gender for women's and men's health, the deployment of 
gender in the construction of male and female sex hormones, the role of sex 
ho1mones in the ongoing iteration of gender, and current representations of breast 
and prostate cancer. But significant differences also mark these debates. The 
grouping together of oppositional terms has a long history within Western 
intellectual traditions, and exposing the way these incorporate hierarchical 
representations of difference has been a major analytic strategy for feminists. 
While it may appear that these couplings are merely used to identify categories and 
the boundaries which separate them, in fact they mask a deeply ingrained 
privileging of one term over another (Shildrick, 1997: 105) and a polarisation 
which effectively excludes middle terms (Haraway, 1989: 12). Locating sex 
hormones within such a scheme provides a way of interrogating the specific 
construction of gender difference in the breast and prostate cancer trials. 
The binary pair which form the foundation of Cartesian metaphysics , the mind I 
body split, provides the basis for dichotomies such as 'rationalism' and 
'empiricism', 'subject' and 'object', and 'reason' and 'passion'. In these splits the 
primary term is always constructed as the referent to which the later, or 'marked' 
term, rather than simply being a conceptual partner, is somehow subordinate or 
inferior (Shildrick, 1997: 105). In such pairings terms are constructed as polar 
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opposites with no commonalities which could link them together or form a middle 
ground. 
While a large number of terms can be coupled in ways that reflect this hierarchical 
organisation of difference, many of these will actually function as subsets of 
broader terms. In this way the privileging which occurs within some binary pairs 
is extended to other related terms. An obvious example of this is the binary pair 
'male' and 'female', where 'female' is always the marked term and discursively 
constructed as inferior to the primary term 'male' (Shildrick, 1997: 106). 'Sex' and 
'gender' and 'science' and 'nature' are other examples. Exploring the relationship 
between such hierarchically organised dichotomous couplings, and seeking to 
identify how and when positive or negative values became attached to the terms, 
has been a way for feminist scholars to unravel seemingly natural beliefs and 
demonstrate that they are in fact the product of specific historical moments and 
social constellations. According to Shildrick, it is the positioning of categories and 
concepts that have become attached to male identity against those attributed to 
female identity that need to be deconstructed (Shildrick, 1997: 107). How and why 
have qualities such as 'active', 'strong', 'objective' and 'independent' become 
marked as 'male' while their counterparts, 'passive', 'weak', 'subjective' and 
'dependent', signify 'female'? In undertaking this task it is not simply a matter of 
gender stereotyping but of providing a detailed evaluation of how the female set 
has systematically been devalued, regardless of the characteristics it displays. This 
devaluing needs to be articulated for each specific example, but put in context so 
that individual qualities (such as female as 'nurturing') are located within a 
discourse of the systemic devaluing of female attributes. When the whole 
discourse is taken into account it becomes more likely that the 'male' term and its 
associated concepts, will be privileged (Shildrick, 1997: 107). The tension inherent 
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in the ordering of 'man' and 'woman', and 'sex' and 'gender' into an antagonistic 
hierarchy strongly indicates that feminist theory needs to analyse the construction 
of the natural sciences, and in particular the life sciences. According to Haraway, 
the discourses of biology and the natural sciences are pivotal technologies for 
mapping the borders between the material and social worlds (Haraway, 1989: 
290). 
For my purposes, the entities called 'sex hormones' are constitutive of the political 
and discursive tensions operating in these dichotomies. The coupling of 
'androgens' and 'oestrogens' is a subset of the dualism male/ female. It is the male 
hormone which is the dominant term, acting to constitute the female hormone as 
the displaced 'other'. Chapter 3 provided a number of examples of the attribution 
of positive and assertive characteristics to 'male' hormones and negative and 
passive characteristics to 'female' hormones, and tied these to historically and 
culturally constituted beliefs. The literature on the PCPT and the BCPTs provides 
another example of the way these beliefs are written into scientific accounts of the 
body. 
Cancer is a disease which provokes profound cultural dread. Sontag had described 
how this dread is expressed through metaphors of chaos, corruption and insidious 
violence as the body betrays itself (Sontag, 1991). Because of the emphasis on the 
role of sex hormones in the cause, prevention and treatment of prostate cancer and 
breast cancer, both diseases can be read as metaphorical accounts of sexuality gone 
mad. These things called hormones, constituted as crucial elements of the essence 
of sex, become twisted, perverted, and turn back on the body in a malignant 
rampage. The portrayal of breast cancer incidence and risk can be interpreted 
through liberal feminist arguments that representations of female sexual pleasure 
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provide a map for interpreting gender politics. These accounts have, however, been 
criticised for falsely universalising female sexual pleasure and failing to consider 
cultural variance, in particular racialised symbolism around black women's 
sexuality which depicts them as more primitive and sexually intense than white 
women (Haraway, 1989: 355). Scientific representations of the relation between 
sex hormones and breast cancer contain a moral narrative about female sexuality: 
the sexually healthy white woman will be prudish and channel her desires through 
married heterosexual coupling aimed at reproduction while those whose desires 
extend beyond this are constituted as possessing an increasingly risky and 
dangerous sexuality. As discussed in Chapter 4, the representation of hormonal 
risk in the breast cancer literature mirrors a specific type of female sexuality; the 
woman at least hormonal risk is one who does not reach puberty too early, has 
several children while she is young and breastfeeds them, does not have any 
induced abortions and does not have a 'late' menopause. These specifications 
constitute and constrain 'healthy' female sexuality. 
Racial factors also feature in the constitution of breast cancer risk categories. For a 
number of reasons which are not definitively understood, white women have a 
higher incidence than Japanese or African-American women. Because of 
biomedicine's racial gaze, Japanese or African-American women may possess the 
same hormonal markers as white women but not be constituted as 'at risk'. The 
white bourgeois west has historically inscribed the 'other' (whether they be 
racially or economically 'other') as naturally possessing an exotic, primitive, and 
insatiable sexuality (see, for example, Gilman, 1985; Stoler, 1997; Watney, 1990). 
For this reason, hormonal markers that indicate a dangerous excessive sexuality for 
white women, merely indicate the 'natural' (therefore unproblematic) 
uncontrollable animalistic sexuality of the dark woman. 
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But racial sexuality is also gendered, and while African-American women are not 
constituted as problematic within hormonal discourses of cancer risk the same is 
not true for African-American men. In the medical portrayal of prostate cancer 
white men are at less risk than Afro-American (see for example Coltman et al., 
1999; Giovannucci, 1995). Interpreting this attribution of risk as a parable about 
sex and morality, the racialised constitution of the sexual proclivity of Afro-
American men as threatening, aggressive, dangerous and cunning is reinforced 
(Haraway, 1989: 355; Watney, 1990). The link between prostate cancer and 
testosterone, and testosterone and aggression further inscribes black men as more 
influenced by the natural rather than the social order. 
Testosterone is the primary hormonal signifier of the category 'male'. Bearing in 
mind the contingent nature of medical know ledge, it is a 'fact' that testosterone is 
doubly responsible for stimulating abnormal cell growth in the prostate both 
through binding with androgen receptor sites, and through providing the source 
material from which prostatic DHT is made. In the medical literature, however, 
testosterone is now distanced from prostate cancer and the majority of attention is 
focused on DHT. For example: 
The androgen dependence of early prostatic cancer is unequivocally 
established by its regression following castration... As such, castration is 
known to reduce circulating levels of testosterone by some 90%; it was 
assumed that testosterone was the key androgen in prostate and tumour 
growth. In the last decade it has become clear, however, that in so far as the 
prostate in concerned, 5a-dihydrotestosterone (DHT) and not testosterone is 
the main trophic hormone responsible for growth .... Thus, if testosterone 
represents the major endocrine support of the [cancer], then castration or its 
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equivalent must, perforce, represent the treatment of choice. If, however, 
tumour growth depends upon DHT, then logically treatment must be directed 
towards elimination of DHT alone, leaving testosterone levels unchanged, ... 
(Fetrow et al., 1984: 352). 
The justification for the increased focus on DHT is the belief that it is 
pharmacologically more potent than testosterone, but in shifting attention away 
from testosterone researchers have enacted a symbolic severing of the causal 
connection between male sexuality and the disease. If testosterone were seen as the 
main entity responsible for causing prostate cancer, then in a sense the 'essence of 
man' is implicated as somehow polluted and morbid. By shifting attention to DHT, 
testosterone remains untainted as a signifier of 'normal masculinity'. Further, the 
cumulative biological effects of a lifetime of sex (bearing in mind that sexual 
arousal and orgasm result in a short-term increase of testosterone) and the 
maintenance of sexuality as a man ages, are not constituted as pathological. This is 
in sharp contrast to the construction of the category 'female' and the way that 
oestrogen, including 'life-time exposure to oestrogen', is depicted as 
fundamentally unstable and problematic (see Chapter 3). 
This disparity in the constitution of male and female sexuality is further amplified 
in the way 'normal sexuality' is portrayed in the prostate cancer and breast cancer 
literatures. Prostate cancer is a specifically sexed disease (even more so than breast 
cancer - from which men can and do suffer). Removal of the testes (which is 
standard treatment for advanced prostate cancer) will of course leave men 
impotent. Drug therapy which stops the production of testosterone (another 
standard treatment) also reduces libido and the ability to achieve an erection. And 
removal of the prostate or part of it (standard treatment for early or localised 
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prostate cancer) leads to impotence rates of between 30 and 80 per cent depending 
on how they are measured (Adami et al., 1994: 958). In addition, the hormonal 
effects of these treatments or treatment with synthetic hormones, can bring about 
an increase in oestrogen circulating in the blood and result in feminising changes 
in the pitch of a man's voice and enlarged breasts (Wasan & Waxman, 1992: 477). 
Questions about the effects of different treatments on men's sexuality are, 
therefore, undoubtedly of crucial importance. But in these accounts what is 
understood to be a 'healthy sexuality' assumes a certain physical type and a 
specific sex act. As discussed in Chapter 3, this physical type (the standard male 
norm) assumes a man has intact genitals and assumes the physical act of interest is 
penetrative intercourse ending in ejaculation, preferably of viable sperm. For 
example: 
And: 
If, as is highly probable, human prostatic cancer likewise depends upon DHT 
for endocrine support, then the way is open to new palliative therapy that 
avoids the trauma of castration. Such an approach is particularly attractive as 
lowered 5a-reductase levels do not affect fertility, or lead to the undesirable 
physiological/psychological side-effects that are characteristic of castration 
(Petrow et al. , 1984: 352-3). 
Pure antiandrogens such as the non-steroidal agent flutamide were developed 
as testosterone receptor antagonists but also suppress cortisol production and 
oestradiol conversion. The major advantage of these compounds is that 
potency is preserved (Wasan & Waxman, 1992: 477). 
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There are many parallels between the effects of treatments for breast cancer and 
prostate cancer. Despite this, representations of female sexuality within cancer 
medicine constitutes women's sexuality as dependent on servicing male pleasure, 
while men are constructed as rightful agents of their own sexuality. As the relevant 
literatures are so extensive it is difficult to demonstrate this persuasively without 
either digressing into a major systematic literature review or presenting highly 
selective (and possibly unrepresentative) examples. As a gross indicator I carried 
out a content analysis of Medline articles for breast cancer and prostate cancer, for 
the period 1990 (the time at which articles referencing the tamoxifen prevention 
trial began to appear) to April 2000. Such an analysis runs the risk of generating 
trite and overly simplistic outcomes and is beneficial to this thesis only because it 
adds texture to my reading of the gendered subjectivities produced within medical 
literature. I must also acknowledge that the key words used to compile this search 
are themselves gendered and work toward producing different outcomes for men 
and women. Rather than seeing this gendering as an obstruction, it is a point of 
interest: how can one inquire into the medical construction of sexuality without 
appealing to language which has a gendered history? The following table shows 
the key words used and the frequency with which they appeared in the literature: 
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Comparative representation of sexuality in the breast cancer and prostate 
cancer literature, 1990 to 2000: 
Total 
medline 
hits 
Breast Cancer Prostate Cancer 
44890 
search term no. of 
hits 
sexuality 49 
libido 17 
sexual 2 
12leasure 
orgasm 4 
infertility 74 
sexual 12 
function 
partner I 84 
husband 
9303 
%of no. of hits 
total BC 
hits 
.11 19 
.03 1 
>.01 1 
>.01 4 
.17 19 
(impotence 146) 
.02 81 
.19 partner / wife 9 
% of 
total PC 
hits 
.21 
.49 
.01 
.04 
.21 
.87 
.09 
ratio 
BC:PC 
1: 1.9 
1:2.7 
1:2.4 
1:4.8 
1: 1.2 
1:32.4 
1:0.5 
As can be seen from the table above, the key words of interest appear in only a 
very small proportion (usually comprising less than half a percent) of the total 
research on breast and prostate cancer. I have expressed them both as a percentage 
of the total number of Medline hits for the terms 'breast cancer' and 'prostate 
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cancer', and as a ratio of the frequency with which the terms occur. The key words 
used can be grouped into three loose themes which refer to different aspects of 
sexuality. These are personal sexuality and sexual pleasure (including the search 
terms 'sexuality', 'libido', 'sexual pleasure' and 'orgasm'), sexual performance 
and reproductive capacity (including the terms 'infertility', 'sexual function' and 
'impotence'), and relation to an intimate partner (including the terms 'partner', 
'wife' and 'husband'). Notions of sexual appetite and gratification (both attributes 
in which an active male sexuality are asserted) occur more often in the prostate 
cancer literature than in the breast cancer literature, ranging from 1.9 times more 
frequently for 'sexuality' to 4.8 times more frequently for 'orgasm'. In the second 
group, performance and reproductive capacity are constructed as more of an 
imperative for men than women, with the term 'sexual function' appearing 32.4 
times more frequently in the prostate cancer literature. 'Infertility' also has a 
disproportionate representation ( appearing 1.2 times in the prostate cancer 
literature for every mention in the breast cancer literature), although the inclusion 
of prostate cancer hits under 'impotence' (a specifically sexed term which 
combines notions of performance as well as reproductive failure, for which there is 
no female equivalent) once more exaggerates this difference. It is only when 
attention is turned to key words which are suggestive of a relationship with others 
that women once more come to the fore. The search 'partner I husband' retrieved 
twice as many hits in the breast cancer literature as the search 'partner I wife' 
retrieved in the prostate cancer literature, confirming that the sexual welfare of the 
sick woman's sexual partner is more salient in the literature than that of the man's 
sexual partner. 
The above findngs tell us nothing particularly novel about breast cancer or prostate 
cancer, but they are representative of the assumptions made within, and reinforced 
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by, biomedical discourse about sexuality. Consider the issue of infertility. As 
discussed earlier, damage to fertility during cancer treatment is seen as a major 
problem for men, and while it is also a problem for women it is a different sort of 
problem. Breast cancer treatment options include mastectomy, removal of the 
ovaries and even removal of the uterus. Removal of the ovaries and uterus are, of 
course, female castration. They may be less outwardly visible than the removal of 
the testes, and less definitively tied to participation in sexual intercourse (as a 
woman can be penetrated regardless of whether she has ovaries, uterus or breasts), 
but their loss is castration nonetheless. Further, cessation of menstruation and 
induced menopause are common effects of radiation treatment and chemotherapy. 
While they are deemed an undesirable side effect of treatment, there is an 
assumption that women will not be fertile after a certain point in their lives, and 
indeed 'late pregnancy' is considered risky or even monstrous, so induced loss of 
fertility is seen as less of a problem and may even be marginally beneficial. While 
lost fertility following prostate cancer is constructed as a problem because it 
impedes men's ability to assert their sexuality through the heterosexual sex act and 
reproduction, the female body constructed in the breast cancer literature possesses 
a malignant, uncontrollable sexuality. Induced infertility among women with 
breast cancer will at least limit the ability of that sexuality to actively replicate its 
deviance. 
The assertion that prostate cancer treatments are problematic because of their 
effect on sexual function again assumes a sexual function for men that is quite 
distinct from the sexual function of women. The active autonomy of male sexual 
pleasure is at the centre of prostate cancer literature through the premise that 
sexual function is dependent on men's ability to achieve an erection and ejaculate, 
and the effects of various treatments are gauged against this standard. While 
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mastectomy is the partial or full loss and stigmatisation of one of the primary 
socially coded sites of female sexual pleasure, the effects of mastectomy on female 
sexuality are frequently canvassed in the form of discussions about 'sexual 
rehabilitation' aimed at the resumption of heterosexual relations (Broom, in press). 
With this commentary I do not mean to undermine the maintenance of full sexual 
pleasure and function as a goal in development of prostate cancer treatments. 
Rather I simply point out that within cancer medicine, sexuality is defined and 
prioritised differently for women and men. 
Medical researchers writing about prostate cancer attribute an agency to male 
sexuality and this agency is exerted most clearly in the performance of 
heterosexual intercourse. Within the discourses of medicine, testosterone and other 
androgens are constituted as being essential for male sexual performance and male 
performance is constituted as being cn1cial for 'normal' male sexual identity. This 
emphasis on the bodily enactment of sex complements writers such as Butler and 
Grosz, for whom the body is a transitional entity, in need of constant psychic and 
physical reinforcement (Butler, 1990; Butler, 1993; Grosz, 1994). In this iteration 
embodied identity is constituted by the corporeal exterior and the psychic interior, 
but is not reducible to a finite relation between them, nor is it ever complete. In 
particular the normalisation of gender is sustained through constant renewal and 
repetition in the form of actions and gestures which mark the body. The need for 
the continual reiteration of gender through bodily performance reveals the 
instability of gender (McNay, 1999). Within this constant remaking of embodied 
identity the psychological and physical effects of prostate cancer treatments both 
transgress normalised masculinity, and create a space for a novel masculinity to 
exist. At the start of the previous chapter I discussed the disavowal of vulnerability 
in dominant forms of contemporary masculinity; the symbolic in1portance of 
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believing that 'real men' don't get sick, and when they do, they don't complain 
(see chapter 6 of this thesis and Kimmel, 1995). The lived experience of prostate 
cancer, with its attendent leaky, medically subjugated body, requires a response as 
a man enacts the bodily preformance of his gender. The collective enactments men 
with prostate cancer can shift the boundaries of gender by the repeated assertion of 
masculinity within this exclusively male disease. In the preformance of their 
sickness, (leaks, possible inability to engage in heterosexual penetrative sex, and 
other transgressions of gender norms) men with prostate cancer can alter 
communal expectations and validate an unconventional preformance of gender by 
others. 
In summary, the medical literature constructs testosterone as an essential element 
of male sexuality. Although testosterone is implicated in causing prostate cancer, 
men with prostate cancer and men at risk of prostate cancer are assumed to be 
rightful agents of their own sexuality. This sexuality is one in which the inability 
to get an erection or ejaculate is seen as a substantial problem to the individual, 
rather than being seen as an indication of the cultural importance placed on phallic 
performance in the heterosexual sex act. Cancer medicine openly advocates the 
priority that treatment should not impinge on this sexuality whereas women are 
assumed to do anything to control breast cancer. In contrast, the sexuality of 
women patients with breast cancer or at risk of breast cancer, is constructed as 
explicitly pathological and in need of containment. While normal male sexuality is 
constructed as 'healthy', normal female sexuality is constructed as inherently 
dangerous and prone to malignancy. The best way to control this corrupt sexuality 
is to remove its source which is oestrogen, breasts, and ovaries, or rehabilitate it to 
the norms of a passive heterosexuality. 
215 
These differences between male and female sexuality in the cancer literature are 
indicative of and help constitute the subjectivity of men and women in medicine 
generally and in experimental medicine in particular. A final example from the 
breast and prostate cancer prevention trials further illustrates this. 
Masculinity, the military and the medical subject 
The finasteride prevention trial had no difficulties in exceeding its recruitment 
target within the allotted two years. This is in sharp contrast with the BCPTs where 
problems attracting participants resulted in a reduction of the trial size and an 
extension of the enrolment period in both the North American and UK based trials. 
The reasons why this occurred highlight differences in the historical constitution of 
experimental medicine, gender and cancer. And these differences constrain the 
subject identities available to and taken up by those involved in the BCPTs and 
PCPT. Specifically, the historical allegiance between a (largely male) state 
sponsored military and experimental medicine, and the (possibly) more 
comfortable fit of men with the identity available to experimental subjects, 
contributed towards the successful enrolment of the PCPT. 
In Chapter 2 I discussed the importance of the involvement of the military in the 
emergence of the RCT as an experimental form. In the finasteride prevention trial 
the historical legacy of the relationship between the military and scientific 
medicine can, again, be identified. The US Department of Defence is an active 
participant in the PCPT, with researchers at four Department medical centres 
contributing, and defence ( and former defence) personnel compns1ng 
approximately 10 per cent of the total number of participants (Allerton et al., 1998: 
65). As the main aim of military medicine is the preservation of a healthy fighting 
force and prostate cancer is largely a disease of older men, the participation of the 
216 
defence institutions may seem unusual; however the impact of the disease on 
recipients of US defence benefits is substantial and set to increase as existing and 
former servicemen age, making prostate cancer a major budgetary issue (Allerton 
et al., 1998: 66). Because of the financial advantages should the trial be successful, 
it is not only in the interest of the Department of Defence to ensure the trial 
reached its recruitment target, but also, that the right kind of participants were 
recruited. Allerton et al. comment that; 
[A major] reason for DOD [Department of Defence] participation in this 
prevention trial lies in the nature of the participants themselves. Active duty 
and retired military personnel and their beneficiaries are generally well-
educated, highly motivated, committed individuals who are used to making 
intelligent, informed choices. This motivation and commitment helps assure 
compliance with study design (Allerton et al., 1998: 66). 
As well as being 'well-educated' and 'highly motivated' this group possess two 
further characteristics which have a potential to contribute to the success of the 
trial. It is a requirement of service within the military that individuals take on the 
rhetoric of altruism and deference of personal gratification for the 'the greater 
good', whether this be the good of one's colleagues in the heat of battle or service 
of the national interest. The rhetoric of altruism is also fundamental to the way the 
medical profession talks about clinical trials, with subjects regularly being 
encouraged to view their participation as contributing toward the advancement of 
medical knowledge for the benefit of future generations. In addition, throughout 
their professional lives members of the military are conditioned to follow the 
instruction of those with authority. As it is defence personnel who are 
administering the PCPT to servicemen and ex-service men, in the setting of 
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military medical facilities, it is safe to assume that this professional conditioning 
will extend to participation in the trial. Both an appreciation for the rhetoric of 
altruism and a deference to authority are likely to enhance recn1itment and 
compliance with trial protocols. 
Further factors combine to provide men a more comfortable fit with the position of 
experimental subject. This thesis has discussed the traditional androcentrism of 
science and some of the ways it appears within scientific medicine. One example 
has been the marginalisation of women within clinical research; the historical 
exclusion of women from trial populations because of risks should they become 
pregnant, the belief that hormonal fluctuations may affect the workings of 
experimental drugs and make women less biologically stable, and the belief that 
women were less likely to comply fully with the requirements of a trial (see 
Chapter 2). At the same time the politicisation of the women's health movement 
has sensitised women, and made them educated health consumers who are no 
longer prepared to uncritically take on board the opinions of the medical 
profession. Although there are calls by won1en' s health advocates for the rigorous 
evaluation of the effects of many standard and experimental treatments on women 
it is reasonable to assume that women remain cautious about participating in 
clinical trials. My chapters on experimental methodology in medicine and the 
BCPTs discuss specific ways that RCTs continue to disenfranchise women. 
The men's health literature talks of the reluctance of many men to seek medical 
help when they are unwell. As a speculative enterprise I suggest that taking up a 
position in a medical experiment may be a way for men to engage with the medical 
profession in ways which reinforce, rather than challenge, their gendered 
subjectivity. Instead of transgressing masculine ideals by admitting physical and 
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psychological need when they seek medical treatment men can align themselves 
with the characteristics of a masculine science while they are participating in a 
trial. Rather than being personal vulnerabilities, their diseases, symptoms and side 
effects become necessary data for the progress of scientific medicine. The personal 
discomfort of disease is transformed into a gesture of altruistic suffering. Of course 
this suggestion makes unrealistic assumptions about men's abilities to detach 
themselves from their experience of disease. Nonetheless, it is a suggestion which 
fits with the Cartesian mind / body split wherein the mind (gendered masculine) is 
of prime significance while the body ( often gendered feminine) is devalued or 
denied, a hegemonic masculinity that disavows psychic or physical embodiment 
and the vulnerability that entails, and feminist concerns about the gendered nature 
of the ideological and material practices of science and scientific medicine. 
Finally, men as a group have been less subjugated within medicine than women 
apparently have. Calls for more attention to the health needs of men and boys 
differ politically from the claims made by the early women's health movement; 
men may have been badly served by a medical profession who ignored their 
specific health needs, but they were not explicitly oppressed by it. Because of this, 
initiatives in men's health, such as the PCPT, may be greeted more enthusiastically 
and less cautiously than similar initiatives in women's health - at one level the 
men's health simply needs to get runs on the board while feminist engagement 
with health suggests women are still concerned with changing the rules of the 
game. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis I have examined processes of legitimation in medicine, looking first at 
the story scientific medicine tells about itself, then moving on to examine how that 
story came about and how it maps onto the social world. I have done this by taking 
the characteristics generally awarded to scientific knowledge - characteristics such as 
'truth', 'adequacy' and 'objectivity' - and examined how, and by whom, they were 
constituted. In other words, I have treated them as categories of inquiry (Shapin & 
Schaffer, 1985: 13-14). 
Sociological critiques of clinical innovation move toward an understanding of how 
justification in medicine occurs by exploring the socially constituted nature of 
individual and professional identity and bringing a gendered critique of science to 
bear on the production of medical knowledge. (Oakley, 1989). Work within the 
sociology of scientific know ledge can extend this by demonstrating the flexibility of 
the boundary between natural and social objects and natural and social know ledge. 
Clinicians need to keep 'doing scientific medicine', and this need must be respected 
by not reducing clinical practice into exclusively social explanations of justification 
and scientific rigour. In order to reduce the risk of allowing social determinism to 
replace scientific determinism, and to avert the potential collapse of the natural into 
the social it is useful to conceive of entities traditionally described as 'natural objects' 
as knowable to us only because of the historical and social constellations through 
which they gain expression. These reifications of social and historical meaning can in 
no sense simply be 'explained away', rather; they exist and exert their presence upon 
other natural objects in tangible ways. 
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Similarly, RCTs are a technological system which is historically and socially 
constituted through the alignment of physical artefacts, human activity, and 
knowledge (Law & Bijker, 1992). Inconsistencies abound in the ways this system is 
represented by medical scientists, particularly in the way researchers routinely smooth 
over the practical difficulties of carrying out clinical research, make them appear 
unproblematic, or obscure them altogether. The result is that RCTs portray the 
clinician as a cognitively and socially disembodied knower and the experimental 
subject as the psychically and historically disembodied object of knowledge. A 
critique of the RCT which acknowledges these inconsistencies and embraces them as 
a focus of analysis develops quite a different picture of the technological system, the 
players involved with it and the knowledges, practices, and objects it helps produce. 
Instead of products of a detached science they become historically, socially and 
politically situated. Further, the type of research design chosen by medical scientists 
also affects the production of knowledges, practices and objects. More than any other 
form of medical experimentation, RCTs are portrayed as incorporating the rhetorical 
benefits associated with science and the scientific method. But this perception, far 
from being self-evidently true, has been carefully crafted through a disavowal of the 
historical and social contingencies that surrounded its emergence and rise to power 
and continue to surround its use. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century RCTs are instrumental in the production 
of the human body. Recognising that accounts of medical science are grounded in 
historical and social practice also requires that the bodies they construct be viewed as 
culturally embedded projects. As the emergence of discourses about sex hormones 
and the insistence on sexually different male and female bodies demonstrates, factors 
that are not strictly rational and scientific always contribute to the explanatory success 
of biological theories. Acknowledging the social embeddedness of medical research 
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allows for an analysis of the political and ideological interests, as well as the 
historical contingencies, which influence and become incorporated into medical 
knowledge, practices and objects. The institutionalisation of a relationship between 
laboratory research on sex hormones and the clinical use of and feedback into that 
research is one example of this. The mobilisation of hormonal discourses to facilitate 
the production of specific types of embodied sexual difference is another. 
In the tamoxifen breast cancer prevention trials and the finasteride prostate cancer 
trial, clinical researchers are attempting to gauge the interactions between 
technologies, beliefs and objects in what they consider to be the best possible way. 
They can only apply the methods of the RCT to hormonal drugs, human bodies and 
diseases which are coded male or female, because of the dense and rich histories 
which are reified into each of these entities and the relationships which connect them. 
For example, while the breast cancer prevention trials were justified on the grounds 
that tamoxifen was a promising treatment which required scientific evaluation, there 
was in fact a myriad of reasons for carrying out the trial. Acknowledging those 
reasons, such as the manoeuvring of different interest groups as they sought to 
maintain or extend the boundaries of their professional domain, provides a more 
accurate, though more complex, picture of medical innovation. 
The controversy which surrounds the BCPTs bears many of the hallmarks which 
usually accompany controversy in science. These included a clash of professional 
interests (with their requisite attempts to claim cognitive authority over the subjects 
and methods of the trials), and a claiming and counter claiming over methodological 
issues including statistical criteria used to identify reference points for the trials. In 
addition, advocates and opponents of the trials attempted to separate social and 
political issues from technical ones and attributed problems (such as ethical questions 
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surrounding the treatment of well women and the IBIS trialists ' criticisms of the early 
closure of the NASBP trial) as being politically motivated. In so doing they 
maintained an insistence that the 'science' involved with the trials was distanced from 
the social and political sphere. Although the finasteride prostate cancer prevention 
trial has not created a similar controversy, it nonetheless shows the importance of 
factors extraneous to science for the development of medical knowledge and practice. 
For example, the historical androcentrism of medical research and the involvement of 
the military in clinical trials aided recruitment for the PCPT, while women's 
disenfranchisement within the clinical research process hampered enrolment for the 
BCPT and continues to affect the perception that they are 'too hard' to study. 
Recognising and utilising the dynamics at work in a scientific controversy broadens 
the strategic possibilities available to those wishing to intervene in research and 
policy debates. In the controversy surrounding the BCPTs the deploying of different 
notions of 'risk' was a way of demarcating professional territory. In medical 
discourse 'risk' is used to denote, as specifically as possible, the likelihood that 
individuals or groups will experience a nominated health condition. Incorporating the 
notion developed by Beck - that 'risk' is a direct product of the decay of modernity 
(Beck, 1992) - the 'risky' medical subject can be understood as the psychic and 
corporeal manifestation of the historical and cultural legacies of modernity. 
Minimising risk, rather than being a purely technical enterprise (such as medical 
management through the use of screening technologies and the consumption of 
synthetic hormones), also becomes a question of reflexive engagement with 
modernity and its cultural and social products. 
Within the breast cancer and prostate cancer literature sex hormones are represented 
as posing a risk to the healthy individual in ways which reflect a specific type of 
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sexuality. There is, however, a disparity between the ways in which male and female 
sexuality are constructed. Specifically, oestrogen has been pathologised in relation to 
breast cancer, while there are moves to quarantine testosterone from being implicated 
as a cause of prostate cancer. One implication of this is the higher priority placed on 
maintaining 'normal sexuality' in the prostate cancer literature compared to the breast 
cancer literature, and the attribution of agency to male sexuality. Thus, scientific 
medicine actively participates in reinscribing male performance of heterosexual 
intercourse as an act of significant symbolic and physical importance. At the same 
time, however, the adoption of screening technologies such as PSA at once draws 
attention to the delicacy of the male body while also invoking normative standards of 
male embodiment which largely disavow the possibility of physiological or psychic 
frailty. The incontinent, impotent, medically subjugated man's relationship with his 
corporeal body disrupts expected notions of male embodiment, aligning him instead 
with an embodied subjectivity traditionally occupied by women. 
Implications for future research 
Because assumptions about gender, sexed bodies and the privilege of science are so 
deeply entrenched within western culture, multiple strategies are needed to engage 
with them. To begin with there is a continued need for theoretical critiques of all 
aspects of the production of medical know ledge from science and technology studies, 
sociology and gender studies, because an historical and sociological gaze sees things 
which may be invisible to a biomedical gaze. But to my mind, these critiques will be 
most useful if they are directed towards and engaged with the politics and 
organisational conditions governing clinical research and practice. There is an 
abundant literature about medicine within STS, women's studies, philosophy and 
cultural studies whose message is unattainable outside the academic disciplines and 
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whose relevance to the material practices of medicine is equally obscure. If social 
commentators wish to influence medicine in any way they must acknowledge the 
current dominance of quantitative methods and the practical benefits they offer 
clinicians, researchers and policy makers. Failure to do so will leave them speaking 
to themselves and not impacting on research or the field of practice. The history of 
medicine is replete with instances where people outside the profession led the way in 
transforming medicine. The stakes are too high for social theorists not to make their 
voice heard. 
The rise of evidence based medicine can be read as an attempt to improve the 
standards of clinical research, but it can also be interpreted as a way of policing the 
boundaries of medical knowledge and practice by professionals who wish to maintain 
and enhance the prestige and social authority medicine enjoyed throughout the 
twentieth century. Steven Epstein points out that the ascendancy of the RCT occurred 
at a time when the consumer health movement and women's health movement were 
posing a serious challenge to medical authority and gaining access to the arenas in 
which medical decisions and policy are made (Epstein, 1996: 189-90). Willis and 
White show editorial policies which privilege certain types of evidence effectively 
stop entire genres of research from being published in prestigious medical journals 
(White & Willis, 1999: unpublished). The requirements of evidence based medicine 
work precisely to exclude all non-quantitative forms of medical knowledge, 
shrouding both the content and (provided clinicians act appropriately) the practice of 
medicine in the mantle of science. In so doing evidence based medicine attempts to 
cordon medicine off from social and political analysis, as if that could insulate it from 
social and political influence. It is necessary, the ref ore, to insist that leading medical 
researchers and theorists respect both the intellectual practices and insights of the 
humanities and social sciences and not ( as too often happens) view them as an inferior 
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and irrelevant enterprise. The humanities and social sciences are robust intellectual 
traditions which contribute greatly to our cultural capital as a society and need in no 
way justify their existence through engagement with the medical profession. When 
immersed in the outcomes-driven world of public health it is important to remember 
this. 
One means of intervening in the privileging of certain types of quantitative evidence 
would be to institute a pedagogical change in the training of medical students and 
policy makers. Medical students need to have their respect for the authority of natural 
science tempered so that they can engage properly with the uncertainty that is an 
unavoidable part of medical practice and research. One point at which such a change 
could occur would be to re-write text book narratives of the development of scientific 
medicine and the history of the RCT. An account of the RCT which discusses the 
historical and political contingencies surrounding its invention and use would diffuse 
the illusion of neutrality which all too often is assumed to accompany trial outcomes. 
Such a move would have profound ramifications for the perceived basis of clinical 
authority, as it would require clinicians to accept a personal moral responsibility for 
the forms in which they re-enact and reconstitute medicine rather than allowing them 
to rely on an abstract notion of truth as governing their practice. By this I do not 
imply that medical practitioners are or should be the arbiters of a disembodied 
universal morality. Instead I urge that medicine should develop a situated morality 
which acknowledges the historical and political nature of concepts such as equity, 
health and well-being. This might not change anything in terms of either patients or 
practitioners lived experience of illness or a clinical encounter, but it certainly would 
change the way arguments about medical knowledge and clinical authority happen. 
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Another consequence of situating moral judgements and notions of objectivity in 
these ways would be a change in the meaning of evidence based medicine' and a 
revaluation of a range of medical experimental methods. As medical researchers shift 
their quest from being a search for truth and generalisability, into a recognition of 
diversity and a search for themes and meanings, so too will experimental methods 
need to evolve so as to cease doing symbolic violence to the diversity of research 
subjects' experiences as they are reduced to a common denominator. Medical 
researchers would be liberated to use a much richer 'tool kit' if the tyranny of the RCT 
were reigned in. 
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